13.03.2025 • 10/2025
A turning point for the German economy?
The international political environment has fundamentally changed with looming trade wars and a deteriorating security situation in Europe. The leading parties in Germany are setting the stage for debt-financed additional defence tasks with far-reaching changes to the debt brake. This entails major risks for the German economy, but also opportunities. Meanwhile, the economy continues to be in a downturn. According to the spring forecast of the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH), gross domestic product (GDP) in 2025 is likely to be roughly the same as in the previous year, and it will not increase significantly until 2026, partly because uncertainty about German economic policy is likely to decrease after the new government is established, meaning that the savings rate of private households will fall again somewhat and the debt-financed additional government spending will gradually have an impact on demand. The IWH economists are forecasting an increase in GDP of 0.1% for 2025. In December, they were still forecasting growth of 0.4% for 2025. The outlook is similar for East Germany, where production is likely to have increased slightly in 2024, unlike in Germany as a whole.
Oliver Holtemöller
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Corporate Loan Spreads and Economic Activity
Anthony Saunders, Alessandro Spina, Sascha Steffen, Daniel Streitz
Review of Financial Studies,
No. 2,
2025
Abstract
We use secondary corporate loan-market prices to construct a novel loan-market-based credit spread. This measure has considerable predictive power for economic activity across macroeconomic outcomes in both the U.S. and Europe and captures unique information not contained in public market credit spreads. Loan-market borrowers are compositionally different and particularly sensitive to supply-side frictions as well as financial frictions that emanate from their own balance sheets. This evidence highlights the joint role of financial intermediary and borrower balance-sheet frictions in understanding macroeconomic developments and enriches our understanding of which type of financial frictions matter for the economy.
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Nachlassende Unternehmensdynamik in Europa: Die Rolle von Schocks und Reaktionsfähigkeit
Filippo Biondi, Sergio Inferrera, Matthias Mertens, Javier Miranda
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 3,
2024
Abstract
Wir untersuchen die Veränderung der Unternehmensdynamik in Europa seit 2000 anhand neuer Daten, die wir für 19 europäische Länder erhoben haben. In allen Ländern dokumentieren wir einen breit angelegten Rückgang der Unternehmensdynamik, der die meisten Wirtschaftszweige und Firmengrößenklassen betrifft. Große und ältere Unternehmen verzeichnen den stärksten Rückgang der Unternehmensdynamik. Gleichzeitig geht der Anteil an Personen, die in jungen Unternehmen arbeiten, zurück. In Übereinstimmung mit Ergebnissen aus den USA reagieren Unternehmen in Europa weniger stark auf Produktivitätsveränderungen als früher („Reaktivität von Firmen“), was einen Teil des Rückgangs der Unternehmensdynamik erklärt. Im Gegensatz zur bisherigen Evidenz für die USA hat sich in Europa jedoch auch die Dynamik von Produktivitätsschocks abgeschwächt, was einen weiteren Teil des Rückgangs der Unternehmensdynamik erklärt. Für das deutsche Verarbeitende Gewerbe berechnen wir, dass der Rückgang der Reaktivität von Firmen ca. 40% des Rückgangs der Unternehmensdynamik erklärt, während die Abschwächung von Produktivitätsschocks 60% des Rückgangs der Unternehmensdynamik erklärt. Diese Prozesse deuten darauf hin, dass Marktfriktionen, wie beispielsweise Firmenmarktmacht in Europa, zu zunehmenden Fehlallokationen führen und dass die Innovationsprozesse sich abgeschwächt haben, woraus eine geringere Umverteilung von Marktanteilen zwischen Firmen resultiert.
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Moderate economic growth in the world – German economy continues to stagnate
Konjunktur aktuell,
No. 3,
2024
Abstract
The recent moderate pace of the global economy will continue for the time being. In Europe, the economy is likely to pick up slightly from the winter half-year 2024/2025. In Germany, the sluggish export business in particular is providing a lack of economic impetus. However, private consumption will contribute to a slight economic recovery in the winter half-year. Gross domestic product is likely to stagnate in 2024 and grow by 1.0% in 2025.
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Import Shocks and Voting Behavior in Europe Revisited
Annika Backes, Steffen Müller
European Journal of Political Economy,
June
2024
Abstract
We provide first evidence for the long-run causal impact that Chinese imports to European regions had on voting outcomes and revisit earlier estimates of the short-run impact for a methodological reason. The fringes of the political spectrum gained ground many years after the China shock plateaued and, unlike an earlier study by Colantone and Stanig (2018b), we do not find any robust evidence for a short-run effect on far-right votes. Instead, far-left and populist parties gained in the short run. We identify persistent long-run effects of import shocks on voting. These effects are biased towards populism and, to a lesser extent, to the far-right.
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23.04.2024 • 13/2024
Chinese mass imports strengthen extreme parties
Globalisation has led to an increase in votes for the political fringes in Europe. A study by the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) is the first to show the long-term consequences of increased Chinese imports in European regions: Far-right and populist parties in particular have benefited from the so-called China shock in national elections.
Steffen Müller
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Voting under Debtor Distress
Jakub Grossmann, Štěpán Jurajda
CERGE-EI Working Paper,
No. 744,
2023
Abstract
There is growing evidence on the role of economic conditions in the recent successes of populist and extremist parties. However, little is known about the role of over-indebtedness, even though debtor distress has grown in Europe following the financial crisis. We study the unique case of the Czech Republic, where by 2017, nearly one in ten citizens had been served at least one debtor distress warrant even though the country consistently features low unemployment. Our municipality-level difference-in-differences analysis asks about the voting consequences of a rise in debtor distress following a 2001 deregulation of consumer-debt collection. We find that debtor distress has a positive effect on support for (new) extreme right and populist parties, but a negative effect on a (traditional) extreme-left party. The effects of debtor distress we uncover are robust to whether and how we control for economic hardship; the effects of debtor distress and economic hardship are of similar magnitude, but operate in opposing directions across the political spectrum.
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Research Data Centre
Research Data Centre (IWH-RDC) Direct link to our Data Offer The IWH Research Data Centre offers external researchers access to microdata and micro-aggregated data sets that…
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Media Response
Media Response March 2025 Oliver Holtemöller: Das Sondervermögen könnte die regionale Ungleichheit verstärken in: Tagesspiegel Background, 24.03.2025 IWH: Deutschlands wahrer…
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Declining Business Dynamism in Europe: The Role of Shocks, Market Power, and Technology
Filippo Biondi, Sergio Inferrera, Matthias Mertens, Javier Miranda
VoxEU CEPR,
2024
Abstract
We study changes in business dynamism in Europe after 2000 using novel micro-aggregated data that we collected for 19 European countries. In all countries, we document a broad-based decline in job reallocation rates that concerns most economic sectors and size classes. This decline is mainly driven by dynamics within sectors, size, and age classes rather than by compositional changes. Large and mature firms experience the strongest decline in job reallocation rates. Simultaneously, the employment shares of young firms decline. Consistent with US evidence, firms’ employment has become less responsive to productivity shocks. However, the dispersion of firms’ productivity shocks has decreased too. To enhance our understanding of these patterns, we derive and apply a novel firm-level framework that relates changes in firms’ sales, market power, wages, and production technology to firms’ responsiveness and job reallocation.
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