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Bitte um Gnade für den BundeshaushaltReint GroppDer Spiegel, 13. November 2024
We use project-level information for the largest regional economic development program in German history to study how government subsidies to firms affect credit markets. We identify credit market responses by considering both, bank lending and firm borrowing during 1998-2019. We find that subsidies lead to larger lending volumes without crowding out credit to non-subsidized firms. Banks that are more exposed to subsidized firms exhibit moderately higher credit risk though. Firm subsidies support lending especially when credit constraints are elevated during the years of the financial crisis.
We give an overview of the "German model" of industrial relations. We organize our review by focusing on the two pillars of the model: sectoral collective bargaining and firm-level codetermination. Relative to the United States, Germany outsources collective bargaining to the sectoral level, resulting in higher coverage and the avoidance of firm-level distributional conflict. Relative to other European countries, Germany makes it easy for employers to avoid coverage or use flexibility provisions to deviate downwards from collective agreements. The greater flexibility of the German system may reduce unemployment, but may also erode bargaining coverage and increase inequality. Meanwhile, firm-level codetermination through worker board representation and works councils creates cooperative dialogue between employers and workers. Board representation has few direct impacts owing to worker representatives' minority vote share, but works councils, which hold a range of substantive powers, may be more impactful. Overall, the German model highlights tensions between efficiency-enhancing flexibility and equity-enhancing collective action.
