12.03.2024 • 8/2024
Risk in the banking sector: four out of ten top supervisors come from the financial industry
Europe's banks realise excess returns on the stock market when their alumni join the boards of national supervisory authorities. A study by the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) shows that this happens more frequently than previously recognised. The findings indicate a risk to financial stability and call for a more merit-based, transparent appointment of senior regulators.
Michael Koetter
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Brown Bag Seminar
Brown Bag Seminar Financial Markets Department The seminar series "Brown Bag Seminar" was offered on a regular basis by members of the Financial Markets department and their…
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The Disciplining Effect of Supervisory Scrutiny in the EU-wide Stress Test
Christoffer Kok, Carola Müller, Steven Ongena, Cosimo Pancaro
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
January
2023
Abstract
Relying on confidential supervisory data related to the 2016 EU-wide stress test, this paper presents novel empirical evidence that supervisory scrutiny associated to stress testing has a disciplining effect on bank risk. We find that banks that participated in the 2016 EU-wide stress test subsequently reduced their credit risk relative to banks that were not part of this exercise. Relying on new metrics for supervisory scrutiny that measure the quantity, potential impact, and duration of interactions between banks and supervisors during the stress test, we find that the disciplining effect is stronger for banks subject to more intrusive supervisory scrutiny during the exercise. We also find that a strong risk management culture is a prerequisite for the supervisory scrutiny to be effective. Finally, we show that a similar disciplining effect is not exerted neither by higher capital charges nor by more transparency and related market discipline induced by the stress test.
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CoCo Bonds, Bank Stability, and Earnings Opacity
Melina Ludolph
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 1,
2022
Abstract
This paper examines the effect of CoCo bonds that qualify as additional tier 1 capital on bank stability and reporting. The results reveal a significant reduction in the distance to insolvency following the hybrid bond issuance due to increased earnings volatility. Banks report less stable net income due to more volatile loss provisions, which increases earnings opacity rather than reflects changes in asset quality. The findings are consistent with the premise that persistent uncertainty and misconceptions among investors about bail-in likelihoods limit their monitoring engagement, which results in banks becoming less transparent.
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Bank Accounting Regulations, Enforcement Mechanisms, and Financial Statement Informativeness: Cross-country Evidence
Augustine Duru, Iftekhar Hasan, Liang Song, Yijiang Zhao
Accounting and Business Research,
No. 3,
2020
Abstract
We construct measures of accounting regulations and enforcement mechanisms that are specific to a country's banking industry. Using a sample of major banks in 37 economies, we find that the informativeness of banks’ financial statements, measured by the value relevance of earnings and common equity, is higher in countries with stricter bank accounting regulations and countries with stronger enforcement. These findings suggest that superior bank accounting and enforcement mechanisms enhance the informativeness of banks’ financial statements. In addition, we find that the effects of bank accounting regulations are more pronounced in countries with stronger enforcement in the banking industry, suggesting that enforcement is complementary to bank accounting regulations in achieving higher value relevance of financial statements. Our study has important policy implications for bank regulators.
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Central Bank Transparency and the Volatility of Exchange Rates
Stefan Eichler, Helge Littke
Journal of International Money and Finance,
2018
Abstract
We analyze the effect of monetary policy transparency on bilateral exchange rate volatility. We test the theoretical predictions of a stylized model using panel data for 62 currencies from 1998 to 2010. We find strong evidence that an increase in the availability of information about monetary policy objectives decreases exchange rate volatility. Using interaction models, we find that this effect is more pronounced for countries with a lower flexibility of goods prices, a lower level of central bank conservatism, and a higher interest rate sensitivity of money demand.
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Central Bank Transparency and the Volatility of Exchange Rates
Stefan Eichler, Helge Littke
Abstract
We analyze the effect of monetary policy transparency on bilateral exchange rate volatility. We test the theoretical predictions of a stylized model using panel data for 62 currencies from 1998 to 2010. We find strong empirical evidence that an increase in the availability of information about monetary policy objectives decreases exchange rate volatility. Using interaction models, we find that this effect is more pronounced for countries with a lower flexibility of goods prices, a lower level of central bank conservatism, and a higher interest rate sensitivity of money demand.
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Central Bank Transparency and Cross-border Banking
Stefan Eichler, Helge Littke, Lena Tonzer
Journal of International Money and Finance,
2017
Abstract
We analyze the effect of central bank transparency on cross-border bank activities. Based on a panel gravity model for cross-border bank claims for 21 home and 47 destination countries from 1998 to 2010, we find strong empirical evidence that a rise in central bank transparency in the destination country, on average, increases cross-border claims. Using interaction models, we find that the positive effect of central bank transparency on cross-border claims is only significant if the central bank is politically independent and operates in a stable economic environment. Central bank transparency and credibility are thus considered complements by banks investing abroad.
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09.03.2017 • 12/2017
Comment: Keep cool and be prepared – IWH president Gropp on the ECB’s interest rates decision
”The European Central Bank (ECB) decided to keep interest rates unchanged today. No surprise here. But Mario Draghi unfortunately did not provide a signal to markets that the ECB may be moving on interest rates in the foreseeable future. “This is a reasonable decision, but also a missed opportunity”, Reint E. Gropp, president of the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association, says. “An ECB increase interest rate move must be well prepared, and today’s press conference would have been an opportunity to prepare markets for the fact that interest rates cannot stay where they are forever.”
Reint E. Gropp
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On the Nonexclusivity of Loan Contracts: An Empirical Investigation
Hans Degryse, Vasso Ioannidou, Erik von Schedvin
Management Science,
No. 12,
2016
Abstract
We study how a bank's willingness to lend to a previously exclusive firm changes once the firm obtains a loan from another bank ("outside loan") and breaks an exclusive relationship. Using a difference-in-difference analysis and a setting where outside loans are observable, we document that an outside loan triggers a decrease in the initial bank's willingness to lend to the firm, i.e., outside loans are strategic substitutes. Consistent with concerns about coordination problems and higher indebtedness, we find that this reaction is more pronounced the larger the outside loan and it is muted if the initial bank's existing and future loans retain seniority and are protected with valuable collateral. Our results give a benevolent role to transparency enabling banks to mitigate adverse effects from outside loans. The resulting substitute behavior may also act as a stabilizing force in credit markets limiting positive comovements between lenders, decreasing the possibility of credit freezes and financial crises.
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