Does increasing common ownership influence firms’ automation strategies? We develop and empirically test a theory indicating that institutional investors’ common ownership drives firms that employ workers in the same local labor markets to boost automation-related innovation. First, we present a model integrating task-based production and common ownership, demonstrating that greater ownership overlap drives firms to internalize the impact of their automation decisions on the wage bills of local labor market competitors, leading to more automation and reduced employment. Second, we empirically validate the model’s predictions. Based on patent texts, the geographic distribution of firms’ labor forces at the establishment level, and exogenous increases in common ownership due to institutional investor mergers, we analyze the effects of rising common ownership on automation innovation within and across labor markets. Our findings reveal that firms experiencing a positive shock to common ownership with labor market rivals exhibit increased automation and decreased employment growth. Conversely, similar ownership shocks do not affect automation innovation if firms do not share local labor markets.

I study how labor market power affects firm wage differences using German manufacturing sector firm-level data (1995-2016). In past decades, labor market power increasingly moderated rising between-firm wage differences. This is because high-paying firms possess high and increasing labor market power and pay wages below competitive levels, whereas low-wage firms pay competitive or even above competitive wages. Over time, large, high-wage, high-productivity firms generate increasingly large labor market rents while charging comparably low product markups. This provides novel insights on why such top firms are profitable and successful. Using micro-aggregated data covering most economic sectors, I validate key results for multiple European countries.