East Germany
The Nasty Gap 30 years after unification: Why East Germany is still 20% poorer than the West Dossier In a nutshell The East German economic convergence process is hardly…
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Productivity
Productivity: More with Less by Better Available resources are scarce. To sustain our society's income and living standards in a world with ecological and demographic change, we…
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Research Clusters
Three Research Clusters Research Cluster "Economic Dynamics and Stability" Research Questions This cluster focuses on empirical analyses of macroeconomic dynamics and stability.…
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Gross domestic product
Gross domestic product Gross domestic product (GDP) includes the value of all goods and services produced in an economic area during a specific period of time. It is defined as an…
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Projects
Our Projects 07.2022 ‐ 12.2026 Evaluation of the InvKG and the federal STARK programme On behalf of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Climate Protection, the IWH and the RWI…
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International Trade Barriers and Regional Employment: The Case of a No-Deal Brexit
Hans-Ulrich Brautzsch, Oliver Holtemöller
Journal of Economic Structures,
No. 11,
2021
Abstract
We use the World Input–Output Database (WIOD) combined with regional sectoral employment data to estimate the potential regional employment effects of international trade barriers. We study the case of a no-deal Brexit in which imports to the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU) would be subject to tariffs and non-tariff trade costs. First, we derive the decline in UK final goods imports from the EU from industry-specific international trade elasticities, tariffs and non-tariff trade costs. Using input–output analysis, we estimate the potential output and employment effects for 56 industries and 43 countries on the national level. The absolute effects would be largest in big EU countries which have close trade relationships with the UK, such as Germany and France. However, there would also be large countries outside the EU which would be heavily affected via global value chains, such as China, for example. The relative effects (in percent of total employment) would be largest in Ireland followed by Belgium. In a second step, we split up the national effects on the NUTS-2 level for EU member states and additionally on the county (NUTS-3) level for Germany. The share of affected workers varies between 0.03% and 3.4% among European NUTS-2 regions and between 0.15% and 0.4% among German counties. A general result is that indirect effects via global value chains, i.e., trade in intermediate inputs, are more important than direct effects via final demand.
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Short-term Economic Effects of a "Brexit" on the German Economy
Hans-Ulrich Brautzsch, Geraldine Dany-Knedlik, Andrej Drygalla, Stefan Gebauer, Oliver Holtemöller, Martina Kämpfe, Axel Lindner, Claus Michelsen, Malte Rieth, Thore Schlaak
IWH Online,
No. 3,
2019
Abstract
Viele Fragen rund um den Brexit sind weiterhin offen. Es kann nicht ausgeschlossen werden, dass sich Großbritannien und die Europäische Union nicht auf einen Austrittsvertrag einigen können. Dann könnte es zu einem sogenannten harten Brexit (No-Deal Brexit) kommen. Wir haben die kurzfristigen Effekte eines harten Brexit für die deutsche Wirtschaft untersucht. Effekte über den Handelskanal werden zunächst auf Basis einer Input-Output-Analyse der internationalen und sektoralen Verflechtungen auf 0,3% in Relation zum Bruttoinlandsprodukt geschätzt. Diese Größenordnung ergibt sich auch aus dem internationalen Konjunkturmodell des IWH, mit dem auch makroökonomische Rückwirkungen berücksichtigt werden. Mit einem harten Brexit entstünde neben den Handelsbarrieren ein erhebliches Verunsicherungspotenzial für Unternehmer und private Haushalte. Dies wirkt sich nachfrageseitig negativ auf die Investitionstätigkeit und den privaten Verbrauch aus. Für sich genommen belaufen sich diese Effekte auf 0,1% des Bruttoinlandsproduktes. Insgesamt könnte das deutsche Bruttoinlandsprodukt in den ein bis zwei Jahren nach einem harten Brexit um mehrere zehntel Prozentpunkte gedämpft werden. Am stärksten wäre wohl die Automobilbranche betroffen. Empfehlungen für diskretionäre konjunkturpolitische Maßnahmen, die auf die Dämpfung der kurzfristigen gesamtwirtschaftlichen Effekte oder auf einzelne Wirtschaftszweige abzielen, lassen sich daraus nicht ableiten. Die automatischen Stabilisatoren sind angesichts der erwarteten Größenordnung der Effekte ausreichend.
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Motivating High‐impact Innovation: Evidence from Managerial Compensation Contracts
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Zenu Sharma, Maya Waisman
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments,
No. 3,
2019
Abstract
We investigate the relationship between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation and firm innovation and find that long‐term incentives in the form of options, especially unvested options, and protection from managerial termination in the form of golden parachutes are positively related to corporate innovation, and particularly to high‐impact, exploratory (new knowledge creation) invention. Conversely, non‐equity pay has a detrimental effect on the input, output and impact of innovation. Tests using the passage of an option expensing regulation (FAS 123R) as an exogenous shock to option compensation suggest a causal interpretation for the link between long‐term pay incentives, patents and citations. Furthermore, we find that the decline in option pay following the implementation of FAS 123R has led to a significant reduction in exploratory innovation and therefore had a detrimental effect on innovation output. Overall, our findings support the idea that compensation contracts that protect from early project failure and incentivize long‐term commitment are more suitable for inducing high‐impact corporate innovation.
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Potential International Employment Effects of a Hard Brexit
Hans-Ulrich Brautzsch, Oliver Holtemöller
Abstract
We use the World Input Output Database (WIOD) to estimate the potential employment effects of a hard Brexit in 43 countries. In line with other studies we assume that imports from the European Union (EU) to the UK will decline by 25% after a hard Brexit. The absolute effects are largest in big EU countries which have close trade relationships with the UK like Germany and France. However, there are also large countries outside the EU which are heavily affected via global value chains like China, for example. The relative effects (in percent of total employment) are largest in Malta and Ireland. UK employment will also be affected via intermediate input production. Within Germany, the motor vehicle industry and in particular the “Autostadt” Wolfsburg are most affected.
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Benchmark Value-added Chains and Regional Clusters in R&D-intensive Industries
Reinhold Kosfeld, Mirko Titze
International Regional Science Review,
No. 5,
2017
Abstract
Although the phase of euphoria seems to be over, policy makers and regional agencies have maintained their interest in cluster policy. Modern cluster theory provides reasons for positive external effects that may accrue from interaction in a group of proximate enterprises operating in common and related fields. Although there has been some progress in locating clusters, in most cases only limited knowledge on the geographical extent of regional clusters has been established. In the present article, we present a hybrid approach to cluster identification. Dominant buyer–supplier relationships are derived by qualitative input–output analysis from national input–output tables, and potential regional clusters are identified by spatial scanning. This procedure is employed to identify clusters of German research and development-intensive industries. A sensitivity analysis reveals good robustness properties of the hybrid approach with respect to variations in the quantitative cluster composition.
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