We study the aggregate, distributional, and welfare effects of fiscal policy responses to Germany’s energy crisis using a novel Ten-Agents New-Keynesian (TENK) model. The energy crisis, compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic, led to sharp increases in energy prices, inflation, and significant consumption disparities across households. Our model, calibrated to Germany’s income and consumption distribution, evaluates key policy interventions, including untargeted and targeted transfers, a value-added tax cut, energy tax reductions, and an energy cost brake. We find that untargeted transfers had the largest short-term aggregate impact, while targeted transfers were most cost-effective in supporting lower-income households. Other instruments, as the prominent energy cost brake, yielded comparably limited welfare gains. These results highlight the importance of targeted fiscal measures in addressing distributional effects and stabilizing consumption during economic crises.

The substantial fluctuations in oil prices in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have highlighted the importance of tail events in the global market for crude oil which call for careful risk assessment. In this paper we focus on forecasting tail risks in the oil market by setting up a general empirical framework that allows for flexible predictive distributions of oil prices that can depart from normality. This model, based on Bayesian additive regression trees, remains agnostic on the functional form of the conditional mean relations and assumes that the shocks are driven by a stochastic volatility model. We show that our nonparametric approach improves in terms of tail forecasts upon three competing models: quantile regressions commonly used for studying tail events, the Bayesian VAR with stochastic volatility, and the simple random walk. We illustrate the practical relevance of our new approach by tracking the evolution of predictive densities during three recent economic and geopolitical crisis episodes, by developing consumer and producer distress indices that signal the build-up of upside and downside price risk, and by conducting a risk scenario analysis for 2024.

We test whether organizational risk management matters to bondholders of U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs), and find that debt financing costs increase when the BHC has lower-quality risk management. Consistent with bailouts giving rise to moral hazard among bank creditors, we find that bondholders put less emphasis on risk management in large institutions for which bailouts are expected ex-ante. BHCs that maintained strong risk management before the financial crisis had lower debt costs during and after the crisis, compared to other banks. Overall, quality risk management can curtail risk exposures at BHCs and result in lower debt costs.