Competition, Risk-shifting, and Public Bail-out Policies
Reint E. Gropp, H. Hakenes, Isabel Schnabel
Review of Financial Studies,
Nr. 6,
2011
Abstract
This article empirically investigates the competitive effects of government bail-out policies. We construct a measure of bail-out perceptions by using rating information. From there, we construct the market shares of insured competitor banks for any given bank, and analyze the impact of this variable on banks' risk-taking behavior, using a large sample of banks from OECD countries. Our results suggest that government guarantees strongly increase the risk-taking of competitor banks. In contrast, there is no evidence that public guarantees increase the protected banks' risk-taking, except for banks that have outright public ownership. These results have important implications for the effects of the recent wave of bank bail-outs on banks' risk-taking behavior.
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Government Interventions in Banking Crises: Effects of Alternative Schemes on Bank Lending and Risk-taking
Diemo Dietrich, Achim Hauck
Scottish Journal of Political Economy,
Nr. 2,
2012
Abstract
We analyse the effects of policy measures to stop the fall in loan supply following a banking crisis. We apply a dynamic framework in which a debt overhang induces banks to curtail lending or to choose a fragile capital structure. Government assistance conditional on new banking activities, like on new lending or on debt and equity issues, allows banks to influence the scale of the assistance and to externalise risks, implying overinvestment or excessive risk taking or both. Assistance without reference to new activities, like granting lump sum transfers or establishing bad banks, does not generate adverse incentives but may have higher fiscal costs.
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Informed and Uninformed Investment in Housing: The Downside of Diversification
Elena Loutskina, Philip E. Strahan
Review of Financial Studies,
Nr. 5,
2011
Abstract
Mortgage lenders that concentrate in a few markets invest more in information collection than diversified lenders. Concentrated lenders focus on the information-intensive jumbo market and on high-risk borrowers. They are better positioned to price risks and, thus, ration credit less. Adverse selection, however, leads to higher retention of mortgages relative to diversified lenders. Finally, concentrated lenders have higher profits than diversified lenders, their profits vary less systematically, and their stock prices fell less during the 2007—2008 credit crisis. The results imply that geographic diversification led to a decline in screening by lenders, which likely played a role in the 2007–2008 crisis.
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Extreme Risks in Financial Markets and Monetary Policies of the Euro-candidates
Hubert Gabrisch, Lucjan T. Orlowski
Comparative Economic Studies,
Nr. 4,
2011
Abstract
This study investigates extreme tail risks in financial markets of the euro-candidate countries and their implications for monetary policies. Our empirical tests show the prevalence of extreme risks in the conditional volatility series of selected financial variables, that is, interbank rates, equity market indexes and exchange rates. We argue that excessive instability of key target and instrument variables should be mitigated by monetary policies. Central banks in these countries will be well-advised to use both standard and unorthodox (discretionary) tools of monetary policy while steering their economies out of the financial crisis and through the euro-convergence process.
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The Term Structure of Banking Crisis Risk in the United States: A Market Data Based Compound Option Approach
Stefan Eichler, Alexander Karmann, Dominik Maltritz
Journal of Banking and Finance,
Nr. 4,
2011
Abstract
We use a compound option-based structural credit risk model to estimate banking crisis risk for the United States based on market data on bank stocks on a daily frequency. We contribute to the literature by providing separate information on short-term, long-term and total crisis risk instead of a single-maturity risk measure usually inferred by Merton-type models or barrier models. We estimate the model by applying the Duan (1994) maximum-likelihood approach. A strongly increasing total crisis risk estimated from early July 2007 onwards is driven mainly by short-term crisis risk. Banks that defaulted or were overtaken during the crisis have a considerably higher crisis risk (especially higher long-term risk) than banks that survived the crisis.
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Do Banks Benefit from Internationalization? Revisiting the Market Power-Risk Nexus
Claudia M. Buch, C. T. Koch, Michael Koetter
Abstract
Recent developments on international financial markets have called the benefits of
bank globalization into question. Large, internationally active banks have
acquired substantial market power, and international activities have not
necessarily made banks less risky. Yet, surprisingly little is known about the
actual link between bank internationalization, bank risk, and market power.
Analyzing this link is the purpose of this paper. We jointly estimate the
determinants of risk and market power of banks, and we analyze the effects of
changes in terms of the number of foreign countries (the extensive margin) and
the volume of foreign assets (the intensive margin). Our paper has four main
findings. First, there is a strong negative feedback effect between risk and market
power. Second, banks with higher shares of foreign assets, in particular those held
through foreign branches, have higher market power at home. Third, holding
assets in a large number of foreign countries tends to increase bank risk. Fourth,
the impact of internationalization differs across banks from different banking
groups and of different size.
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Cross-border Exposures and Financial Contagion
Hans Degryse, Muhammad Ather Elahi, Maria Fabiana Penas
International Review of Finance,
Nr. 2,
2010
Abstract
Integrated financial markets provide opportunities for expansion and improved risk sharing, but also pose threats of contagion risk through cross-border exposures. This paper examines cross-border contagion risk over the period 1999–2006. To that purpose we use aggregate cross-border exposures of 17 countries as reported in the Bank for International Settlements Consolidated Banking Statistics. We find that a shock that affects the liabilities of one country may undermine the stability of the entire financial system. Particularly, a shock wiping out 25% (35%) of US (UK) cross-border liabilities against non-US (non-UK) banks could lead to bank contagion eroding at least 94% (45%) of the recipient countries' banking assets. We also find that since 2006 a shock to Eastern Europe, Turkey and Russia affects most countries. Our simulations also reveal that the ‘speed of propagation of contagion’ has increased in recent years resulting in a higher number of directly exposed banking systems. Finally, we find that contagion is more widespread in geographical proximities.
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The Extreme Risk Problem for Monetary Policies of the Euro-Candidates
Hubert Gabrisch, Lucjan T. Orlowski
Abstract
We argue that monetary policies in euro-candidate countries should also aim at mitigating excessive instability of the key target and instrument variables of monetary policy during turbulent market periods. Our empirical tests show a significant degree of leptokurtosis, thus prevalence of tail-risks, in the conditional volatility series of such variables in the euro-candidate countries. Their central banks will be well-advised to use both standard and unorthodox (discretionary) tools of monetary policy to mitigate such extreme risks while steering their economies out of the crisis and through the euroconvergence process. Such policies provide flexibility that is not embedded in the Taylor-type instrument rules, or in the Maastricht convergence criteria.
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