05.04.2023 • 8/2023
Stubborn Core Inflation – Time for Supply Side Policies
The leading economic research institutes have raised their forecast for growth in German economic output in the current year to 0.3%. In the fall, they were still expecting a decline of 0.4%. “The economic setback in the winter half-year 2022/2023 is likely to have been less severe than feared in the fall. The main reason for this is a smaller loss of purchasing power as a result of a significant drop in energy prices,” says Timo Wollmershäuser, Head of Forecasts at ifo. Nevertheless, the rate of inflation will fall only slowly from 6.9% last year to 6.0% this year.
Oliver Holtemöller
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Stubborn Core Inflation – Time for Supply Side Policies
Oliver Holtemöller, Stefan Kooths, Torsten Schmidt, Timo Wollmershäuser
Wirtschaftsdienst,
No. 4,
2023
Abstract
Die Projektgruppe Gemeinschaftsdiagnose hat ihre Prognose für den Anstieg der Wirtschaftsleistung im laufenden Jahr auf 0,3 % angehoben. Im Herbst 2022 hatte sie noch mit einem Rückgang um 0,4 % gerechnet. Der konjunkturelle Rückschlag im Winterhalbjahr 2022/2023 ist glimpflicher ausgefallen als im Herbst befürchtet, weil die Energiepreise schneller wieder gesunken sind als erwartet. Dennoch wird die Inflationsrate nur langsam zurückgehen, von 6,9 % im vergangenen Jahr auf 6,0 % im Jahr 2023.
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28.06.2022 • 15/2022
Gefahr einer Gaslücke gegenüber April deutlich verringert – aber Versorgungsrisiken bleiben
Die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Versorgungslücke mit Erdgas im Fall eines Stopps russischer Lieferungen ist gegenüber April deutlich gesunken. Zu diesem Ergebnis kommt eine aktualisierte Simulationsrechnung der an der Gemeinschaftsdiagnose beteiligten Institute. Trotz mittlerweile deutlich besser gefüllter Speicher sind damit aber noch nicht alle Risiken für die Gasversorgung der Industrie im Winterhalbjahr 2022/2023 gebannt. Es ist daher ratsam, zeitnah die Preissignale bei den Verbrauchern ankommen zu lassen.
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13.04.2022 • 8/2022
From Pandemic to Energy Crisis: Economy and Politics under Permanent Stress
The German economy is steering through difficult waters and faces the highest inflation rates in decades. In their spring report, the leading German economic research institutes revise their outlook for this year significantly downward. The recovery from the COVID-19 crisis is slowing down as a result of the war in Ukraine, but remains on track. The institutes expect GDP to increase by 2.7% and 3.1% in 2022 and 2023 respectively. In the event of an immediate interruption to Russian gas supplies, a total of 220 billion euros in German economic output would be at risk in both years.
Oliver Holtemöller
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15.04.2021 • 11/2021
Pandemic delays upswing – Demography slows growth
In their spring report, the leading economic research institutes forecast an increase in gross domestic product of 3.7% in the current year and 3.9% in 2022. The renewed shutdown is delaying the economic recovery, but as soon as the risks of infection, particularly from vaccination, have been averted, a strong recovery will begin. The economy is likely to return to normal output levels around the start of the coming year.
Oliver Holtemöller
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Why Are Households Saving so much During the Corona Recession?
Reint E. Gropp, William McShane
IWH Policy Notes,
No. 1,
2021
Abstract
Savings rates among European households have reached record levels during the Corona recession. We investigate three possible explanations for the increase in household savings: precautionary motivations induced by increased economic uncertainty, reduced consumption opportunities due to lockdown measures, and Ricardian Equivalence, i.e. increases in the expected future tax-burden of households driven by increases in government debt. To test these explanations, we compile a monthly panel of euro area countries from January 2019 to August 2020. Our findings indicate that the chief driver of the increase in household savings is supply: As governments restrict households’ opportunities to spend, households spend less. We estimate that going from no lockdown measures to that of Italy’s in March, would have resulted in the growth of Germany’s deposit to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio being 0.6 percentage points higher each month. This would be equivalent to the volume of deposits increasing by roughly 14.3 billion euros or 348 euros per house monthly. Demand effects, driven by either fears of unemployment or fear of infection from COVID-19, appear to only have a weak impact on household savings, whereas changes in government debt are unrelated or even negatively related to savings rates. The analysis suggests that there is some pent-up demand for consumption that may unravel after lockdown measures are abolished and may result in a significant increase in consumption in the late spring/early summer 2021.
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14.12.2020 • 25/2020
Deutsche Lebensversicherer investieren nicht ausreichend in Start-ups
Die deutschen Lebensversicherer legen ihr Kapital bislang zu wenig in Aktien an und hemmen so die wirtschaftliche Dynamik. Eine Studie des Leibniz-Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) legt nahe, dass der Gründerszene Risikokapital fehlt, um erfolgreiche Start-ups zu finanzieren. Grund dafür ist das Anlageverhalten potenzieller Investoren. IWH-Präsident Reint Gropp fordert Reformen, die die Finanzierung innovativer Ideen fördern.
Reint E. Gropp
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06.07.2020 • 13/2020
IWH issues warning of a new banking crisis
The coronavirus recession could mean the end for dozens of banks across Germany – even if Germany survives the economic crisis relatively unscathed. An analysis by the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) shows that many savings banks and cooperative banks are particularly at risk. Loans worth hundreds of billions of euros are on the balance sheets of the financial institutions concerned. IWH President Gropp warns of a potentially high additional burden for the already weakened real economy.
Reint E. Gropp
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The Corona Recession and Bank Stress in Germany
Reint E. Gropp, Michael Koetter, William McShane
IWH Online,
No. 4,
2020
Abstract
We conduct stress tests for a large sample of German banks across different recoveries from the Corona recession. We find that, depending on how quickly the economy recovers, between 6% to 28% of banks could become distressed from defaulting corporate borrowers alone. Many of these banks are likely to require regulatory intervention or may even fail. Even in our most optimistic scenario, bank capital ratios decline by nearly 24%. The sum of total loans held by distressed banks could plausibly range from 127 to 624 billion Euros and it may take years before the full extent of this stress is observable. Hence, the current recession could result in an acute contraction in lending to the real economy, thereby worsening the current recession , decelerating the recovery, or perhaps even causing a “double dip” recession. Additionally, we show that the corporate portfolio of savings and cooperative banks is more than five times as exposed to small firms as that of commercial banks and Landesbanken. The preliminary evidence indicates small firms are particularly exposed to the current crisis, which implies that cooperative and savings banks are at especially high risk of becoming distressed. Given that the financial difficulties may seriously impair the recovery from the Covid-19 crisis, the pressure to bail out large parts of the banking system will be strong. Recent research suggests that the long run benefits of largely resisting these pressures may be high and could result in a more efficient economy.
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Transmitting Fiscal Covid-19 Counterstrikes Effectively: Mind the Banks!
Reint E. Gropp, Michael Koetter, William McShane
IWH Online,
No. 2,
2020
Abstract
The German government launched an unprecedented range of support programmes to mitigate the economic fallout from the Covid-19 pandemic for employees, self-employed, and firms. Fiscal transfers and guarantees amount to approximately €1.2 billion by now and are supplemented by similarly impressive measures taken at the European level. We argue in this note that the pandemic poses, however, also important challenges to financial stability in general and bank resilience in particular. A stable banking system is, in turn, crucial to ensure that support measures are transmitted to the real economy and that credit markets function seamlessly. Our analysis shows that banks are exposed rather differently to deteriorated business outlooks due to marked differences in their lending specialisation to different economic sectors. Moreover, a number of the banks that were hit hardest by bleak growth prospects of their borrowers were already relatively thinly capitalised at the outset of the pandemic. This coincidence can impair the ability and willingness of selected banks to continue lending to their mostly small and medium sized entrepreneurial customers. Therefore, ensuring financial stability is an important pre-requisite to also ensure the effectiveness of fiscal support measures. We estimate that contracting business prospects during the first quarter of 2020 could lead to an additional volume of non-performing loans (NPL) among the 40 most stressed banks ‒ mostly small, regional relationship lenders ‒ on the order of around €200 million. Given an initial stock of NPL of €650 million, this estimate thus suggests a potential level of NPL at year-end of €1.45 billion for this fairly small group of banks already. We further show that 17 regional banking markets are particularly exposed to an undesirable coincidence of starkly deteriorating borrower prospects and weakly capitalised local banks. Since these regions are home to around 6.8% of total employment in Germany, we argue that ensuring financial stability in the form of healthy bank balance sheets should be an important element of the policy strategy to contain the adverse real economic effects of the pandemic.
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