Complex-task Biased Technological Change and the Labor Market
Colin Caines, Florian Hoffmann, Gueorgui Kambourov
Review of Economic Dynamics,
April
2017
Abstract
In this paper we study the relationship between task complexity and the occupational wage- and employment structure. Complex tasks are defined as those requiring higher-order skills, such as the ability to abstract, solve problems, make decisions, or communicate effectively. We measure the task complexity of an occupation by performing Principal Component Analysis on a broad set of occupational descriptors in the Occupational Information Network (O*NET) data. We establish four main empirical facts for the U.S. over the 1980–2005 time period that are robust to the inclusion of a detailed set of controls, subsamples, and levels of aggregation: (1) There is a positive relationship across occupations between task complexity and wages and wage growth; (2) Conditional on task complexity, routine-intensity of an occupation is not a significant predictor of wage growth and wage levels; (3) Labor has reallocated from less complex to more complex occupations over time; (4) Within groups of occupations with similar task complexity labor has reallocated to non-routine occupations over time. We then formulate a model of Complex-Task Biased Technological Change with heterogeneous skills and show analytically that it can rationalize these facts. We conclude that workers in non-routine occupations with low ability of solving complex tasks are not shielded from the labor market effects of automatization.
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Deutsche Wirtschaft gut ausgelastet — Wirtschaftspolitik neu ausrichten
Roland Döhrn, Ferdinand Fichtner, Oliver Holtemöller, Stefan Kooths, Timo Wollmershäuser
Wirtschaftsdienst,
Nr. 10,
2016
Abstract
Die deutsche Wirtschaft befindet sich in einem moderaten Aufschwung. Die Gemeinschaftsdiagnose Herbst 2016 prognostiziert, dass das Bruttoinlandsprodukt 2016 um 1,9%, 2017 um 1,4% und 2018 um 1,6% zulegen dürfte. Dabei gehen von der Weltkonjunktur nur geringe stimulierende Effekte aus, zudem dürften sich in den außerordentlich niedrigen Kapitalmarktzinsen nicht nur die derzeitige Geldpolitik, sondern auch niedrige Wachstumserwartungen widerspiegeln. All dies hemmt die Ausrüstungsinvestitionen. So ist es weiterhin in erster Linie der Konsum, der den Aufschwung trägt.
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Electoral Credit Supply Cycles Among German Savings Banks
Reint E. Gropp, Vahid Saadi
IWH Online,
Nr. 11,
2015
Abstract
In this note we document political lending cycles for German savings banks. We find that savings banks on average increase supply of commercial loans by €7.6 million in the year of a local election in their respective county or municipality (Kommunalwahl). For all savings banks combined this amounts to €3.4 billion (0.4% of total credit supply in Germany in a complete electoral cycle) more credit in election years. Credit growth at savings banks increases by 0.7 percentage points, which corresponds to a 40% increase relative to non-election years. Consistent with this result, we also find that the performance of the savings banks follows the same electoral cycle. The loans that the savings banks generate during election years perform worse in the first three years of maturity and loan losses tend to be realized in the middle of the election cycle.
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26.11.2015 • 43/2015
Sparkassen vergeben in Wahljahren mehr Kredite
Offenbar nutzen Kommunalpolitiker und -politikerinnen in Wahljahren ihren Einfluss auf die Kreditvergabe der Sparkassen aus. Dies legen Berechnungen des Leibniz-Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) nahe. „In Jahren, in denen Kommunalwahlen stattfanden, erhöhten die Sparkassen ihre Unternehmenskredite im Durchschnitt um 7,6 Mio. Euro“, erklärt IWH-Präsident Reint E. Gropp. Kredite, die in Wahljahren gewährt wurden, waren außerdem von geringerer Qualität und verringerten die Einnahmen der Sparkassen.
Reint E. Gropp
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Censored Fractional Response Model: Estimating Heterogeneous Relative Risk Aversion of European Households
Qizhou Xiong
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 11,
2015
Abstract
This paper estimates relative risk aversion using the observed shares of risky assets and characteristics of households from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey of the European Central Bank. Given that the risky share is a fractional response variable belonging to [0, 1], this paper proposes a censored fractional response estimation method using extremal quantiles to approximate the censoring thresholds. Considering that participation in risky asset markets is costly, I estimate both the heterogeneous relative risk aversion and participation cost using a working sample that includes both risky asset holders and non-risky asset holders by treating the zero risky share as the result of heterogeneous self-censoring. Estimation results show lower participation costs and higher relative risk aversion than what was previously estimated. The estimated median relative risk aversions of eight European countries range from 4.6 to 13.6. However, the results are sensitive to households’ perception of the risky asset market return and volatility.
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Konjunktur aktuell: Deutsche Konjunktur kommt langsam wieder in Schwung
Konjunktur aktuell,
Nr. 1,
2015
Abstract
Das Bruttoinlandsprodukt in Deutschland stieg im Jahr 2014 um 1,5% und wird im Jahr 2015 wohl um 1,3% zulegen. Nach einem schwachen Winterhalbjahr dürfte die deutsche Konjunktur langsam wieder in Schwung kommen, auch weil der niedrige Ölpreis für deutsche Haushalte und Unternehmen eine Kostenentlastung bedeutet. Der Verbraucherpreisindex dürfte im Jahr 2015 um 1,1% zunehmen. Die Arbeitslosenquote wird wohl auf ihrem aktuellen Niveau von 6,4% verharren, obwohl vom flächendeckenden Mindestlohn für sich genommen negative Beschäftigungseffekte ausgehen werden.
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Die mittelfristige wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in Deutschland für die Jahre 2014 bis 2019
Hans-Ulrich Brautzsch, Katja Drechsel, Oliver Holtemöller, Brigitte Loose, Götz Zeddies
Konjunktur aktuell,
Nr. 1,
2015
Abstract
Alles in allem dürfte das Bruttoinlandsprodukt in Deutschland im Jahr 2014 um 1,5% steigen. Im Jahr 2015 wird es wohl um 1,3% zunehmen – etwa 0,2 Prozentpunkte davon sind auf den Ölpreisrückgang zurückzuführen. Nach einer Unterauslastung der Kapazitäten im Jahr 2014 dürfte sich die Produktionslücke Ende des Jahres 2015 schließen. Im Jahr 2016 dürfte die Produktion um 1,6% steigen. Für das Jahr 2014 reicht das 66%-Prognoseintervall für den Zuwachs des Bruttoinlandsprodukts von 1,4% bis 1,6%, für das Jahr 2015 von 0,4% bis 2,1% und für das Jahr 2016 von 0,2% bis 3,4%.
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The Quantity Theory Revisited: A New Structural Approach
Makram El-Shagi, Sebastian Giesen
Macroeconomic Dynamics,
Nr. 1,
2015
Abstract
We propose a unified identification scheme to identify monetary shocks and track their propagation through the economy. We combine three approaches dealing with the consequences of monetary shocks. First, we adjust a state space version of the P-star type model employing money overhang as the driving force of inflation. Second, we identify the contemporaneous impact of monetary policy shocks by applying a sign restriction identification scheme to the reduced form given by the state space signal equations. Third, to ensure that our results are not distorted by the measurement error exhibited by the official monetary data, we employ the Divisia M4 monetary aggregate provided by the Center for Financial Stability. Our approach overcomes one of the major difficulties of previous models by using a data-driven identification of equilibrium velocity. Thus, we are able to show that a P-star model can fit U.S. data and money did indeed matter in the United States.
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Do We Need New Modelling Approaches in Macroeconomics?
Claudia M. Buch, Oliver Holtemöller
Financial Cycles and the Real Economy: Lessons for CESEE Countries,
2014
Abstract
The economic and financial crisis that emerged in 2008 also initiated an intense discussion on macroeconomic research and the role of economists in society. The debate focuses on three main issues. Firstly, it is argued that economists failed to predict the crisis and to design early warning systems. Secondly, it is claimed that economists use models of the macroeconomy which fail to integrate financial markets and which are inadequate to model large economic crises. Thirdly, the issue has been raised that economists invoke unrealistic assumptions concerning human behaviour by assuming that all agents are self-centred, rationally optimizing individuals. In this paper, we focus on the first two issues. Overall, our thrust is that the above statements are a caricature of modern economic theory and empirics. A rich field of research developed already before the crisis and picked up shortcomings of previous models.
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