Regulating Zombie Mortgages
Jonathan Lee, Duc Duy Nguyen, Huyen Nguyen
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 16,
2024
Abstract
Using the adoption of Zombie Property Law (ZL) across several US states, we show that increased lender accountability in the foreclosure process affects mortgage lending decisions and standards. Difference-in-differences estimations using a state border design show that ZL incentivizes lenders to screen mortgage applications more carefully: they deny more applications and impose higher interest rates on originated loans, especially risky loans. In turn, these loans exhibit higher ex-post performance. ZL also affects lender behavior after borrowers become distressed, causing them to strategically keep delinquent mortgages alive. Our findings inform the debate on policy responses to foreclosure crises.
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Climate Stress Tests, Bank Lending, and the Transition to the Carbon-neutral Economy
Larissa Fuchs, Huyen Nguyen, Trang Nguyen, Klaus Schaeck
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 9,
2024
Abstract
We ask if bank supervisors’ efforts to combat climate change affect banks’ lending and their borrowers’ transition to the carbon-neutral economy. Combining information from the French supervisory agency’s climate pilot exercise with borrowers’ emission data, we first show that banks that participate in the exercise increase lending to high-carbon emitters but simultaneously charge higher interest rates. Second, participating banks collect new information about climate risks, and boost lending for green purposes. Third, receiving credit from a participating bank facilitates borrowers’ efforts to improve environmental performance. Our findings establish a hitherto undocumented link between banking supervision and the transition to net-zero.
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Klimastresstests, Kreditvergabeverhalten der Banken und der Übergang zur klimaneutralen Wirtschaft
Larissa Fuchs, Huyen Nguyen, Trang Nguyen, Klaus Schaeck
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Nr. 1,
2024
Abstract
Kann die Bankenaufsicht den Übergang zu einer kohlenstoffneutralen Wirtschaft unterstützen, indem sie die Kreditvergabe der Banken an Unternehmen beeinflusst? Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Kreditvergabe der Banken vor und nach dem weltweit ersten Klimastresstest in Frankreich und die Reaktion der kreditnehmenden Unternehmen. Die dem Stresstest unterworfenen Banken geben kohlenstoffintensiven Unternehmen mehr Kredite. Zugleich verlangen sie ihnen aber höhere Zinssätze ab. Die kohlenstoffintensiven Kreditnehmer, deren Banken sich dem Klimastresstest unterzogen haben, verpflichten sich eher zu ehrgeizigen Emissionszielen und integrieren eher Umweltaspekte in die Bewertung von Investitionsprojekten. Jedoch reduzieren sie weder direkt ihre Kohlenstoffemissionen noch beenden sie Beziehungen zu klimaschädlichen Lieferanten. Die Studie belegt somit einen kausalen Zusammenhang zwischen Klimastresstests der Banken und der Verringerung des Transitionsrisikos der Kreditnehmer.
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Climate Stress Tests, Bank Lending, and the Transition to the Carbon-Neutral Economy
Larissa Fuchs, Trang Nguyen, Klaus Schaeck
SSRN Working Papers,
Nr. 4427729,
2023
Abstract
Does banking supervision affect borrowers’ transition to the carbon-neutral economy? We use a unique identification strategy that combines the French bank climate pilot exercise with borrowers’ carbon emissions to present two novel findings. First, climate stress tests actively facilitate borrowers’ transition to a low-carbon economy through a lending channel. Stress-tested banks increase loan volumes but simultaneously charge higher interest rates for brown borrowers. Second, additional lending is associated with some improvements in environmental performance. While borrowers commit more to reduce carbon emissions and are more likely to evaluate environmental effects of their projects, they neither reduce direct carbon emissions, nor terminate relationships with environmentally unfriendly suppliers. Our findings establish a causal link between bank climate stress tests and borrowers’ reductions in transition risk.
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Medienecho
Medienecho Juli 2024 Oliver Holtemöller: “Profit und Spiele” in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 24.07.2024 IWH: “Die Luft für Start-ups wird dünner” in: Springer Professional, 23.07.2024…
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Gleichstellung & Antidiskriminierung
Chancengleichheit am IWH Das IWH bekennt sich zu einer aktiven Förderung der beruflichen Gleichstellung von Frauen und Männern, die über gesetzliche Vorgaben hinausgeht. Im Jahr…
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To Securitize or To Price Credit Risk?
Danny McGowan, Huyen Nguyen
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
im Erscheinen
Abstract
Do lenders securitize or price loans in response to credit risk? Exploiting exogenous variation in regional credit risk due to foreclosure law differences along US state borders, we find that lenders securitize mortgages that are eligible for sale to the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) rather than price regional credit risk. For non-GSE-eligible mortgages with no GSE buyback provision, lenders increase interest rates as they are unable to shift credit risk to loan purchasers. The results inform the debate surrounding the GSEs' buyback provisions, the constant interest rate policy, and show that underpricing regional credit risk increases the GSEs' debt holdings.
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Zinsaufschlag oder Übertragung durch Verbriefung? Der Umgang mit Risiken im US-Hypothekenmarkt
Danny McGowan, Huyen Nguyen
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Nr. 3,
2022
Abstract
Seit der Finanzkrise der Jahre 2007 und 2008 diskutiert die Wissenschaft darüber, wie Kreditgeber die Verbriefung von Hypotheken nutzen, um das Kreditrisiko an Dritte weiterzugeben, und wie dies zur Finanzkrise beigetragen hat. Eine aktuelle IWH-Studie betrachtet die Entscheidungssituation des Kreditgebers zwischen Risikoaufschlag und Risikoübertragung. Sie nutzt rechtliche Unterschiede in verschiedenen US-Bundesstaaten bei der Zwangsvollstreckung von Hypotheken, um daraus unterschiedliche regionale Kreditrisiken abzuleiten. Ist dieses regionale Risiko erhöht, reagieren Kreditgeber durch vermehrte Verbriefung, wenn Hypotheken zum Verkauf an halbstaatliche Agenturen (Government Sponsored Enterprises, GSE) wie Fannie Mae und Freddie Mac zugelassen sind und so gegen Ausfall versichert werden können. Bei Hypotheken, für die kein Rückkauf durch GSE infrage kommt, erhöhen die Kreditgeber dagegen die Zinsen, da sie das Kreditrisiko nicht an die Kreditkäufer weitergeben können.
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Banking Reform, Risk-Taking, and Accounting Quality: Evidence from Post-Soviet Transition States
Yiwei Fang, Wassim Dbouk, Iftekhar Hasan, Lingxiang Li
Journal of International Accounting Research,
Nr. 1,
2022
Abstract
The drastic banking reform within Central and Eastern Europe following the collapse of the Soviet Union provides an ideal quasi-experimental design to examine the causal effects of institutional development on accounting quality (AQ). We find that banking reform spurs significant improvement in predictive power of earnings and reductions in earnings smoothing, earnings-inflating discretionary provisions, and avoidance of reporting losses. These effects hold under alternative model specifications and after considering concurrent institutional developments. In contrast, corporate reform shows no such effects, refuting the alternative explanation that unobserved factors affect both reform speed in general and the quality of financial reporting. We further identify four specific reformative actions that are integral to the drastic banking reform process where prudential regulation contributes the most to the observed AQ improvement. It supports the conjecture that banking reform improves AQ by reducing banks' risk-taking behaviors and, as a result, their motive behind accounting manipulation.
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Firm-level Employment, Labour Market Reforms, and Bank Distress
Ralph Setzer, Moritz Stieglitz
Journal of International Money and Finance,
February
2022
Abstract
We explore the impact of financial frictions on the employment effect of labour market reforms. Our study combines a new cross-country reform database on labour market reforms with matched firm-bank data for nine euro area countries over the period 1999 to 2013. While we find that labour market reforms are overall effective in increasing employment, restricted access to bank credit can undo up to half of medium to long-term employment gains at the firm-level. Entrepreneurs without sufficient access to credit cannot reap the full benefits of more flexible employment regulation.
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