The Forward-looking Disclosures of Corporate Managers: Theory and Evidence
Reint E. Gropp, Rasa Karapandza, Julian Opferkuch
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 25,
2016
Abstract
We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project’s potential for success. We find that if the manager’s disclosures are costly, she will never release forward-looking statements that do not convey information to external investors. Furthermore, managers of firms that are transparent and face significant disclosure-related costs will refrain from forward-looking disclosures. In contrast, managers of opaque and profitable firms will follow a policy of accurate disclosures. To test our findings empirically, we devise an index that captures the quantity of forward-looking disclosures in public firms’ 10-K reports, and relate it to multiple firm characteristics. For opaque firms, our index is positively correlated with a firm’s profitability and financing needs. For transparent firms, there is only a weak relation between our index and firm fundamentals. Furthermore, the overall level of forward-looking disclosures declined significantly between 2001 and 2009, possibly as a result of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
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On the Trail of Core–periphery Patterns in Innovation Networks: Measurements and New Empirical Findings from the German Laser Industry
Wilfried Ehrenfeld, Toralf Pusch, Muhamed Kudic
Annals of Regional Science,
Nr. 1,
2015
Abstract
It has been frequently argued that a firm’s location in the core of an industry’s innovation network improves its ability to access information and absorb technological knowledge. The literature has still widely neglected the role of peripheral network positions for innovation processes. In addition to this, little is known about the determinants affecting a peripheral actors’ ability to reach the core. To shed some light on these issues, we have employed a unique longitudinal dataset encompassing the entire population of German laser source manufacturers (LSMs) and laser-related public research organizations (PROs) over a period of more than two decades. The aim of our paper is threefold. First, we analyze the emergence of core–periphery (CP) patterns in the German laser industry. Then, we explore the paths on which LSMs and PROs move from isolated positions toward the core. Finally, we employ non-parametric event history techniques to analyze the extent to which organizational and geographical determinates affect the propensity and timing of network core entries. Our results indicate the emergence and solidification of CP patterns at the overall network level. We also found that the paths on which organizations traverse through the network are characterized by high levels of heterogeneity and volatility. The transition from peripheral to core positions is impacted by organizational characteristics, while an organization’s geographical location does not play a significant role.
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Stale Information, Shocks, and Volatility
Reint E. Gropp, A. Kadareja
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
Nr. 6,
2012
Abstract
We propose a new approach to measuring the effect of unobservable private information on volatility. Using intraday data, we estimate the effect of a well-identified shock on the volatility of stock returns of European banks as a function of the quality of public information available about the banks. We hypothesize that as publicly available information becomes stale, volatility effects and its persistence increase, as private information of investors becomes more important. We find strong support for this idea in the data. We further show that stock volatility is higher just before important announcements if information is stale.
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Competition, Risk-shifting, and Public Bail-out Policies
Reint E. Gropp, H. Hakenes, Isabel Schnabel
Review of Financial Studies,
Nr. 6,
2011
Abstract
This article empirically investigates the competitive effects of government bail-out policies. We construct a measure of bail-out perceptions by using rating information. From there, we construct the market shares of insured competitor banks for any given bank, and analyze the impact of this variable on banks' risk-taking behavior, using a large sample of banks from OECD countries. Our results suggest that government guarantees strongly increase the risk-taking of competitor banks. In contrast, there is no evidence that public guarantees increase the protected banks' risk-taking, except for banks that have outright public ownership. These results have important implications for the effects of the recent wave of bank bail-outs on banks' risk-taking behavior.
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Analyzing Innovation Drivers in the German Laser Industry: the Role of Positioning in the Social and Geographical Space
Muhamed Kudic, Peter Bönisch, Iciar Dominguez Lacasa
Abstract
Empirical and theoretical contributions provide strong evidence that firm-level performance outcomes in terms of innovativeness can either be determined by the firm’s position in the social space (network effects) or by the firm’s position in the geographical space (co-location effects). Even though we can observe quite recently first attempts in bringing together these traditionally distinct research streams (Whittington et al. 2009), research on interdependent network and geographical co-location effects is still rare. Consequently, we seek to answer the following research question: considering that the effects of social and geographic proximity on firm’s innovativeness can be interdependent, what are the distinct and combined effects of firm’s network and geographic position on firm-level innovation output? We analyze the innovative performance of German laser source manufacturers between 1995 and 2007. We use an official database on publicly funded R&D collaboration projects in order to construct yearly networks and analyze firm’s network positions. Based on information on population entries and exits we calculate various types of geographical proximity measures between private sector and public research organizations (PRO). We use patent grants as dependent variable in order to measure firm-level innovation output. Empirical results provide evidence for distinct effect of network degree centrality. Distinct effect of firm’s geographical co-location to laser-related public research organization promotes patenting activity. Results on combined network and co-location effects confirms partially the existence of in-terdependent proximity effects, even though a closer look at these effects reveals some ambiguous but quite interesting findings.
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Evaluating Communication Strategies for Public Agencies: Transparency, Opacity, and Secrecy
Axel Lindner
B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics,
2009
Abstract
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects stemming from different communication strategies of public agencies if strategies of agents are complementary to each other: Communication can either be fully transparent, or the agency opaquely publishes only its overall assessment of the economy, or it keeps information completely secret. It is shown that private agents put more weight on their private information in the transparent case than in the case of opacity. Thus, in many cases, the appropriate measure against overreliance on public information is giving more details to the public instead of denying access to public information.
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Evaluating communication strategies for public agencies: transparency, opacity, and secrecy
Axel Lindner
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 8,
2008
Abstract
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects stemming
from different communication strategies of public agencies if strategies of agents are complementary to each other: communication can either be fully transparent, or the agency opaquely publishes only its overall assessment of the economy, or it keeps information completely secret. It is shown that private agents put more weight to their private information in the transparent case than in case of opacity. Thus, in many cases, the appropriate measure against overreliance on public information is giving more details to the public instead of denying access to public information.
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On the Economics of Ex-Post Transfers in a Federal State: A Mechanism Design Approach
Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher, T. Kuhn
WWDP, 95,
Nr. 95,
2008
Abstract
As a common feature in many federal states grants-in aid are payed to jurisdictions ex post, i.e. after local policy measures have chosen. We show that the central government cannot offer grants ex ante in a federal states with informational asymmetries as well as inter-temporal commitment problems. Local governments’ incentives to provide public goods are distorted if they rely on federal grants-in-aid offered ex post. Furthermore it becomes obvious that local governments are apt to substitute tax revenue for higher grants-in-aid if relevant local data are unobservable for the central government. To which extend ex post transfers mitigate local governments’ incentives crucially depends on the information structure predominant in the federation.
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Local Public Utilities' Profits and Municipal Expenses in Germany: An Empirical Analysis
Peter Haug, Birger Nerré
Proceedings of the 99th Annual Conference on Taxation (November 16-18), Washington DC,
2006
Abstract
The article offers information on profits and municipal expenses of local public utilities in Germany. It reveals that cities and municipalities faced rising expenses over the last years and the only way for local governments to avoid budgetary bottlenecks is to postpone infrastructure investment and increase short-term borrowing. The countries municipalities tried to overcome such difficulties by increasing local public utilities' profits.
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Does Transparency of Central Banks produce Multiple Equilibria on Currency Markets?
Axel Lindner
Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
Nr. 1,
2006
Abstract
A recent strand of literature shows that multiple equilibria in models of markets for pegged currencies vanish if there is slightly diverse information among traders; see Morris and Shin (2001). It is known that this approach works only if the common knowledge in the market is not too precise. This has led to the conclusion that central banks should try to avoid making their information common knowledge. We develop a model in which more transparency of the central bank implies better private information, because each trader utilises public information according to her own private information. Thus, transparency makes multiple equilibria less likely.
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