Tracing negative media attention, this paper investigates the effect of reputational risk on firm value. Decomposing reputational damage into environmental, social and corporate-governance dimensions, it reports that environmental reputational risk has the most significant negative effect on price earnings, i.e., firms exposed to environmental risk are likely to be priced at a discount or charged a higher risk premium when discounting future earnings.

We investigate the French 2012 financial transaction tax (FTT) and find robust evidence for anticipation effects before the implementation date. Controlling for short-run effects, we only find weak evidence for a long-run reduction in trading activity. Thus, the main impact of the French FTT on trading activity is short-run. In line with liquidity clientele effects, we find a more potent effect for low-liquidity stocks and a reallocation of trading to high-liquidity stocks from the Supplemental Liquidity Provider (SLP) program. Finally, we find weak evidence for a persistent volatility reduction but no indication of a significant FTT impact on price efficiency.

This paper investigates whether managers’ personal connections help corporate productivity to recover after a negative economic shock. Leveraging the heterogeneity in the severity of the financial crisis across different sectors, the paper reports that (i) the financial crisis had a negative effect on within-firm productivity, (ii) the effect was long-lasting and persistent, supporting a productivity-hysteresis hypothesis, and (iii) managers’ personal connections allowed corporations to recover from this productivity slowdown. Among the possible mechanisms, we show that connected managers operating in affected sectors foster productivity recovery through higher input cost efficiency and better access to the credit market, as well as more efficient use of labour and capital.

We assess the cleansing effects of the 2008–2009 financial crisis. U.S. regions with higher levels of supervisory forbearance on distressed banks see less restructuring in the real sector: fewer establishments, firms, and jobs are lost when more distressed banks remain in business. In these regions, the banking sector has been less healthy for several years after the crisis. Regions with less forbearance experience higher productivity growth after the crisis with more firm entries, job creation, and employment, wages, patents, and output growth. Forbearance is greater for state-chartered banks and in regions with weaker banking competition and more independent banks.

This paper empirically investigates the role of social trust in the long-term performance of the initial public offerings (IPOs) in China, controlling for the formal institutional environment. We find that privately owned or smaller IPO firms experience significantly better post-IPO performance when they are incorporated in regions with more social trust. The state-owned and bigger IPO firms, on the other hand, experience better long-term post-IPO performance when they are incorporated in regions with stronger formal institutions (e.g. court enforcement and contract holding). Political pluralism turns out to benefit all IPOs in the long term. In addition, our evidence shows that stronger social trust substitutes for the quality of court enforcement but complements the role of contract holding. These results are robust after controlling for alternative definitions of ownership, outliers, non-linear effects of institutions, and the potential endogeneity of institutions in the model.

Asset purchase programmes (APPs) may insulate banks from having to terminate relationships with unproductive customers. Using administrative plant and bank data, we test whether APPs impinge on industry dynamics in terms of plant entry and exit. Plants in Germany connected to banks with access to an APP are approximately 20% less likely to exit. In particular, unproductive plants connected to weak banks with APP access are less likely to close. Aggregate entry and exit rates in regional markets with high APP exposures are also lower. Thus, APPs seem to subdue Schumpeterian cleansing mechanisms, which may hamper factor reallocation and aggregate productivity growth.

This paper analyses whether Christian moralities and rules formed differently by Catholics and Protestants impact the likelihood of households to become overindebted. We find that over-indebtedness is lower in regions in which Catholics outweigh Protestants, indicating that Catholics‘ forgiveness culture and a stricter enforcement of rules by Protestants serve as explanations for our results. Our results provide evidence that religion affects the financial situations of individuals and show that even 500 years after the split between Catholics and Protestants, the differences in the mind-sets of both denominations play an important role for situations of severe financial conditions.

We show that banks that are facing relatively high locally non-diversifiable risks in their home region expand more across states than banks that do not face such risks following branching deregulation in the 1990s and 2000s. These banks with high locally non-diversifiable risks also benefit relatively more from deregulation in terms of higher bank stability. Further, these banks expand more into counties where risks are relatively high and positively correlated with risks in their home region, suggesting that they do not only diversify but also build on their expertise in local risks when they expand into new regions.

We exploit election-driven turnover in State and local governments in Germany to study how banks adjust their securities portfolios in response to the loss of political connections. We find that local savings banks, which are owned by their host county and supervised by local politicians, increase significantly their holdings of home-State sovereign bonds when the local government and the State government are dominated by different political parties. Banks' holdings of other securities, like federal bonds, bonds issued by other States, or stocks, are not affected by election outcomes. We argue that banks use sub-sovereign bond purchases to gain access to politically distant government authorities.

We test whether limited market discipline imposes exit barriers and poor profitability in banking. We exploit an exogenous shock to the governance of government-owned banks: the unification of counties. County mergers lead to enforced government-owned bank mergers. We compare forced to voluntary bank exits and show that the former cause better bank profitability and efficiency at the expense of riskier financial profiles. Regarding real effects, firms exposed to forced bank mergers borrow more at lower cost, increase investment, and exhibit higher employment. Thus, reduced exit frictions in banking seem to unleash the economic potential of both banks and firms.