Forecasting the CO2 certificate price risk
Henry Dannenberg, Wilfried Ehrenfeld
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 5,
2008
Abstract
Die Modellierung des CO2Zertifikatepreisrisikos ist ein wichtiger Teilaspekt eines ganzheitlichen Managements von mit dem Emissionshandel verbundenen Unternehmensrisiken. Das Papier diskutiert ein Preisbildungsmodell, auf dessen Grundlage das Zertifikatepreisrisiko bewertet werden kann. Es wird davon ausgegangen, dass der Zertifikatepreis durch die erwarteten Grenzvermeidungskosten der Handelsperiode determiniert wird und stochastisch um dieses Niveau schwankt. Dieses Verhalten wird mit einem Mean-Reversion-Prozess modelliert. Aufgrund von Unsicherheiten bezüglich künftiger Umweltzustände ist jedoch zu vermuten, dass innerhalb einer Handelsperiode durch das Bekanntwerden neuer Informationen sprunghafte Veränderungen der erwarteten Grenzvermeidungskosten auftreten können, womit sprunghafte Verschiebungen des erwarteten Preisniveaus einhergehen. Neben der ParameterSchätzung ist es daher auch ein Ziel der Arbeit, den Mean-Reversion-Prozess so zu modifizieren, dass solche sprunghaften Veränderungen des erwarteten Reversion-Niveaus abgebildet werden können.
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Do Weak Supervisory Systems Encourage Bank Risk-taking?
Claudia M. Buch, G. DeLong
Journal of Financial Stability,
2008
Abstract
Weak bank supervision could give banks the ability to shift risk from themselves to supervisors. We use cross-border bank mergers as a natural experiment to test changes in risk and the impact of supervision. We examine cross-border bank mergers and find that the supervisory structures of the partners’ countries influence changes in post-merger total risk. An acquirer from a country with strong supervision lowers total risk after a cross-border merger. However, total risk increases when the target bank is located in a country with relatively strong supervision. This result is consistent with strong host regulators limiting the risky activities of their local banks. Foreign-owned competitors could then engage in the risky projects, especially if the foreign banks’ supervisors are not strong. An acquirer entering a country with strong supervision appears to shift risk back to its home country. The results suggest that bank supervisors can reduce total banking risk in their countries by being strong.
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The Stability of Bank Efficiency Rankings when Risk Preferences and Objectives are Different
Michael Koetter
European Journal of Finance,
No. 2,
2008
Abstract
We analyze the stability of efficiency rankings of German universal banks between 1993 and 2004. First, we estimate traditional efficiency scores with stochastic cost and alternative profit frontier analysis. Then, we explicitly allow for different risk preferences and measure efficiency with a structural model based on utility maximization. Using the almost ideal demand system, we estimate input- and profit-demand functions to obtain proxies for expected return and risk. Efficiency is then measured in this risk-return space. Mean risk-return efficiency is somewhat higher than cost and considerably higher than profit efficiency (PE). More importantly, rank–order correlation between these measures are low or even negative. This suggests that best-practice institutes should not be identified on the basis of traditional efficiency measures alone. Apparently, low cost and/or PE may merely result from alternative yet efficiently chosen risk-return trade-offs.
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Risk-factor competition law infringement
Henry Dannenberg, Nicole Steinat
Risk, Fraud & Compliance ZRFC,
No. 1,
2008
Abstract
Die von der Europäischen Kommission aufgrund von Kartellverstößen verhängten Bußgelder sind in den letzten Jahren erheblich angestiegen. Egal ob der Verstoß bewusst oder unbewusst erfolgt, ergeben sich erhebliche finanzielle Risiken für Unternehmen. Im Folgenden Beitrag wird dargestellt, wie die Verteilung der Bußgeldhöhe bei einem Kartellrechtsverstoß im Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum für ein Unternehmen hergeleitet werden kann. Das mögliche Bußgeld, welches ein Vielfaches eines Jahresumsatzes im betroffenen Markt betragen kann, sollte Unternehmer dafür sensibilisieren, das eigene Unternehmen auf mögliche Verstöße zu überprüfen.
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International Banking and the Allocation of Risk
Claudia M. Buch
IAW Discussion Paper No. 32,
2007
Abstract
Macroeconomic risks could magnify individual bank risk. Mitigating the influence of economy-wide risks on banks could therefore be very important to maintain a smooth-running banking system. In this paper, we explore the extent to which macroeconomic risks affect banks. We use a bank-level dataset on over 2,000 banks worldwide for the years 1995-2002 to study the effect of macroeconomic volatility, the openness of the banking system, and banking regulations on bank risks. Our measure of bank risk is the volatility of banks' pre-tax profits. We find that macroeconomic volatility increases banks' profit volatility and that international openness of the banking system lowers bank risk. We find no impact of banking regulation on profit volatility. Our findings suggest that if policymakers want to lower bank risk, they should seek to lower macroeconomic volatility as well as increase openness in the banking system.
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Three methods of forecasting currency crises: Which made the run in signaling the South African currency crisis of June 2006?
Tobias Knedlik, Rolf Scheufele
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 17,
2007
Abstract
In this paper we test the ability of three of the most popular methods to forecast the South African currency crisis of June 2006. In particular we are interested in the out-ofsample performance of these methods. Thus, we choose the latest crisis to conduct an out-of-sample experiment. In sum, the signals approach was not able to forecast the outof- sample crisis of correctly; the probit approach was able to predict the crisis but just with models, that were based on raw data. Employing a Markov-regime-switching approach also allows to predict the out-of-sample crisis. The answer to the question of which method made the run in forecasting the June 2006 currency crisis is: the Markovswitching approach, since it called most of the pre-crisis periods correctly. However, the “victory” is not straightforward. In-sample, the probit models perform remarkably well and it is also able to detect, at least to some extent, out-of-sample currency crises before their occurrence. It can, therefore, not be recommended to focus on one approach only when evaluating the risk for currency crises.
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The Role of Credit Ratings in Banking Regulations. Credit Ratings Are Insufficiently Anticipating the Risk for Currency Crises.
Tobias Knedlik, Johannes Ströbel
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 10,
2007
Abstract
Bonitätsbewertungen durch Rating-Agenturen gewinnen durch die unter dem Stichwort Basel II diskutierten Reformvorschläge zur Bankenregulierung an Bedeutung. Insbesondere hängt das durch die Regulierung geforderte Mindesteigenkapital unter dem standardisierten Ansatz von Basel II von der Bewertung der Kreditrisiken durch externe Rating-Agenturen ab. Bonitätsbewertungen, speziell von souveränen Schuldnern, bestimmen damit wesentlich die Höhe des Mindesteigenkapitals von Banken. In der Vergangenheit haben Rating-Agenturen Währungskrisenrisiken systematisch unterschätzt. Diese sind jedoch für die Bewertung des Kreditausfallrisikos souveräner Schuldner wichtig. Die prozyklischen Effekte von Basel II entstehen vor allem dadurch, daß im Fall von Währungskrisen aufgrund der zu positiven Bewertung im Vorfeld der Krise schlagartig massive Herabstufungen notwendig werden. Diese Effekte können nur minimiert werden, wenn die währungskriseninduzierten Kreditausfallrisiken angemessen berücksichtigt werden. Die Kritik an der Methode der Rating-Agenturen, insbesondere an mangelnder Berücksichtigung neuerer Währungskrisenmodelle infolge der Asienkrisen von 1997/98, führte zu Reaktionen der Agenturen. So sagte z. B. Standard and Poor’s die Berücksichtigung mikroökonomischer Indikatoren zu, die bei aktuellen Krisen als Krisenfaktoren erkannt wurden. In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird anhand eines Beispiels untersucht, inwiefern sich empirische Anzeichen dafür erkennen lassen, daß mikroökonomische Indikatoren in der Praxis der Bonitätsprüfung beachtet werden. Das Ergebnis der empirischen Untersuchungen zeigt, daß traditionelle makroökonomische Indikatoren die Rating-Ergebnisse dominieren. In aktuellen Ratings können keine Anzeichen für eine stärkere Berücksichtigung von Mikro-Indikatoren gefunden werden. Es muß daher geschlußfolgert werden, daß, wie in der Wirtschaft im Wandel 8/2007 ausgeführt, auch weiterhin prozyklische, krisenverstärkende Effekte von Basel II ausgehen. Die Rating-Agenturen erfüllen bislang die Rolle als frühzeitige Antizipatoren für Währungskrisenrisiken unzureichend.
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The Effect of the Iraq War on Foreign Bank Lending to the MENA Region
H. Evren Damar
Emerging Markets Finance and Trade,
No. 5,
2007
Abstract
This paper examines whether a large geopolitical event, such as the war in Iraq, can affect foreign bank lending from developed countries to emerging markets. Using country-level data, the paper analyzes the effects of economic shocks and the Iraq war on the availability of foreign bank credit to five countries in the Middle East and North Africa. The war has had a nonuniform effect on foreign banks: Although the war has led to higher U.S. lending, it has also discouraged British and Italian banks from lending to the region. Implications concerning the stability and reliability of foreign bank credit in the face of increased geopolitical risks are identified and discussed.
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Systematic Mispricing in European Equity Prices?
Marian Berneburg
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 6,
2007
Abstract
One empirical argument that has been around for some time and that clearly contra- dicts equity market efficiency is that market prices seem too volatile to be optimal estimates of the present value of future discounted cash flows. Based on this, it is deduced that systematic pricing errors occur in equity markets which hence can not be efficient in the Effcient Market Hypothesis sense. The paper tries to show that this so-called excess volatility is to a large extend the result of the underlying assumptions, which are being employed to estimate the present value of cash flows. Using monthly data for three investment style indices from an integrated European Equity market, all usual assumptions are dropped. This is achieved by employing the Gordon Growth Model and using an estimation process for the dividend growth rate that was suggested by Barsky and De Long. In extension to Barsky and De Long, the discount rate is not assumed at some arbitrary level, but it is estimated from the data. In this manner, the empirical results do not rely on the prerequisites of sta- tionary dividends, constant dividend growth rates as well as non-variable discount rates. It is shown that indeed volatility declines considerably, but is not eliminated. Furthermore, it can be seen that the resulting discount factors for the three in- vestment style indices can not be considered equal, which, on a risk-adjusted basis, indicates performance differences in the investment strategies and hence stands in contradiction to an efficient market. Finally, the estimated discount rates under- went a plausibility check, by comparing their general movement to a market based interest rate. Besides the most recent data, the estimated discount rates match the movements of market interest rates fairly well.
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