Die Kosten von Wahlversprechen: Wie lokale Sparkassen eine neue Landesregierung finanzieren
Michael Koetter, Shasha Li, Paulina Scheit
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 3,
2022
Abstract
Staatliche Banken in Deutschland verfolgen einen lokalen Entwicklungsauftrag in ihrer jeweiligen Gemeinde. Da sie dem Staat gehören, sind sie jedoch politischem Einfluss ausgesetzt. Dies birgt das Risiko, dass eine politisierte Mittelvergabe den Entwicklungsauftrag beeinträchtigt. Dennoch ist erstaunlich wenig darüber bekannt, ob die Kreditvergabe durch Banken in staatlichem Besitz in erster Linie dem Ziel der Entwicklung der Region oder einem politischen Ziel dient. In diesem Beitrag wird untersucht, wie sich ein Wechsel der Regierungspartei auf Landesebene auf die Kreditvergabe durch Sparkassen an die Landesregierung in Deutschland zwischen 1992 und 2018 ausgewirkt hat. Die Schätzergebnisse bestätigen: Lokale Sparkassen erhöhen nach einem wahlbedingten Wechsel der Regierungspartei die Kreditvergabe an die Landesregierung – auf Kosten der Kreditvergabe an lokale Haushalte. Ein Regierungswechsel kann also die Indienstnahme der Sparkassen für landespolitische Ziele aktivieren und möglicherweise ihren öffentlichen Auftrag zur lokalen Entwicklung beeinträchtigen.
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17.08.2022 • 19/2022
Labour mobility is part of structural change
The coal phase-out will also change the affected regions in that part of the workforce will migrate. Politicians should take this process into account in structural policy, because it cannot be completely prevented. A study published by the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) illustrates this with a historical example.
Oliver Holtemöller
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Political Uncertainty and Bank Loan Contracts: Does Government Quality Matter?
Iftekhar Hasan, Ying-Chen Huang, Yin-Siang Huang, Chih-Yung Lin
Journal of Financial Services Research,
December
2021
Abstract
We investigate the relation between political uncertainty and bank loan spreads using a sample of loan contracts for the G20 firms during the period from 1982 to 2015. We find that banks charge firms higher loan spreads and require more covenants during election years when domestic political risks are elevated. Greater differences in the support ratios of opinion polls on candidates lead to the lower cost of bank loans. This political effect also lessens when the government quality of the borrower’s country is better than that of the lender’s country. Better quality government can lower the political risk component of bank loan spreads.
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Partisan Professionals: Evidence from Credit Rating Analysts
Elisabeth Kempf, Margarita Tsoutsoura
Journal of Finance,
No. 6,
2021
Abstract
Partisan perception affects the actions of professionals in the financial sector. Linking credit rating analysts to party affiliations from voter records, we show that analysts not affiliated with the U.S. president's party downward-adjust corporate credit ratings more frequently. Since we compare analysts with different party affiliations covering the same firm in the same quarter, differences in firm fundamentals cannot explain the results. We also find a sharp divergence in the rating actions of Democratic and Republican analysts around the 2016 presidential election. Our results show that analysts' partisan perception has price effects and may influence firms' investment policies.
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The Impact of Political Uncertainty on Institutional Ownership
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Yun Zhu
Journal of Financial Stability,
December
2021
Abstract
This paper provides original evidence from institutional investors that political uncertainty greatly affects investment behavior. Using institutional holdings of common stock, we find that institutions significantly reduce their holdings by 0.8–2.3% points during presidential election years. Such effect holds for gubernatorial elections with cross-state-border difference-in-difference analysis and for tests using a political uncertainty index. The effect is the opposite for American Depository Receipts (ADRs). In addition, we find that institutions benefit financially from the observed strategy, and such strategy is in line with predicted outcomes of presidential election polls.
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Trade Shocks, Labour Markets and Elections in the First Globalisation
Richard Bräuer, Wolf-Fabian Hungerland, Felix Kersting
Abstract
This paper studies the economic and political effects of a large trade shock in agriculture – the grain invasion from the Americas – in Prussia during the first globalisation (1871-1913). We show that this shock accelerated the structural change in the Prussian economy through migration of workers to booming cities. In contrast to studies using today’s data, we do not observe declining per capita income and political polarisation in counties affected by foreign competition. Our results suggest that the negative and persistent effects of trade shocks we see today are not a universal feature of globalisation, but depend on labour mobility. For our analysis, we digitise data from Prussian industrial and agricultural censuses on the county level and combine it with national trade data at the product level. We exploit the cross-regional variation in cultivated crops within Prussia and instrument with Italian trade data to isolate exogenous variation.
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Political Cycles in Bank Lending to the Government
Michael Koetter, Alexander Popov
Review of Financial Studies,
No. 6,
2021
Abstract
We study how political party turnover after German state elections affects banks’ lending to the regional government. We find that between 1992 and 2018, party turnover at the state level leads to a sharp and substantial increase in lending by local savings banks to their home-state government. This effect is accompanied by an equivalent reduction in private lending. A statistical association between political party turnover and government lending is absent for comparable cooperative banks that exhibit a similar regional organization and business model. Our results suggest that political frictions may interfere with government-owned banks’ local development objectives.
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The Economic Record of the Government and Sovereign Bond and Stock Returns Around National Elections
Stefan Eichler, Timo Plaga
Journal of Banking and Finance,
September
2020
Abstract
This paper investigates the role of the fiscal and economic record of the incumbent government in shaping the price response of sovereign bonds and stocks to the election outcome in emerging markets and developed countries. For sovereign bonds in emerging markets, we find robust evidence for higher cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) if a government associated with a relatively low primary fiscal balance is voted out of office compared to elections where the fiscal balance was relatively high. This effect of the incumbent government's fiscal record is significantly more pronounced in the presence of high sovereign default risk and strong political veto players, whereas the quality of institutions does not explain differences in effects for different events. We do not find robust effects of the government's fiscal record for developed countries and stocks.
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Politics, Banks, and Sub-sovereign Debt: Unholy Trinity or Divine Coincidence?
Michael Koetter, Alexander Popov
Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper,
No. 53,
2018
Abstract
We exploit election-driven turnover in State and local governments in Germany to study how banks adjust their securities portfolios in response to the loss of political connections. We find that local savings banks, which are owned by their host county and supervised by local politicians, increase significantly their holdings of home-State sovereign bonds when the local government and the State government are dominated by different political parties. Banks' holdings of other securities, like federal bonds, bonds issued by other States, or stocks, are not affected by election outcomes. We argue that banks use sub-sovereign bond purchases to gain access to politically distant government authorities.
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Connecting to Power: Political Connections, Innovation, and Firm Dynamics
Ufuk Akcigit, Salomé Baslandze, Francesca Lotti
NBER Working Paper,
No. 25136,
2018
Abstract
How do political connections affect firm dynamics, innovation, and creative destruction? To answer this question, we build a firm dynamics model, where we allow firms to invest in innovation and/or political connection to advance their productivity and to overcome certain market frictions. Our model generates a number of theoretical testable predictions and highlights a new interaction between static gains and dynamic losses from rent-seeking in aggregate productivity. We test the predictions of our model using a brand-new dataset on Italian firms and their workers, spanning the period from 1993 to 2014, where we merge: (i) firm-level balance sheet data; (ii) social security data on the universe of workers; (iii) patent data from the European Patent Office; (iv) the national registry of local politicians; and (v) detailed data on local elections in Italy. We find that firm-level political connections are widespread, especially among large firms, and that industries with a larger share of politically connected firms feature worse firm dynamics. We identify a leadership paradox: when compared to their competitors, market leaders are much more likely to be politically connected, but much less likely to innovate. In addition, political connections relate to a higher rate of survival, as well as growth in employment and revenue, but not in productivity – a result that we also confirm using a regression discontinuity design.
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