Welche Faktoren verzögern die Umsetzung der Bankenunion?
Michael Koetter, Thomas Krause, Lena Tonzer
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 1,
2018
Abstract
Die Europäische Kommission hat weitreichende Reformen zur Regulierung und Überwachung des europäischen Bankensektors beschlossen, um die Stabilität europäischer Banken zu gewährleisten. In den meisten Mitgliedsländern verzögert sich allerdings die Umsetzung der zugrunde liegenden Richtlinien der Europäischen Kommission. Dieser Beitrag geht den Gründen für diese Verzögerung nach. Es zeigt sich, dass insbesondere bereits existierende Regulierungen und institutionelle Rahmenbedingungen das Tempo der Umsetzung entscheidend bestimmen. Entgegen populären Meinungsäußerungen sind die Struktur der Bankensektoren in den Mitgliedstaaten und politische Faktoren hingegen von nachrangiger Bedeutung.
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Die Mär vom egoistischen Ökonomen – Wie Ökonomen auf Anreize reagieren
Dmitri Bershadskyy
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 1,
2018
Abstract
Menschen, die über ökonomische Bildung verfügen, reagieren stärker auf wirtschaftliche Anreize. Entgegen der verbreiteten Annahme handeln Ökonomen jedoch nicht egoistischer als Nicht-Ökonomen, wenn es darum geht, gemeinsam ein öffentliches Gut zu finanzieren. Mit Hilfe eines Experiments, in dem die Teilnehmer echtes Geld gewinnen konnten, wird gezeigt, dass Ökonomen sich stärker an den vorliegenden Anreizstrukturen orientieren. Auf der einen Seite tragen Ökonomen am Anfang leicht höher zu dem öffentlichen Gut bei und fangen signifikant später an, von der sozial optimalen Strategie abzuweichen. Auf der anderen Seite leisten Ökonomen zum Ende des Experiments, wenn Trittbrettfahrerverhalten weniger Konsequenzen hat, deutlich geringere Beiträge als Nicht-Ökonomen. Im zweiten Teil des Experiments wird den Teilnehmenden die Möglichkeit gegeben, in eine Erleichterung der kooperativen Finanzierung des öffentlichen Guts zu investieren, wobei zwischen einem investitionsfreundlichen (Geld-zurück-Garantie) und einem weniger investitionsfreundlichen Szenario (keine Garantie) unterschieden wird. Das Experiment zeigt, dass die Probanden mit ökonomischer Ausbildung auf diesen kleinen Unterschied in den Anreizstrukturen stärker reagieren.
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Predicting Earnings and Cash Flows: The Information Content of Losses and Tax Loss Carryforwards
Sandra Dreher, Sebastian Eichfelder, Felix Noth
Abstract
We analyse the relevance of losses, accounting information on tax loss carryforwards, and deferred taxes for the prediction of earnings and cash flows up to four years ahead. We use a unique hand-collected panel of German listed firms encompassing detailed information on tax loss carryforwards and deferred taxes from the tax footnote. Our out-of-sample predictions show that considering accounting information on tax loss carryforwards and deferred taxes does not enhance the accuracy of performance forecasts and can even worsen performance predictions. We find that common forecasting approaches that treat positive and negative performances equally or that use a dummy variable for negative performance can lead to biased performance forecasts, and we provide a simple empirical specification to account for that issue.
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Endogenous Institution Formation in Public Good Games: The Effect of Economic Education
Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher, Dmitri Bershadskyy, Philipp Schreck, Florian Timme
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 29,
2017
Abstract
In a public good experiment, the paper analyses to which extent individuals with economic education behave differently in a second-order dilemma. Second-order dilemmas may arise, when individuals endogenously build up costly institutions that help to overcome a public good problem (first-order dilemma). The specific institution used in the experiment is a communication platform allowing for group communication before the first-order public good game takes place. The experimental results confirm the finding of the literature that economists tend to free ride more intensively in public good games than non-economists. The difference is the strongest in the end-game phase, yielding in the conclusion that the magnitude of the end-game effect depends on the share of economists in the pool of participants. When it comes to the building-up of institutions, the individual efficiency gain of the institution and its inherent cost function constitute the driving forces for the contribution behaviour. Providing an investment friendly environment yields in economists contributing more to the institution than non-economists. Therefore, we make clear that first-order results of a simple public good game cannot be simply applied for second-order incentive problems.
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Delay Determinants of European Banking Union Implementation
Michael Koetter, Thomas Krause, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
To safeguard financial stability and harmonise regulation, the European Commission substantially reformed banking supervision, resolution, and deposit insurance via EU directives. But most countries delay the transposition of these directives. We ask if transposition delays result from strategic considerations of governments conditional on the state of their financial, regulatory, and political systems? Supervisors might try to protect national banking systems and local politicians maybe reluctant to surrender national sovereignty to deal with failed banks. Alternatively, intricate financial regulation might require more implementation time in large and complex financial and political systems. We therefore collect data on the transposition delays of the three Banking Union directives and investigate observed delay variation across member states. Our correlation analyses suggest that existing regulatory and institutional frameworks, rather than banking market structure or political factors, matter for transposition delays.
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Bank Recapitalization, Regulatory Intervention, and Repayment
Thomas Kick, Michael Koetter, Tigran Poghosyan
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
No. 7,
2016
Abstract
We use prudential supervisory data for all German banks during 1994–2010 to test if regulatory interventions affect the likelihood that bailed-out banks repay capital support. Accounting for the selection bias inherent in nonrandom bank bailouts by insurance schemes and the endogenous administration of regulatory interventions, we show that regulators can increase the likelihood of repayment substantially. An increase in intervention frequencies by one standard deviation increases the annual probability of capital support repayment by 7%. Sturdy interventions, like restructuring orders, are effective, whereas weak measures reduce repayment probabilities. Intervention effects last up to 5 years.
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Macroeconomic Trade Effects of Vehicle Currencies: Evidence from 19th Century China
Makram El-Shagi, Lin Zhang
Abstract
We use the Chinese experience between 1867 and 1910 to illustrate how the volatility of vehicle currencies affects trade. Today’s widespread vehicle currency is the dollar. However, the macroeconomic effects of this use of the dollar have rarely been addressed. This is partly due to identification problems caused by its international importance. China had adopted a system, where silver was used almost exclusively for trade, similar to a vehicle currency. While being important for China, the global role of silver was marginal, alleviating said identification problems. We develop a bias corrected structural VAR showing that silver price fluctuations significantly affected trade.
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Spinoffs in Germany: Characteristics, Survival, and the Role of their Parents
Daniel Fackler, A. Schmucker, Claus Schnabel
Small Business Economics,
No. 1,
2016
Abstract
Using a 50 % sample of all private sector establishments in Germany, we report that spinoffs are larger, initially employ more skilled and more experienced workers, and pay higher wages than other startups. We investigate whether spinoffs are more likely to survive than other startups, and whether spinoff survival depends on the quality and size of their parent companies, as suggested in some of the theoretical and empirical literature. Our estimated survival models confirm that spinoffs are generally less likely to exit than other startups. We also distinguish between pulled spinoffs, where the parent company continues after they are founded, and pushed spinoffs, where the parent company stops operations. Our results indicate that in western and eastern Germany and in all sectors investigated, pulled spinoffs have a higher probability of survival than pushed spinoffs. Concerning the parent connection, we find that intra-industry spinoffs and spinoffs emerging from better-performing or smaller parent companies are generally less likely to exit.
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Switching to Exchange Rate Flexibility? The Case of Central and Eastern European Inflation Targeters
Andrej Drygalla
FIW Working Paper,
No. 139,
2015
Abstract
This paper analyzes changes in the monetary policy in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland following the policy shift from exchange rate targeting to inflation targeting around the turn of the millennium. Applying a Markovswitching dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, switches in the policy parameters and the volatilities of shocks hitting the economies are estimated and quantified. Results indicate the presence of regimes of weak and strong responses of the central banks to exchange rate movements as well as periods of high and low volatility. Whereas all three economies switched to a less volatile regime over time, findings on changes in the policy parameters reveal a lower reaction to exchange rate movements in the Czech Republic and Poland, but an increased attention to it in Hungary. Simulations for the Czech Republic and Poland also suggest their respective central banks, rather than a sound macroeconomic environment, being accountable for reducing volatility in variables like inflation and output. In Hungary, their favorable developments can be attributed to a larger extent to the reduction in the size of external disturbances.
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Geriet die preisliche Wettbewerbsfähigkeit von Euroraum-Ländern nach Gründung der Währungsunion aus dem Gleichgewicht?
Makram El-Shagi, Axel Lindner, Gregor von Schweinitz
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 3,
2014
Abstract
Waren die Peripherieländer im Euroraum am Vorabend der Eurokrise nicht mehr wettbewerbsfähig? Oder war die preisliche Wettbewerbsfähigkeit in den Kernländern wie Deutschland ungewöhnlich hoch? Antworten auf diese Fragen sind nicht einfach. Das gängige Maß für die preisliche Wettbewerbsfähigkeit sind die realen effektiven Wechselkurse. Deren Bestimmungsfaktoren waren jedoch kurz vor der Krise selbst möglicherweise nicht im Gleichgewicht und lassen daher kaum Rückschlüsse auf gleichgewichtige Wechselkurse zu. Um dieses Messproblem zu umgehen, wird ein Matching-Ansatz zur Schätzung realer effektiver Wechselkurse verwendet. Dazu wird für jedes Mitgliedsland des Euroraums ein synthetisches Vergleichsland als Kombination mehrerer anderer Länder konstruiert, die den Euro nicht eingeführt haben. Es zeigt sich, dass die Peripherieländer des Euroraums am besten durch eine Mischung von Schwellenländern und entwickelten Volkswirtschaften beschrieben werden, während für ein Matching der Kernländer keine Schwellenländer notwendig sind. Die hier angewendete Methode zeigt, dass die realen effektiven Wechselkurse in den Peripherieländern zwischen Oktober 2007 und September 2008 teilweise deutlich zu hoch waren, während sie in den Kernländern mehr oder weniger nah bei ihrem Gleichgewichtsniveau lagen.
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