Does Transparency of Central Banks produce Multiple Equilibria on Currency Markets?
Axel Lindner
Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
No. 1,
2006
Abstract
A recent strand of literature shows that multiple equilibria in models of markets for pegged currencies vanish if there is slightly diverse information among traders; see Morris and Shin (2001). It is known that this approach works only if the common knowledge in the market is not too precise. This has led to the conclusion that central banks should try to avoid making their information common knowledge. We develop a model in which more transparency of the central bank implies better private information, because each trader utilises public information according to her own private information. Thus, transparency makes multiple equilibria less likely.
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Financial fragility and exchange rate arrangements of EU candidate countries
Hubert Gabrisch
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 156,
2002
Abstract
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Financial crisis and problems yet to solve - Conference proceedings
IWH-Sonderhefte,
No. 6,
2000
Abstract
Since the beginning of 1997, a currency and/or banking crisis broke out in several transition countries (Bulgaria, Romania, the Czech Republic, Russia, Ukraine). In 1995, Hungary avoided a financial crisis by adjusting properly her macroeconomic policies. Financial markets in transition countries are still small. They gain, however, more and more importance for the entire economy. Part of the countries mentioned are candidates for EU membership. They have to show their ability to stabilize their exchange rates and financial sectors. The fact that overcoming the financial crisis in Asia and Latin America required international assistance (e.g. IMF) underlines the political importance of strategies of preventing such crises in the EU's immediate neighborhood.
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