Consequences of China’s Opening to Foreign Banks
Ran Li, Xiang Li, Wen Lei, Yiping Huang
L. Song, R. Garnaut, C. Fang, L. Johnston (Hrsg.), China's Domestic Transformation in a Global Context. Acton: ANU Press,
forthcoming
Abstract
China’s government has recently implemented additional reforms to relax the regulatory environment for foreign banks. Specifically, State Council Order No. 657, signed by Premier Li Keqiang, announced a decision to revise the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of Foreign-Funded Banks, effective from 1 January 2015. Implications of the revised regulations include removal of the requirement that a minimum of RMB100 million operating capital be transferred unconditionally from the overseas parent bank to the newly opened Chinese branch. In addition, in terms of the conditions attached to the right to carry out RMB-denominated activity, foreign banks are now eligible to apply to undertake local currency business after operating in China for one year—down from the previous three years. The requirement for two consecutive years of profit will be scrapped as well.
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Do Manufacturing Firms Benefit from Services FDI? – Evidence from Six New EU Member States
J. Damijan, Crt Kostevc, Philipp Marek, Matija Rojec
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 5,
2015
Abstract
This paper focuses on the effect of foreign presence in the services sector on the productivity growth of downstream customers in the manufacturing sector in six EU new member countries in the course of their accession to the European Union. For this purpose, the analysis combines firm-level information, data on economic structures and annual national input-output tables. The findings suggest that services FDI may enhance productivity of manufacturing firms in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries through vertical forward spillovers, and thereby contribute to their competitiveness. The consideration of firm characteristics shows that the magnitude of spillover effects depends on size, ownership structure, and initial productivity level of downstream firms as well as on the diverging technological intensity across sector on the supply and demand side. The results suggest that services FDI foster productivity of domestic rather than foreign controlled firms in the host economy. For the period between 2003 and 2008, the findings suggest that the increasing share of services provided by foreign affiliates enhanced the productivity growth of domestic firms in manufacturing by 0.16%. Furthermore, the firms’ absorptive capability and the size reduce the spillover effect of services FDI on the productivity of manufacturing firms. A sectoral distinction shows that firms at the end of the value chain experience a larger productivity growth through services FDI, whereas the aggregate positive effect seems to be driven by FDI in energy supply. This does not hold for science-based industries, which are spurred by foreign presence in knowledge-intensive business services.
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Financial Stability and Central Bank Governance
Michael Koetter, Kasper Roszbach, G. Spagnolo
International Journal of Central Banking,
No. 4,
2014
Abstract
The financial crisis has ignited a debate about the appropriate objectives and the governance structure of Central Banks. We use novel survey data to investigate the relation between these traits and banking system stability focusing in particular on their role in micro-prudential supervision. We find that the separation of powers between single and multiple bank supervisors cannot explain credit risk prior or during the financial crisis. Similarly, a large number of Central Bank governance traits do not correlate with system fragility. Only the objective of currency stability exhibits a significant relation with non-performing loan levels in the run-up to the crisis. This effect is amplified for those countries with most frequent exposure to IMF missions in the past. Our results suggest that the current policy discussion whether to centralize prudential supervision under the Central Bank and the ensuing institutional changes some countries are enacting may not produce the improvements authorities are aiming at. Whether other potential improvements in prudential supervision due to, for example, external disciplinary devices, such as IMF conditional lending schemes, are better suited to increase financial stability requires further research.
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Taxes, Banks and Financial Stability
Reint E. Gropp
R. de Mooij and G. Nicodème (eds), Taxation and Regulation of the Financial Sector. MIT Press,
2014
Abstract
In response to the financial crisis of 2008/2009, numerous new taxes on financial institutions have been discussed or implemented around the world. This paper discusses the connection between the incidence of the taxes, their incentive effects, and policy makers’ objectives. Combining basic insights from banking theory with standard models of tax incidence shows that the incidence of such taxes will disproportionately fall on small and medium size enterprises. The arguments presented suggest it is unlikely that the taxes will have a beneficial impact on financial stability or raise significant amounts of revenue without increasing the cost of capital to bank dependent firms significantly.
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The Dynamics of Bank Spreads and Financial Structure
Reint E. Gropp, Christoffer Kok, J.-D. Lichtenberger
Quarterly Journal of Finance,
No. 4,
2014
Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of within banking sector competition and competition from financial markets on the dynamics of the transmission from monetary policy rates to retail bank interest rates in the euro area. We use a new dataset that permits analysis for disaggregated bank products. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we test whether development of financial markets and financial innovation speed up the pass through. We find that more developed markets for equity and corporate bonds result in a faster pass-through for those retail bank products directly competing with these markets. More developed markets for securitized assets and for interest rate derivatives also speed up the transmission. Further, we find relatively strong effects of competition within the banking sector across two different measures of competition. Overall, the evidence supports the idea that developed financial markets and competitive banking systems increase the effectiveness of monetary policy.
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Executive Compensation Structure and Credit Spreads
Stefano Colonnello, Giuliano Curatola, Ngoc Giang Hoang
Abstract
We develop a model of managerial compensation structure and asset risk choice. The model provides predictions about how inside debt features affect the relation between credit spreads and compensation components. First, inside debt reduces credit spreads only if it is unsecured. Second, inside debt exerts important indirect effects on the role of equity incentives: When inside debt is large and unsecured, equity incentives increase credit spreads; When inside debt is small or secured, this effect is weakened or reversed. We test our model on a sample of U.S. public firms with traded CDS contracts, finding evidence supportive of our predictions. To alleviate endogeneity concerns, we also show that our results are robust to using an instrumental variable approach.
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Interbank Lending and Distress: Observables, Unobservables, and Network Structure
Ben Craig, Michael Koetter, U. Krüger
Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper, No. 18/2014,
No. 18,
2014
Abstract
We provide empirical evidence on the relevance of systemic risk through the interbank lending channel. We adapt a spatial probit model that allows for correlated error terms in the cross-sectional variation that depend on the measured network connections of the banks. The latter are in our application observed interbank exposures among German bank holding companies during 2001 and 2006. The results clearly indicate significant spillover effects between banks’ probabilities of distress and the financial profiles of connected peers. Better capitalized and managed connections reduce the banks own risk. Higher network centrality reduces the probability of distress, supporting the notion that more complete networks tend to be more stable. Finally, spatial autocorrelation is significant and negative. This last result may indicate too-many-to-fail mechanics such that bank distress is less likely if many peers already experienced distress.
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Financial Incentives and Loan Officer Behavior: Multitasking and Allocation of Effort Under an Incomplete Contract
Patrick Behr, Alejandro H. Drexler, Reint E. Gropp, Andre Guettler
Abstract
In this paper we investigate the implications of providing loan officers with a compensation structure that rewards loan volume and penalizes poor performance versus a fixed wage unrelated to performance. We study detailed transaction information for more than 45,000 loans issued by 240 loan officers of a large commercial bank in Europe. We examine the three main activities that loan officers perform: monitoring, originating, and screening. We find that when the performance of their portfolio deteriorates, loan officers increase their effort to monitor existing borrowers, reduce loan origination, and approve a higher fraction of loan applications. These loans, however, are of above-average quality. Consistent with the theoretical literature on multitasking in incomplete contracts, we show that loan officers neglect activities that are not directly rewarded under the contract, but are in the interest of the bank. In addition, while the response by loan officers constitutes a rational response to a time allocation problem, their reaction to incentives appears myopic in other dimensions.
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Im Fokus: Die Entwicklung der Kernkapitalquoten der deutschen Banken seit der Finanzkrise
Manuel Buchholz, Felix Noth
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 3,
2014
Abstract
Das Eigenkapital einer Bank dient aus aufsichtsrechtlicher Sicht zwei Zielen: zum einen dem Ausgleich von Verlusten aus laufenden Geschäften oder der Begleichung von Gläubigeransprüchen im Insolvenzfall, zum anderen der Begrenzung von Verlustrisiken aus bestimmten Geschäften. Ein wichtiger Bestandteil des Eigenkapitals ist dabei das Kernkapital. Das Kernkapital ist der Anteil des Eigenkapitals einer Bank, der dem Institut dauerhaft zur Verfügung steht und somit als echter Verlustpuffer dienen kann. Bestandteile sind unter anderem das Stammkapital, Kapitalrücklagen, Gewinnrücklagen oder eigene Aktien der Bank. Aus dem Kernkapital ergibt sich eine wichtige aufsichtsrechtliche Kenngröße: die Kernkapitalquote (Tier 1 Capital Ratio). Diese berechnet sich als das Verhältnis von Kernkapital zur Summe der Risikoaktiva einer Ba
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