Political Uncertainty and Bank Loan Contracts: Does Government Quality Matter?
Iftekhar Hasan, Ying-Chen Huang, Yin-Siang Huang, Chih-Yung Lin
Journal of Financial Services Research,
December
2021
Abstract
We investigate the relation between political uncertainty and bank loan spreads using a sample of loan contracts for the G20 firms during the period from 1982 to 2015. We find that banks charge firms higher loan spreads and require more covenants during election years when domestic political risks are elevated. Greater differences in the support ratios of opinion polls on candidates lead to the lower cost of bank loans. This political effect also lessens when the government quality of the borrower’s country is better than that of the lender’s country. Better quality government can lower the political risk component of bank loan spreads.
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Do Banks Value Borrowers' Environmental Record? Evidence from Financial Contracts
I-Ju Chen, Iftekhar Hasan, Chih-Yung Lin, Tra Ngoc Vy Nguyen
Journal of Business Ethics,
December
2021
Abstract
Banks play a unique role in society. They not only maximize profits but also consider the interests of stakeholders. We investigate whether banks consider firms’ pollution records in their lending decisions. The evidence shows that banks offer significantly higher loan spreads, higher total borrowing costs, shorter loan maturities, and greater collateral to firms with higher levels of chemical pollution. The costly effects are stronger for borrowers with greater risk and weaker corporate governance. Further, the results show that banks with higher social responsibility account for their borrowers’ environmental performance and charge higher loan spreads to those with poor performance. These results support the idea that banks with higher social responsibility can promote the practice of business ethics in firms.
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CEO Network Centrality and the Likelihood of Financial Reporting Fraud
Salim Chahine, Yiwei Fang, Iftekhar Hasan, Mohamad Mazboudi
Abacus,
No. 4,
2021
Abstract
This paper investigates the association between CEO’s relative position in the social network and the likelihood of being involved in corporate fraud. Tracing a large sample of US publicly listed firms, we find that CEO network centrality is inversely related to the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. We also document a significant spillover effect of financial reporting behaviour from the dominant (most central) CEO to other CEOs in the same social network, suggesting that the ethical corporate behaviour of CEOs is, on average, influenced by that of their dominant CEO in the network. We further find that the role of CEO network centrality in reducing fraud risk is more prominent in firms with lower auditor quality. Overall, our results suggest that network centrality is an important CEO trait that promotes ethical financial reporting behaviour within social networks.
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Executive Equity Risk-Taking Incentives and Firms’ Choice of Debt Structure
Iftekhar Hasan, Walid Saffar, Yangyang Chen, Leon Zolotoy
Journal of Banking and Finance,
December
2021
Abstract
We examine how executive equity risk-taking incentives affect firms’ choice of debt structure. Using a longitudinal sample of U.S. firms, we document that when executive compensation is more sensitive to stock volatility (i.e., has higher vega), firms reduce their reliance on bank debt financing. We utilize the passage of the Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123R option-expensing regulation as an exogenous shock to management option compensation to account for potential endogeneity. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the documented effect of vega is amplified among firms with higher growth opportunities and more opaque financial information; we also find vega's effect is mitigated in firms with limited abilities to tap into public debt market. Supplemental analyses suggest that firms with higher vega face more stringent bank loan covenants. We conclude that, by encouraging risk-taking, higher vega reduces firms’ reliance on bank debt financing in order to avoid more stringent bank monitoring.
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Cryptocurrency Volatility Markets
Fabian Wöbbeking
Digital Finance,
No. 3,
2021
Abstract
By computing a volatility index (CVX) from cryptocurrency option prices, we analyze this market’s expectation of future volatility. Our method addresses the challenging liquidity environment of this young asset class and allows us to extract stable market implied volatilities. Two alternative methods are considered to compute volatilities from granular intra-day cryptocurrency options data, which spans over the COVID-19 pandemic period. CVX data therefore capture ‘normal’ market dynamics as well as distress and recovery periods. The methods yield two cointegrated index series, where the corresponding error correction model can be used as an indicator for market implied tail-risk. Comparing our CVX to existing volatility benchmarks for traditional asset classes, such as VIX (equity) or GVX (gold), confirms that cryptocurrency volatility dynamics are often disconnected from traditional markets, yet, share common shocks.
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Warum Boni im Bankenbereich scheitern (müssen)
Reint E. Gropp, Andre Guettler
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 3,
2021
Abstract
In der Finanzkrise sind Boni für Bankmanager in die Kritik geraten. Bonussysteme stehen im Verdacht, Anreize für eine zu riskante Kreditvergabe zu setzen. Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht am Beispiel einer großen internationalen Geschäftsbank, wie sich ein Bonussystem, das ein hohes Volumen neu vergebener Kredite belohnt und den Ausfall von Krediten bestraft, auf das Verhalten von Kreditsachbearbeitern auswirkt. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Kreditsachbearbeiter die Anbahnung neuer und die Überwachung bestehender Kredite verstärken, wenn sie ihren monatlichen Bonus zu verlieren drohen. Eine genauere Prüfung von Kreditanträgen findet dagegen nicht statt. Kreditsachbearbeiter passen ihr Verhalten besonders gegen Monatsende an, wenn die Bonuszahlung herannaht. Langjährige Mitarbeiter reagieren stärker auf das System als jüngere Kollegen. Komplexe Produktivitätsaspekte wie die Teamfähigkeit können mit Bonussystemen nicht erfasst werden.
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14.10.2021 • 26/2021
East German economy less affected by supply bottlenecks than German economy as a whole, but lower vaccination rates pose risks – Implications of the Joint Economic Forecast Autumn 2021 and of Länder data from recent publications of the Federal Statisti
Supply bottlenecks affect production in the manufacturing sector in East Germany somewhat less than in Germany as a whole. With 1.8%, the increase in Gross Domestic Product in eastern Germany in 2021 therefore is likely to be lower than in Germany as a whole (2.4%); this gap is likely to enlarge in 2022, when supply bottlenecks hamper less (East Germany: 3.6%, Germany 4.8%).
Oliver Holtemöller
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Covered Bonds and Bank Portfolio Rebalancing
Jin Cao, Ragnar E. Juelsrud, Talina Sondershaus
Norges Bank Working Papers,
No. 6,
2021
Abstract
We use administrative and supervisory data at the bank and loan level to investigate the impact of the introduction of covered bonds on the composition of bank balance sheets and bank risk. Covered bonds, despite being collateralized by mortgages, lead to a shift in bank lending from mortgages to corporate loans. Young and low-rated firms in particular receive more credit, suggesting that overall credit risk increases. At the same time, we find that total balance sheet liquidity increases. We identify the channel in a theoretical model and provide empirical evidence: Banks with low initial liquidity and banks with sufficiently high risk-adjusted return on firm lending drive the results.
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Inequality in Life and Death
Martin S. Eichenbaum, Sergio Rebelo, Mathias Trabandt
Abstract
We argue that the Covid epidemic disproportionately affected the economic well-being and health of poor people. To disentangle the forces that generated this outcome, we construct a model that is consistent with the heterogeneous impact of the Covid recession on low- and high-income people. According to our model, two thirds of the inequality in Covid deaths reflect pre-existing inequality in comorbidity rates and access to quality health care. The remaining third, stems from the fact that low-income people work in occupations where the risk of infection is high. Our model also implies that the rise in income inequality generated by the Covid epidemic reflects the nature of the goods that low-income people produce. Finally, we assess the health-income trade-offs associated with fiscal transfers to the poor and mandatory containment policies.
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