
14:15 - 15:45
Capital (Mis)allocation, Incentives and Productivity
This paper studies how managerial pay shapes the allocation of capital within firms.
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We leverage quasi-experimental variation in the composition of managerial pay between cash bonuses and equity compensation. We find that a relative increase in cash bonuses leads firms to reallocate capital toward less durable investment projects. To rationalize the empirical evidence, we develop a quantitative model with agency frictions. In the model, a relative increase in cash bonuses strengthens managerial short-termism, which shifts the investment composition toward less durable projects. The observed change in managerial pay exacerbates within-firm capital misallocation and leads to a sizeable contraction in output.
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Economist
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