Governance and Finance
This research group studies traditional and modern views of corporate governance in financial markets. It contributes to understanding the effectiveness of different governance mechanisms' roles in talent selection, incentive, and retention. The group also investigates how various stakeholders impact corporate governance.
Research Cluster
Financial Resilience and RegulationYour contact
![Professor Shuo Xia, PhD](/fileadmin/_processed_/c/7/csm_Shuo_Xia_05eaee98b1.jpg)
- Department Financial Markets
Refereed Publications
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Social Capital and Debt Contracting: Evidence from Bank Loans and Public Bonds
in: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, No. 3, 2017
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Corporate Social Responsibility and Profit Shifting
in: European Accounting Review, 2099
Abstract
This paper examines the relation between corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance and tax–motivated income shifting. Using a profit–shifting measure estimated from multinational enterprises (MNEs) data, we find that parent firms with higher CSR scores shift significantly more profits to their low-tax foreign subsidiaries. Overall, our evidence suggests that MNEs engaging in CSR activities acquire legitimacy and moral capital that temper negative responses by stakeholders and thus have greater scope and chance to engage in unethical profit-shifting activities, consistent with the legitimacy theory.
Working Papers
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Non-Standard Errors
in: IWH Discussion Papers, No. 11, 2021
Abstract
In statistics, samples are drawn from a population in a datagenerating process (DGP). Standard errors measure the uncertainty in sample estimates of population parameters. In science, evidence is generated to test hypotheses in an evidencegenerating process (EGP). We claim that EGP variation across researchers adds uncertainty: non-standard errors. To study them, we let 164 teams test six hypotheses on the same sample. We find that non-standard errors are sizeable, on par with standard errors. Their size (i) co-varies only weakly with team merits, reproducibility, or peer rating, (ii) declines significantly after peer-feedback, and (iii) is underestimated by participants.
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Why Do Workers at Larger Firms Outperform?
in: Working Paper, 2020
Abstract
Workers at larger firms outperform on average. For example, equity analysts working for more reputable brokerage firms produce more accurate earnings forecasts. Analysts employed by the highest ranked brokerages are about 6% more accurate than those employed by the lowest ranked brokerages, which is equivalent to an advantage of 17.5 years of more experience. This outperformance is driven by two significant effects: more reputable firms provide more resources that improve analysts' forecasting ability (influence), while more reputable firms also attract more talented candidates (sorting). We estimate a two-sided matching model to disentangle these two effects. We find that the direct influence effect accounts for 73% of the total impact while the sorting effect accounts for the remaining 27%.
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Lame-Duck CEOs
in: SSRN Working Papers, 2018
Abstract
We examine the relationship between protracted CEO successions and stock returns. In protracted successions, an incumbent CEO announces his or her resignation without a known successor, so the incumbent CEO becomes a “lame duck.” We find that 31% of CEO successions from 2005 to 2014 in the S&P 1500 are protracted, during which the incumbent CEO is a lame duck for an average period of about 6 months. During the reign of lame duck CEOs, firms generate an annual four-factor alpha of 11% and exhibit significant positive earnings surprises. Investors’ under-reaction to no news on new CEO information and underestimation of the positive effects of the tournament among the CEO candidates drive our results.
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Selection Versus Incentives in Incentive Pay: Evidence from a Matching Model
in: SSRN Working Papers, 2018
Abstract
Higher incentive pay is associated with better firm performance. I introduce a model of CEO-firm matching to disentangle the two confounding effects that drive this result. On one hand, higher incentive pay directly induces more effort; on the other hand, higher incentive pay indirectly attracts more talented CEOs. I find both effects are essential to explain the result, with the selection effect accounting for 12.7% of the total effect. The relative importance of the selection effect is the largest in industries with high talent mobility and in more recent years.
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The Liquidity Premium of Safe Assets: The Role of Government Debt Supply
in: IWH Discussion Papers, No. 11, 2017
Abstract
The persistent premium of government debt attributes to two main reasons: absolute nominal safety and liquidity. This paper employs two types of measures of government debt supply to disentangle the safety and liquidity part of the premium. The empirical evidence shows that, after controlling for the opportunity cost of money, the quantitative impact of total government debt-to-GDP ratio is still significant and negative, which is consistent with the theoretical predictions of the CAPM with utility surplus of holding convenience assets. The relative availability measure, the ratio of total government liability to all sector total liability, separates the liquidity premium from the safety premium and has a negative impact too. Both theoretical and empirical results suggest that the substitutability between government debt and private safe assets dictates the quantitative impact of the government debt supply.