1. Publications
  2. Applied Economics Letters, 9/2016
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Do Federal Reserve Bank Presidents’ Interest Rate Votes in the FOMC Follow an Electoral Cycle?

We find that Federal Reserve Bank presidents’ regional bias in their dissenting interest rate votes in the Federal Open Market Committee follows an electoral cycle. Presidents put more weight on their district’s economic environment during the year prior to their (re-)election relative to nonelection years.

01. January 2016

Authors Stefan Eichler Tom Lähner

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Keywords

banking industry Federal Reserve Bank presidents FOMC voting electoral cycle

JEL Classification

E52 E58 D72

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