Kommentar: Wir brauchen eine neue Corona-Strategie
Reint E. Gropp
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Nr. 1,
2021
Abstract
Die gegenwärtige Corona-Strategie der Bundesregierung, wenn man sie denn so nennen kann, konzentriert sich darauf, besonders gefährdete Personen durch Impfung zu schützen und die Ansteckung aller anderen durch den Lockdown zu vermeiden. Sie ignoriert, dass Menschen im täglichen Leben immer Risiken eingehen und dabei auch Risiken berücksichtigen, die durch das Verhalten anderer entstehen. Sie entscheiden selbst, wie stark sie sich gefährden, je nach ihrer persönlichen gesundheitlichen Situation und Risikoaffinität. Die Möglichkeit, Risiken einzugehen, ist ein inhärenter Teil einer freiheitlichen Gesellschaft: Die Gesellschaft vertraut prinzipiell dem Einzelnen, einigermaßen vernünftige Entscheidungen zu treffen – und die Konsequenzen zu tragen, wenn die Dinge schiefgehen. Der Staat setzt dabei die Rahmenbedingungen, aber niemals mit dem Ziel, das Risiko für den Einzelnen auf null zu drücken.
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Supranational Rules, National Discretion: Increasing versus Inflating Regulatory Bank Capital?
Reint E. Gropp, Thomas Mosk, Steven Ongena, Ines Simac, Carlo Wix
Abstract
We study how higher capital requirements introduced at the supranational and implemented at the national level affect the regulatory capital of banks across countries. Using the 2011 EBA capital exercise as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that affected banks inflate their levels of regulatory capital without a commensurate increase in their book equity and without a reduction in bank risk. This observed regulatory capital inflation is more pronounced in countries where credit supply is expected to tighten. Our results suggest that national authorities forbear their domestic banks to meet supranational requirements, with a focus on short-term economic considerations.
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Supranational Rules, National Discretion: Increasing versus Inflating Regulatory Bank Capital
Reint E. Gropp, Thomas Mosk, Steven Ongena, Ines Simac, Carlo Wix
Abstract
The implementation of supranational regulations at the national level often provides national authorities with substantial room to engage in discretion and forbearance. Using evidence from a supranational increase in bank capital requirements, this column shows that national authorities may assist banks' efforts to inflate their regulatory capital to pass such supranational requirements. While supranational rules should be binding in theory, national discretion may effectively undermine them in practice.
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The Real Impact of Ratings-based Capital Rules on the Finance-Growth Nexus
Iftekhar Hasan, Gazi Hassan, Suk-Joong Kim, Eliza Wu
International Review of Financial Analysis,
January
2021
Abstract
We investigate whether ratings-based capital regulation has affected the finance-growth nexus via a foreign credit channel. Using quarterly data on short to medium term real GDP growth and cross-border bank lending flows from G-10 countries to 67 recipient countries, we find that since the implementation of Basel 2 capital rules, risk weight reductions mapped to sovereign credit rating upgrades have stimulated short-term economic growth in investment grade recipients but hampered growth in non-investment grade recipients. The impact of these rating upgrades is strongest in the first year and then reverses from the third year and onwards. On the other hand, there is a consistent and lasting negative impact of risk weight increases due to rating downgrades across all recipient countries. The adverse effects of ratings-based capital regulation on foreign bank credit supply and economic growth are compounded in countries with more corruption and less competitive banking sectors and are attenuated with greater political stability.
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16.12.2020 • 26/2020
Konjunktur aktuell: Neue Pandemiewelle verzögert konjunkturelle Erholung in Deutschland
Der Lockdown lässt die Produktion in Deutschland zum Jahresende zurückgehen. Sobald die Infektionsschutzmaßnahmen gelockert werden, dürfte die Erholung zunächst nur langsam in Gang kommen, auch weil die befristete Mehrwertsteuersenkung ausläuft. Dank milderer Witterung und Impfkampagne dürfte die deutsche Wirtschaft ab dem Frühjahr wieder stärker expandieren. Das Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) prognostiziert, dass das Bruttoinlandsprodukt im Jahr 2021 um 4,4% zunehmen wird, nach einem Rückgang um 5% im Jahr 2020. In Ostdeutschland fällt sowohl der Rückgang als auch der Wiederanstieg deutlich geringer aus.
Oliver Holtemöller
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Entry into Self-employment and Individuals’ Risk-taking Propensities
Matthias Brachert, Walter Hyll, Abdolkarim Sadrieh
Small Business Economics,
Nr. 4,
2020
Abstract
Most of the existing empirical literature on self-employment decisions assumes that individuals’ risk-taking propensities are stable over time. We allow for endogeneity on both sides when examining the relationship between individual risk-taking propensities and entry into self-employment. We confirm that a greater risk-taking propensity is associated with a higher probability of entering self-employment. However, we also find evidence that entering self-employment is associated with a significant and substantial increase in an individual’s propensity to take risks. Our findings add to the growing evidence that risk-taking propensities are not only inborn, but also determined by environmental factors.
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14.12.2020 • 25/2020
Deutsche Lebensversicherer investieren nicht ausreichend in Start-ups
Die deutschen Lebensversicherer legen ihr Kapital bislang zu wenig in Aktien an und hemmen so die wirtschaftliche Dynamik. Eine Studie des Leibniz-Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) legt nahe, dass der Gründerszene Risikokapital fehlt, um erfolgreiche Start-ups zu finanzieren. Grund dafür ist das Anlageverhalten potenzieller Investoren. IWH-Präsident Reint Gropp fordert Reformen, die die Finanzierung innovativer Ideen fördern.
Reint E. Gropp
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Why Life Insurers are Key to Economic Dynamism in Germany
Reint E. Gropp, William McShane
IWH Online,
Nr. 6,
2020
Abstract
Young entrepreneurial firms are of critical importance for innovation. But to bring their new ideas to the market, these startups depend on investors who understand and are willing to accept the risk associated with a new firm. Perhaps the key reason as to why the US has succeeded in producing nearly all the most successful new firms of the 21st century is the economy’s ability to supply vast sums of capital to promising startups. The volume of venture capital (VC) invested in the US is more than 60 times that of Germany. In this policy note, we argue that differences in the regulatory and structural context of institutional investors, in particular life insurance companies, is a central driver of the relative lack of VC - and thereby successful startups - in Germany.
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Sovereign Default Risk, Macroeconomic Fluctuations and Monetary-Fiscal Stabilisation
Markus Kirchner, Malte Rieth
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 22,
2020
Abstract
This paper examines the role of sovereign default beliefs for macroeconomic fluctuations and stabilisation policy in a small open economy where fiscal solvency is a critical problem. We set up and estimate a DSGE model on Turkish data and show that accounting for sovereign risk significantly improves the fit of the model through an endogenous amplication between default beliefs, exchange rate and inflation movements. We then use the estimated model to study the implications of sovereign risk for stability, fiscal and monetary policy, and their interaction. We find that a relatively strong fiscal feedback from deficits to taxes, some exchange rate targeting, or a monetary response to default premia are more effective and efficient stabilisation tools than hawkish inflation targeting.
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Executive Compensation, Macroeconomic Conditions, and Cash Flow Cyclicality
Stefano Colonnello
Finance Research Letters,
November
2020
Abstract
I model the joint effects of debt, macroeconomic conditions, and cash flow cyclicality on risk-shifting behavior and managerial wealth-for-performance sensitivity. The model shows that risk-shifting incentives rise during recessions and that the shareholders can eliminate such adverse incentives by reducing the equity-based compensation in managerial contracts. Moreover, this reduction should be larger in highly procyclical firms. These novel, testable predictions provide insights into optimal shareholder responses to agency costs of debt throughout the business cycle.
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