Does IFRS Information on Tax Loss Carryforwards and Negative Performance Improve Predictions of Earnings and Cash Flows?
Sandra Dreher, Sebastian Eichfelder, Felix Noth
Journal of Business Economics,
January
2024
Abstract
We analyze the usefulness of accounting information on tax loss carryforwards and negative performance to predict earnings and cash flows. We use hand-collected information on tax loss carryforwards and corresponding deferred taxes from the International Financial Reporting Standards tax footnotes for listed firms from Germany. Our out-of-sample tests show that considering accounting information on tax loss carryforwards does not enhance performance forecasts and typically even worsens predictions. The most likely explanation is model overfitting. Besides, common forecasting approaches that deal with negative performance are prone to prediction errors. We provide a simple empirical specification to account for that problem.
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On Modeling IPO Failure Risk
Gonul Colak, Mengchuan Fu, Iftekhar Hasan
Economic Modelling,
April
2022
Abstract
This paper offers a novel framework, combining firm operational risk, IPO pricing risk, and market risk, to model IPO failure risk. By analyzing nearly a thousand variables, we observe that prior IPO failure risk models have suffered from a major missing-variable problem. Evidence reveals several key new firm-level determinants, e.g., the volatility operating performance, the size of its accounts payable, pretax income to common equity, total short-term debt, and a few macroeconomic variables such as treasury bill rate, and book-to-market of the DJIA index. These findings have major economic implications. The total value loss from not predicting the imminent failure of an IPO is significantly lower with this proposed model compared to other established models. The IPO investors could have saved around $18billion over the period between 1994 and 2016 by using this model.
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Regulierungsdefizite und Reformalternativen der Gemeinsamen Europäischen Fischereipolitik
Steffen Hentrich
Beitrag in IWH-Sammelwerk,
aus: Deregulierung in Deutschland – theoretische und empirische Analysen – Tagungsband
2004
Abstract
Seit Jahrzehnten versucht die Europäische Union im Rahmen der Gemeinsamen Fischereipolitik (GFP) den ökologischen, wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Problemen der Überfischung und Überkapitalisierung der europäischen Fischerei Herr zu werden. Mit der Festlegung von Höchstfangmengen (TAC), technischen Vorschriften für die Fangtechnik, befristeten räumlichen Fangverboten, zeitlichen Restriktionen für die Fangaktivitäten sowie der Förderung des Kapazitätsabbaus und des Einsatzes bestandsschonender Fangtechnik hat diese Politik jedoch bislang nur an den Symptomen des Marktversagens einer kollektiven Nutzung der Common-Pool-Ressource Fisch angesetzt. Zudem hat die GFP mit der Subventionierung des Neubaus und der Modernisierung der Fangtechnik und umfangreichen Preisstützungsmaßnahmen zusätzliche Marktverzerrungen geschaffen und damit erheblich zur Verschärfung der ohnehin schon vorhandenen Marktfunktionsstörungen beigetragen. Dementsprechend ernüchternd ist die Erfolgsbilanz dieser Politik. Eine Reihe von Fischbeständen leidet unter permanenter Überfischung und befindet sich zum Teil bereits außerhalb „sicherer biologischer Grenzen“, die Rentabilität der Fischereiunternehmen wird durch immer geringer werdende Fangerträge und eine chronische Unterauslastung ihrer Fangkapazitäten beeinträchtigt. Das Resultat sind sinkende Einkommen der Beschäftigten der Fischerei, eine Verschlechterung der Arbeitsbedingungen auf See sowie eine Verknappung und Verteuerung des Fischangebots.
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Endogenous Institution Formation in Public Good Games: The Effect of Economic Education
Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher, Dmitri Bershadskyy, Philipp Schreck, Florian Timme
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 29,
2017
Abstract
In a public good experiment, the paper analyses to which extent individuals with economic education behave differently in a second-order dilemma. Second-order dilemmas may arise, when individuals endogenously build up costly institutions that help to overcome a public good problem (first-order dilemma). The specific institution used in the experiment is a communication platform allowing for group communication before the first-order public good game takes place. The experimental results confirm the finding of the literature that economists tend to free ride more intensively in public good games than non-economists. The difference is the strongest in the end-game phase, yielding in the conclusion that the magnitude of the end-game effect depends on the share of economists in the pool of participants. When it comes to the building-up of institutions, the individual efficiency gain of the institution and its inherent cost function constitute the driving forces for the contribution behaviour. Providing an investment friendly environment yields in economists contributing more to the institution than non-economists. Therefore, we make clear that first-order results of a simple public good game cannot be simply applied for second-order incentive problems.
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Hold-up and the Use of Performance-sensitive Debt
Tim R. Adam, Daniel Streitz
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
April
2016
Abstract
We examine whether performance-sensitive debt (PSD) is used to reduce hold-up problems in long-term lending relationships. We find that the use of PSD is more common in the presence of a long-term lending relationship and if the borrower has fewer financing alternatives available. In syndicated deals, however, the presence of a relationship lead arranger reduces the use of PSD because a lead arranger has little incentive to hold-up a client. Further supporting the hypothesis that hold-up concerns motivate the use of PSD, we find a substitution effect between the use of PSD and the tightness of financial covenants.
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Sovereign Default Risk and Decentralization: Evidence for Emerging Markets
Stefan Eichler, M. Hofmann
European Journal of Political Economy,
Nr. 32,
2013
Abstract
We study the impact of decentralization on sovereign default risk. Theory predicts that decentralization deteriorates fiscal discipline since subnational governments undertax/overspend, anticipating that, in the case of overindebtedness, the federal government will bail them out. We analyze whether investors account for this common pool problem by attaching higher sovereign yield spreads to more decentralized countries. Using panel data on up to 30 emerging markets in the period 1993–2008 we confirm this hypothesis. Higher levels of fiscal and political decentralization increase sovereign default risk. Moreover, higher levels of intergovernmental transfers and a larger number of veto players aggravate the common pool problem.
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Testing for Structural Breaks at Unknown Time: A Steeplechase
Makram El-Shagi, Sebastian Giesen
Computational Economics,
Nr. 1,
2013
Abstract
This paper analyzes the role of common data problems when identifying structural breaks in small samples. Most notably, we survey small sample properties of the most commonly applied endogenous break tests developed by Brown et al. (J R Stat Soc B 37:149–163, 1975) and Zeileis (Stat Pap 45(1):123–131, 2004), Nyblom (J Am Stat Assoc 84(405):223–230, 1989) and Hansen (J Policy Model 14(4):517–533, 1992), and Andrews et al. (J Econ 70(1):9–38, 1996). Power and size properties are derived using Monte Carlo simulations. We find that the Nyblom test is on par with the commonly used F type tests in a small sample in terms of power. While the Nyblom test’s power decreases if the structural break occurs close to the margin of the sample, it proves far more robust to nonnormal distributions of the error term that are found to matter strongly in small samples although being irrelevant asymptotically for all tests that are analyzed in this paper.
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Has the Euro Increased International Price Elasticities?
Oliver Holtemöller, Götz Zeddies
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 18,
2010
publiziert in: Empirica
Abstract
This paper analyzes the role of common data problems when identifying structural breaks in small samples. Most notably, we survey small sample properties of the most commonly applied endogenous break tests developed by Brown, Durbin, and Evans (1975) and Zeileis (2004), Nyblom (1989) and Hansen (1992), and Andrews, Lee, and Ploberger (1996). Power and size properties are derived using Monte Carlo simulations. Results emphasize that mostly the CUSUM type tests are affected by the presence of heteroscedasticity, whereas the individual parameter Nyblom test and AvgLM test are proved to be highly robust. However, each test is significantly affected by leptokurtosis. Contrarily to other tests, where skewness is far more problematic than kurtosis, it has no additional effect for any of the endogenous break tests we analyze. Concerning overall robustness the Nyblom test performs best, while being almost on par to more recently developed tests in terms of power.
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Testing for Structural Breaks at Unknown Time: A Steeplechase
Makram El-Shagi, Sebastian Giesen
Abstract
This paper analyzes the role of common data problems when identifying structural breaks in small samples. Most notably, we survey small sample properties of the most commonly applied endogenous break tests developed by Brown, Durbin, and Evans (1975) and Zeileis (2004), Nyblom (1989) and Hansen (1992), and Andrews, Lee, and Ploberger (1996). Power and size properties are derived using Monte Carlo simulations. Results emphasize that mostly the CUSUM type tests are affected by the presence of heteroscedasticity, whereas the individual parameter Nyblom test and AvgLM test are proved to be highly robust. However, each test is significantly affected by leptokurtosis. Contrarily to other tests, where skewness is far more problematic than kurtosis, it has no additional effect for any of the endogenous break tests we analyze. Concerning overall robustness the Nyblom test performs best, while being almost on par to more recently developed tests in terms of power.
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Banking Integration, Bank Stability, and Regulation: Introduction to a Special Issue of the International Journal of Central Banking
Reint E. Gropp, H. Shin
International Journal of Central Banking,
Nr. 1,
2009
Abstract
The link between banking integration and financial stability has taken center stage in the wake of the current financial crisis. To what extent is the banking system in Europe integrated? What role has the introduction of the common currency played in this context? Are integrated banking markets more vulnerable to contagion and financial instability? Does the fragmented regulatory framework in Europe pose special problems in resolving bank failures? What policy reforms may become necessary? These questions are of considerable policy interest as evidenced by the extensive discussions surrounding the design and implementation of a new regulatory regime and by the increasing attention coming from academia.
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