Governance and Finance
In recent decades, corporate governance no longer focuses on maximizing shareholder value but on balancing all stakeholders' interests. Corporate governance is then viewed more broadly as the nexus of rules, practices, and processes that determine the objective of a firm. Absent good governance, shareholders might realise inferior returns, creditors might lose interest payments, business partners might suffer from contract breaches, and employees might lose their future career opportunities (e. g., managers that used to work for Enron). High-quality governance ensures that all stakeholders' capital is effectively managed. Firms benefit from good governance in various ways, such as a higher valuation, a lower cost of capital, better talent attraction, and higher customer loyalty, for example.
The research group “Governance and Finance” studies traditional and modern views of corporate governance in financial markets and contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it contributes to understanding the effectiveness of different governance mechanisms' roles in talent selection, incentive, and retention. Individuals carry out corporate objectives, and good governance must ensure that the most qualified talent is allocated to the optimal position, exerts optimal effort, and stays with the firm. For example, the most important duty of the board of directors is to select, incentive, and retain the most talented/suitable CEO.
Second, this group also investigates how various forces in credit market impact corporate governance. Various stakeholders seek to influence corporate strategy differently with recent advances in the financial market. For example, the rise of common ownership might reduce firms' incentives to compete, the increase of active ownership might suddenly switch firms' investment strategies (i. e., shareholder activism), and the participation of shareholders in the credit market provides opportunities to internalise the shareholder-creditor conflicts. This group's research seeks to advance the knowledge of different stakeholders' methods and their effectiveness in influencing governance objects.
Workpackage 1: Talent Selection, Incentive, and Retention
Workpackage 2: Stakeholders and Governance
Research Cluster
Financial Resilience and RegulationYour contact

- Department Financial Markets
Refereed Publications

Corporate Social Responsibility and Profit Shifting
in: European Accounting Review, forthcoming
Abstract
This paper examines the relation between corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance and tax–motivated income shifting. Using a profit–shifting measure estimated from multinational enterprises (MNEs) data, we find that parent firms with higher CSR scores shift significantly more profits to their low-tax foreign subsidiaries. Overall, our evidence suggests that MNEs engaging in CSR activities acquire legitimacy and moral capital that temper negative responses by stakeholders and thus have greater scope and chance to engage in unethical profit-shifting activities, consistent with the legitimacy theory.

The Corporate Investment Benefits of Mutual Fund Dual Holdings
in: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, forthcoming
Abstract
Mutual fund families increasingly hold bonds and stocks from the same firm. We present evidence that dual ownership allows firms to increase valuable investments and refinance by issuing bonds with lower yields and fewer restrictive covenants, especially when firms face financial distress. Dual holders also prevent overinvestment by firms with entrenched managers. Overall, our results suggest that mutual fund families internalize the agency conflicts of their portfolio companies, highlighting the positive governance externalities of intra-family cooperation.

Creditor-control Rights and the Nonsynchronicity of Global CDS Markets
in: Review of Corporate Finance Studies, No. 1, 2025
Abstract
<p>We analyze how creditor rights affect the nonsynchronicity of global corporate credit default swap spreads (CDS-NS). CDS-NS is negatively related to the country-level creditor-control rights, especially to the “restrictions on reorganization” component, where creditor-shareholder conflicts are high. The effect is concentrated in firms with high investment intensity, asset growth, information opacity, and risk. Pro-creditor bankruptcy reforms led to a decline in CDS-NS, indicating lower firm-specific idiosyncratic information being priced in credit markets. A strategic-disclosure incentive among debtors avoiding creditor intervention seems more dominant than the disciplining effect, suggesting how strengthening creditor rights affects power rebalancing between creditors and shareholders.</p>

The Effects of Antitrust Laws on Horizontal Mergers: International Evidence
in: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, No. 7, 2024
Abstract
This study examines how antitrust law adoptions affect horizontal merger and acquisition (M&A) outcomes. Using the staggered introduction of competition laws in 20 countries, we find antitrust regulation decreases acquirers’ five-day cumulative abnormal returns surrounding horizontal merger announcements. A decrease in deal value, target book assets, and industry peers' announcement returns are consistent with the market power hypothesis. Exploiting antitrust law adoptions addresses a downward bias to an estimated effect of antitrust enforcement (Baker (2003)). The potential bias from heterogeneous treatment effects does not nullify our results. Overall, antitrust policies seem to deter post-merger monopolistic gains, potentially improving customer welfare.

Non-Standard Errors
in: Journal of Finance, No. 3, 2024
Abstract
In statistics, samples are drawn from a population in a datagenerating process (DGP). Standard errors measure the uncertainty in sample estimates of population parameters. In science, evidence is generated to test hypotheses in an evidencegenerating process (EGP). We claim that EGP variation across researchers adds uncertainty: non-standard errors. To study them, we let 164 teams test six hypotheses on the same sample. We find that non-standard errors are sizeable, on par with standard errors. Their size (i) co-varies only weakly with team merits, reproducibility, or peer rating, (ii) declines significantly after peer-feedback, and (iii) is underestimated by participants.
Working Papers

Censored Fractional Response Model: Estimating Heterogeneous Relative Risk Aversion of European Households
in: IWH Discussion Papers, No. 11, 2015
Abstract
This paper estimates relative risk aversion using the observed shares of risky assets and characteristics of households from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey of the European Central Bank. Given that the risky share is a fractional response variable belonging to [0, 1], this paper proposes a censored fractional response estimation method using extremal quantiles to approximate the censoring thresholds. Considering that participation in risky asset markets is costly, I estimate both the heterogeneous relative risk aversion and participation cost using a working sample that includes both risky asset holders and non-risky asset holders by treating the zero risky share as the result of heterogeneous self-censoring. Estimation results show lower participation costs and higher relative risk aversion than what was previously estimated. The estimated median relative risk aversions of eight European countries range from 4.6 to 13.6. However, the results are sensitive to households’ perception of the risky asset market return and volatility.