Mutual fund families increasingly hold bonds and stocks from the same firm. We present evidence that dual ownership allows firms to increase valuable investments and refinance by issuing bonds with lower yields and fewer restrictive covenants, especially when firms face financial distress. Dual holders also prevent overinvestment by firms with entrenched managers. Overall, our results suggest that mutual fund families internalize the agency conflicts of their portfolio companies, highlighting the positive governance externalities of intra-family cooperation.

Does increasing common ownership influence firms’ automation strategies? We develop and empirically test a theory indicating that institutional investors’ common ownership drives firms that employ workers in the same local labor markets to boost automation-related innovation. First, we present a model integrating task-based production and common ownership, demonstrating that greater ownership overlap drives firms to internalize the impact of their automation decisions on the wage bills of local labor market competitors, leading to more automation and reduced employment. Second, we empirically validate the model’s predictions. Based on patent texts, the geographic distribution of firms’ labor forces at the establishment level, and exogenous increases in common ownership due to institutional investor mergers, we analyze the effects of rising common ownership on automation innovation within and across labor markets. Our findings reveal that firms experiencing a positive shock to common ownership with labor market rivals exhibit increased automation and decreased employment growth. Conversely, similar ownership shocks do not affect automation innovation if firms do not share local labor markets.

We test whether organizational risk management matters to bondholders of U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs), and find that debt financing costs increase when the BHC has lower-quality risk management. Consistent with bailouts giving rise to moral hazard among bank creditors, we find that bondholders put less emphasis on risk management in large institutions for which bailouts are expected ex-ante. BHCs that maintained strong risk management before the financial crisis had lower debt costs during and after the crisis, compared to other banks. Overall, quality risk management can curtail risk exposures at BHCs and result in lower debt costs.