Dynamic Equity Slope
Matthijs Breugem, Stefano Colonnello, Roberto Marfè, Francesca Zucchi
University of Venice Ca' Foscari Department of Economics Working Papers,
No. 21,
2020
Abstract
The term structure of equity and its cyclicality are key to understand the risks drivingequilibrium asset prices. We propose a general equilibrium model that jointly explainsfour important features of the term structure of equity: (i) a negative unconditionalterm premium, (ii) countercyclical term premia, (iii) procyclical equity yields, and (iv)premia to value and growth claims respectively increasing and decreasing with thehorizon. The economic mechanism hinges on the interaction between heteroskedasticlong-run growth — which helps price long-term cash flows and leads to countercyclicalrisk premia — and homoskedastic short-term shocks in the presence of limited marketparticipation — which produce sizeable risk premia to short-term cash flows. The slopedynamics hold irrespective of the sign of its unconditional average. We provide empirical support to our model assumptions and predictions.
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Private Equity and Portfolio Companies: Lessons From the Global Financial Crisis
Shai B. Bernstein, Josh Lerner, Filippo Mezzanotti
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,
No. 3,
2020
Abstract
Critics of private equity have warned that the high leverage often used in PE-backed companies could contribute to the fragility of the financial system during economic crises. The proliferation of poorly structured transactions during booms could increase the vulnerability of the economy to downturns. The alternative hypothesis is that PE, with its operating capabilities, expertise in financial restructuring, and massive capital raised but not invested ("dry powder"), could increase the resilience of PE-backed companies. In their study of PE-backed buyouts in the U.K. - which requires and thereby makes accessible more information about private companies than, say, in the U.S. - the authors report finding that, during the 2008 global financial crisis, PE-backed companies decreased their overall investments significantly less than comparable, non-PE firms. Moreover, such PE-backed firms also experienced greater equity and debt inflows, higher asset growth, and increased market share. These effects were especially notable among smaller, riskier PE-backed firms with less access to capital, and also for those firms backed by PE firms with more dry powder at the crisis onset. In a survey of the partners and staff of some 750 PE firms, the authors also present compelling evidence that PEs firms play active financial and operating roles in preserving or restoring the profitability and value of their portfolio companies.
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Private Equity and Financial Fragility During the Crisis
Shai B. Bernstein, Josh Lerner, Filippo Mezzanotti
Review of Financial Studies,
No. 4,
2019
Abstract
Does private equity (PE) contribute to financial fragility during economic crises? The proliferation of poorly structured transactions during booms may increase the vulnerability of the economy to downturns. During the 2008 crisis, PE-backed companies decreased investments less than did their peers and experienced greater equity and debt inflows, higher asset growth, and increased market share. These effects are especially strong among financially constrained companies and those whose PE investors had more resources at the crisis onset. In a survey, PE firms report being active investors during the crisis and spending more time working with their portfolio companies.
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Aktuelle Trends: Große deutsche Banken werden kleiner und haben
mehr Eigenkapital
Lena Tonzer, Talina Sondershaus
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 4,
2017
Abstract
Große Banken profitieren in der Regel von einem „Toobig- to-fail“-Status: Sie sind „zu groß, um zu scheitern“. Vor der letzten Finanzkrise, die im Jahr 2007 begann, haben die Vermögenswerte der großen Banken in Deutschland durchschnittlich zugenommen. Je größer der Marktanteil und die Vernetzung großer Banken, desto größer sind die systemischen Auswirkungen, falls eine Bank in Schieflage gerät. Aus Angst vor einem systemischen Zusammenbruch werden deshalb oft staatliche Garantien ausgesprochen oder Eigenkapital bereitgestellt. Wenn große Banken die Rettung durch den Staat antizipieren, kann das dazu führen, dass sie riskantere Geschäfte eingehen. Diese Problematik kam in der letzten Krise zum Tragen, sodass zahlreiche regulatorische Änderungen beschlossen wurden, um das systemische Risiko großer Banken zu reduzieren.
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24.04.2017 • 22/2017
Higher capital requirements: It’s the firms that end up suffering
61 European banks were scheduled to increase their capital cover by 2012 to provide a sufficient buffer for future crises. As the study by the research group chaired by Reint E. Gropp at the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association shows, the banks did implement these requirements – not by raising their levels of equity, but by reducing their credit supply. This resulted in lower firm, investment, and sales growth for firms which obtained a larger share of their bank credit from these banks.
Reint E. Gropp
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11.08.2016 • 34/2016
2016 stress tests: Italian banks don’t look worse than German large commercial banks
The European Banking Authority today presented the results of the 2016 stress tests. They show that most European banks appear more or less stable. “What worries me is, however, that the Italian banks do not look worse than the large German commercial banks,” says Reint E. Gropp, president of the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH). “It appears that both Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank would benefit significantly from an increase in equity. The stress test was also missing two crucial points: One, the effect of a long lasting low interest rate environment on banks was not simulated. And second, the test did not take into consideration that many small institutions could fail at the same time. This is not an unlikely scenario, given how small banks in particular struggle with shrinking interest margins,“ says Gropp. Finally, the stress test should not distract from the urgency to solve the problems in the Italian banking system.
Reint E. Gropp
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Stock Market Firm-Level Information and Real Economic Activity
Filippo di Mauro, Fabio Fornari, Dario Mannucci
ECB Working Paper,
No. 1366,
2011
Abstract
We provide evidence that changes in the equity price and volatility of individual firms (measures that approximate the definition of 'granular shock' given in Gabaix, 2010) are key to improve the predictability of aggregate business cycle fluctuations in a number of countries. Specifically, adding the return and the volatility of firm-level equity prices to aggregate financial information leads to a significant improvement in forecasting business cycle developments in four economic areas, at various horizons. Importantly, not only domestic firms but also foreign firms improve business cycle predictability for a given economic area. This is not immediately visible when one takes an unconditional standpoint (i.e. an average across the sample). However, conditioning on the business cycle position of the domestic economy, the relative importance of the two sets of firms - foreign and domestic - exhibits noticeable swings across time. Analogously, the sectoral classification of the firms that in a given month retain the highest predictive power for future IP changes also varies significantly over time as a function of the business cycle position of the domestic economy. Limited to the United States, predictive ability is found to be related to selected balance sheet items, suggesting that structural features differentiate the firms that can anticipate aggregate fluctuations from those that do not help to this aim. Beyond the purely forecasting application, this finding may enhance our understanding of the underlying origins of aggregate fluctuations. We also propose to use the cross sectional stock market information to macro-prudential aims through an economic Value at Risk.
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The Importance of Estimation Uncertainty in a Multi-Rating Class Loan Portfolio
Henry Dannenberg
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 11,
2011
Abstract
This article seeks to make an assessment of estimation uncertainty in a multi-rating class loan portfolio. Relationships are established between estimation uncertainty and parameters such as probability of default, intra- and inter-rating class correlation, degree of inhomogeneity, number of rating classes used, number of debtors and number of historical periods used for parameter estimations. In addition, by using an exemplary portfolio based on Moody’s ratings, it becomes clear that estimation uncertainty does indeed have an effect on interest rates.
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Are European Equity Style Indices Efficient? – An Empirical Quest in Three Essays
Marian Berneburg
Schriften des IWH,
No. 28,
2008
Abstract
Many situations in the history of the stock markets indicate that assets are not always efficiently priced. But why does it matter whether the stock market is efficiently priced? Because “well-functioning financial markets are a key factor to high economic growth”. (Mishkin and Eakins, 2006, pp. 3-4) In three essays, it is the aim of the author to shed some more light on the topic of market efficiency, which is far from being resolved. Since European equity markets have increased in importance globally, the author, instead of focusing on US markets, looks at a unified European equity market. By testing for a random walk in equity prices, revisiting Shiller’s claim of excess volatility through the means of a vector error correction model, and modifying the Gordon-Growth-Model, the book concludes that a small degree of inefficiency cannot be ruled out. While usually European equity markets are pricing assets correctly, some periods (e.g. the late 1990s and early 2000s) show clear signs of mispricing; the hypothesis of a world with two states (regime one, a normal efficient state, and regime two, a state in which markets are more momentum driven) presents a possible explanation.
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