The Corporate Investment Benefits of Mutual Fund Dual Holdings
Rex Wang Renjie, Patrick Verwijmeren, Shuo Xia
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
forthcoming
Abstract
Mutual fund families increasingly hold bonds and stocks from the same firm. We present evidence that dual ownership allows firms to increase valuable investments and refinance by issuing bonds with lower yields and fewer restrictive covenants, especially when firms face financial distress. Dual holders also prevent overinvestment by firms with entrenched managers. Overall, our results suggest that mutual fund families internalize the agency conflicts of their portfolio companies, highlighting the positive governance externalities of intra-family cooperation.
Read article
Creditor-control Rights and the Nonsynchronicity of Global CDS Markets
Iftekhar Hasan, Miriam Marra, Eliza Wu, Gaiyan Zhang
Review of Corporate Finance Studies,
forthcoming
Abstract
We analyze how creditor rights affect the nonsynchronicity of global corporate credit default swap spreads (CDS-NS). CDS-NS is negatively related to the country-level creditor-control rights, especially to the “restrictions on reorganization” component, where creditor-shareholder conflicts are high. The effect is concentrated in firms with high investment intensity, asset growth, information opacity, and risk. Pro-creditor bankruptcy reforms led to a decline in CDS-NS, indicating lower firm-specific idiosyncratic information being priced in credit markets. A strategic-disclosure incentive among debtors avoiding creditor intervention seems more dominant than the disciplining effect, suggesting how strengthening creditor rights affects power rebalancing between creditors and shareholders.
Read article
Drehtüren in den Vorstandsetagen der Finanzaufsicht: Sind Banker oder Bürokraten die besseren Aufseher?
Michael Koetter, Noel Nietzold
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
2024
Abstract
Der „umgekehrte Drehtüreffekt“ beschreibt das Phänomen, wenn ehemalige Bankerinnen und Banker Vorstandspositionen in nationalen Aufsichtsbehörden (National Supervisory Agency, NSA) bekleiden. Ein neu erhobener Datensatz zeigt, dass etwa ein Drittel der Vorstandsmitglieder in europäischen NSA vorher in der Finanzindustrie tätig war. Die Bestellung ehemaliger Banker in NSA-Vorstände geht mit positiven Börsenreaktionen einher, was auf eine „Näheprämie“ in der Bewertung beaufsichtigter Banken hindeutet. Im Gegensatz dazu ruft die Berufung von Bürokraten ohne praktische Vorkenntnisse in der Bankenwelt negative Börsenreaktionen hervor. Bis zur Einführung des Einheitlichen Aufsichtsmechanismus (Single Supervisory Mechanism, SSM) in Europa korreliert die Präsenz ehemaliger Banker in NSA-Vorständen mit einer geringeren regulatorischen Kapitalquote, was auf einen nachsichtigeren Aufsichtsstil schließen lässt.
Read article
Poison Bonds
Rex Wang Renjie, Shuo Xia
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 3,
2024
Abstract
This paper documents the rise of “poison bonds”, which are corporate bonds that allow bondholders to demand immediate repayment in a change-of-control event. The share of poison bonds among new issues has grown substantially in recent years, from below 20% in the 90s to over 60% since mid-2000s. This increase is predominantly driven by investment-grade issues. We provide causal evidence that the pressure to eliminate poison pills has led firms to issue poison bonds as an alternative. Our analysis suggests that this practice entrenches incumbent managers and destroys shareholder value. Holding a portfolio of firms that remove poison pills but promptly issue poison bonds results in negative abnormal returns of −7.3% per year. Our findings have important implications for the agency theory of debt: (i) more debt may not discipline the management; and (ii) even without financial distress, managerial entrenchment can lead to agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors.
Read article
The Reverse Revolving Door in the Supervision of European Banks
Stefano Colonnello, Michael Koetter, Alex Sclip, Konstantin Wagner
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 25,
2023
Abstract
We show that around one third of executive directors on the boards of national supervisory authorities (NSA) in European banking have an employment history in the financial industry. The appointment of executives without a finance background associates with negative valuation effects. Appointments of former bankers, in turn, spark positive stock market reactions. This „proximity premium“ of supervised banks is a more likely driver of positive valuation effects than superior financial expertise or intrinsic skills of former executives from the financial industry. Prior to the inception of the European Single Supervisory Mechanism, the presence of former financial industry executives on the board of NSA associates with lower regulatory capital and faster growth of banks, pointing to a more lenient supervisory style.
Read article
Common Venture Capital Investors and Startup Growth
Ofer Eldar, Jillian Grennan
Review of Financial Studies,
No. 2,
2023
Abstract
We exploit the staggered introduction of liability waivers when investors hold stakes in conflicting business opportunities as a shock to venture capital (VC) investment and director networks. After the law changes, we find increases in within-industry VC investment and common directors serving on startup boards. Despite the potential for rent extraction, same-industry startups inside VC portfolios benefit by raising more capital, failing less, and exiting more successfully. VC directors serving on other startup boards are the primary mechanism associated with positive outcomes, consistent with common VC investment facilitating informational exchanges in VC portfolios.
Read article
Standards
Achieving Scientific Quality and Meeting Social Standards In order to secure the highest standards, the courses and the research projects will be evaluated. Evaluations form the…
See page
Assistance with attacks in research communication
Scicomm Support Services Scicomm supports and advises researchers and research communicators in the event of attacks and unobjective conflicts in research communication. Services:…
See page
Exposure to Conflict, Migrations and Long-run Education and Income Inequality: Evidence from Bosnia and Herzegovina
Adnan Efendic, Dejan Kovač, Jacob N. Shapiro
Defence and Peace Economics,
No. 8,
2023
Abstract
We investigate the long-term relationship between conflict-related migration and individual socioeconomic inequality. Looking at the post-conflict environment of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), a former Yugoslav state most heavily impacted by the wars of the early 1990s, the paper focuses on differences in educational performance and income between four groups: migrants, internally displaced persons, former external migrants, and those who did not move. The analysis leverages a municipality-representative survey (n ≈ 6,000) that captured self-reported education and income outcomes as well as migration histories. We find that individuals with greater exposure to conflict had systematically worse educational performance and lower earnings two decades after the war. Former external migrants now living in BiH have better educational and economic outcomes than those who did not migrate, but these advantages are smaller for external migrants who were forced to move. We recommend that policies intended to address migration-related discrepancies should be targeted on the basis of individual and family experiences caused by conflict.
Read article
Poison Bonds
Shuo Xia, Rex Wang Renjie
SSRN Discussion Paper,
2023
Abstract
This paper documents the rise of "poison bonds", which are corporate bonds that allow bondholders to demand immediate repayment in a change-of-control event. The share of poison bonds among new issues has grown substantially in recent years, from below 20% in the 90s to over 60% after 2005. This increase is predominantly driven by investment-grade issues. We provide causal evidence that the pressure to eliminate poison pills has led firms to issue poison bonds as an alternative. Further analyses suggest that this practice entrenches incumbent managers, coincidentally benefits bondholders, but destroys shareholder value. Holding a portfolio of firms that remove poison pills but promptly issue poison bonds results in negative abnormal returns of -7.3% per year. Our findings have important implications for understanding the agency benefits and costs of debt: (1) more debt does not necessarily discipline the management; and (2) even without financial distress, managerial entrenchment can lead to conflicts between shareholders and creditors.
Read article
