Konjunktur aktuell: Aufschwung in Deutschland und in der Welt
Konjunktur aktuell,
No. 5,
2017
Abstract
Zur Jahreswende ist die deutsche Konjunktur nach wie vor kräftig. Das Bruttoinlandsprodukt dürfte im Jahr 2017 um 2,2% zunehmen, und weil in diesem Jahr deutlich weniger Arbeitstage anfallen als zuvor, beträgt die Zuwachsrate kalenderbereinigt sogar 2,5%. Der Aufschwung ist breit aufgestellt. Schon länger treibt die deutliche Zunahme der Beschäftigung die privaten Einkommen, den Konsum und den Wohnungsbau, der außerdem von den sehr nied-rigen Zinsen Rückenwind erhält. Zudem profitieren die deutschen Exporte zurzeit von der schwungvollen internationalen Konjunktur. Auch weil die Geldpolitik im Euroraum vorerst expansiv bleibt, ist damit zu rechnen, dass sich der Aufschwung im Jahr 2018 fortsetzt; die Produktion dürfte dann erneut um 2,2% zunehmen (auch kalenderbereinigt). Die Verbraucherpreisinflation ist in den Jahren 2017 und 2018 mit 1,7% moderat. Zwar nimmt der binnenwirtschaftliche Preisdruck zu, aber die die Effekte des Energiepreisanstiegs vom Jahr 2017 laufen im Jahr 2018 aus, und die Aufwertung des Euro im Sommer 2017 wirkt preissenkend. Die schon gegenwärtig niedrige Arbeitslosenquote geht im kommenden Jahr weiter zurück. Der Finanzierungssaldo des Staates fällt im Jahr 2018 mit 1,3% in Relation zum Bruttoinlandsprodukt fast so hoch wie im Vorjahr aus, wenn man keine neuen finanzpolitischen Maßnahmen unterstellt. Die ostdeutsche Wirtschaft dürfte in den Jahren 2017 und 2018 mit 2,1% bzw. 2,0% etwas langsamer expandieren als die gesamtdeutsche. Weil das Verarbeitende Gewerbe in Ostdeutschland nicht so exportorientiert ist wie das im Westen, profitiert es auch nicht ganz so stark von der gegenwärtig sehr kräftigen internationalen Konjunktur.
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Do We Want These Two to Tango? On Zombie Firms and Stressed Banks in Europe
Manuela Storz, Michael Koetter, Ralph Setzer, Andreas Westphal
ECB Working Paper,
2017
Abstract
We show that the speed and type of corporate deleveraging depends on the interaction between corporate and financial sector health. Based on granular bank-firm data pertaining to small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) from five stressed and two non-stressed euro area economies, we show that “zombie” firms generally continued to lever up during the 2010–2014 period. Whereas relationships with stressed banks reduce SME leverage on average, we also show that zombie firms that are tied to weak banks in euro area periphery countries increase their indebtedness even further. Sustainable economic recovery therefore requires both: deleveraging of banks and firms.
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Multidimensional Well-being and Regional Disparities in Europe
Jörg Döpke, Andreas Knabe, Cornelia Lang, Philip Maschke
Journal of Common Market Studies,
No. 5,
2017
Abstract
Using data from the OECD Regional Well-Being Index – a set of quality-of-life indicators measured at the sub-national level – we construct a set of composite well-being indices. We analyze the extent to which the choice of five alternative aggregation methods affects the well-being ranking of regions. We find that regional inequality in these composite measures is lower than regional inequality in real GDP per capita. For most aggregation methods, the rank correlation across regions appears to be quite high. It is also shown that using alternative indices instead of GDP per capita would only have a small effect on the set of regions eligible for aid from EU Structural Funds. The exception appears to be an aggregation based on how individual dimensions relate to average life satisfaction across regions, which would substantially change both the ranking of regions and which regions would be eligible for EU funds.
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Predicting the Rise of EU Right-Wing Populism in Response to Unbalanced Immigration
Marko Jusup, Dejan Kovač, Boris Podobnik, H. Eugene Stanley
Complexity,
August
2017
Abstract
Among the central tenets of globalization is the free migration of labor. Although much has been written about the benefits of globalization, little is known about its limitations and how antiglobalist sentiment can be strongly affected by high levels of immigration. Analyzing poll data from a group of EU countries affected by the recent migrant crisis, we find that over the last three years the percentage of right-wing (RW) populist voters in a given country depends on the prevalence of immigrants in this country’s population and the total immigration inflow into the entire EU. The latter is likely due to the perception that the EU functions as a supranational state in which a lack of inner borders means that “someone else’s problem” can easily become “my problem.” We find that the increase in the percentage of RW voters substantially surpasses the percentage of immigration inflow, implying that if this process continues, ongoing democratic processes will cause RW populism to prevail and globalization to rapidly decrease. We locate tipping points between the fraction of immigrants and the rise of RW populism, and we model our empirical findings using a complex network framework in which the success of globalization rests on a balance between immigration and immigrant integration.
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15.06.2017 • 26/2017
Ailing banks increase leverage of ailing firms
Euro area countries such as Greece and Spain continue to struggle not only with their banks, but also with highly indebted domestic firms. Michael Koetter from the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) and co-authors show the failure to resolve banks’ financial difficulties also prevents debt reduction of over-leveraged firms – and sometimes even contributes to increasing leverage of the weakest firms.
Michael Koetter
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Do We Want These Two to Tango? On Zombie Firms and Stressed Banks in Europe
Manuela Storz, Michael Koetter, Ralph Setzer, Andreas Westphal
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 13,
2017
Abstract
We show that the speed and type of corporate deleveraging depends on the interaction between corporate and financial sector health. Based on granular bank-firm data pertaining to small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) from five stressed and two non-stressed euro area economies, we show that “zombie” firms generally continued to lever up during the 2010–2014 period. Whereas relationships with stressed banks reduce SME leverage on average, we also show that zombie firms that are tied to weak banks in euro area periphery countries increase their indebtedness even further. Sustainable economic recovery therefore requires both: deleveraging of banks and firms.
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Transposition Frictions, Banking Union, and Integrated Financial Markets in Europe
Michael Koetter, Thomas Krause, Lena Tonzer
G20 Insights Policy Brief, Policy Area "Financial Resilience",
2017
Abstract
In response to the financial crisis of 2007/2008, policymakers implemented comprehensive changes concerning the regulation and supervision of banks. Many of those changes, including Basel III or the directives pertaining to the Single Rulebook in the European Union (EU), are agreed upon at the supranational level, which constitutes a key step towards harmonized regulation and supervision in an integrated European financial market. However, the success of these reforms depends on the uniform and timely implementation at the national level. Avoiding strategic delays to implement EU regulation into national laws should thus constitute a main target of the G20.
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Inflation Dynamics During the Financial Crisis in Europe: Cross-sectional Identification of Long-run Inflation Expectations
Geraldine Dany-Knedlik, Oliver Holtemöller
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 10,
2017
Abstract
We investigate drivers of Euro area inflation dynamics using a panel of regional Phillips curves and identify long-run inflation expectations by exploiting the crosssectional dimension of the data. Our approach simultaneously allows for the inclusion of country-specific inflation and unemployment-gaps, as well as time-varying parameters. Our preferred panel specification outperforms various aggregate, uni- and multivariate unobserved component models in terms of forecast accuracy. We find that declining long-run trend inflation expectations and rising inflation persistence indicate an altered risk of inflation expectations de-anchoring. Lower trend inflation, and persistently negative unemployment-gaps, a slightly increasing Phillips curve slope and the downward pressure of low oil prices mainly explain the low inflation rate during the recent years.
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Drivers of Systemic Risk: Do National and European Perspectives Differ?
Claudia M. Buch, Thomas Krause, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
In Europe, the financial stability mandate generally rests at the national level. But there is an important exception. Since the establishment of the Banking Union in 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) can impose stricter regulations than the national regulator. The precondition is that the ECB identifies systemic risks which are not adequately addressed by the macroprudential regulator at the national level. In this paper, we ask whether the drivers of systemic risk differ when applying a national versus a European perspective. We use market data for 80 listed euro-area banks to measure each bank’s contribution to systemic risk (SRISK) at the national and the euro-area level. Our research delivers three main findings. First, on average, systemic risk increased during the financial crisis. The difference between systemic risk at the national and the euro-area level is not very large, but there is considerable heterogeneity across countries and banks. Second, an exploration of the drivers of systemic risk shows that a bank’s contribution to systemic risk is positively related to its size and profitability. It decreases in a bank’s share of loans to total assets. Third, the qualitative determinants of systemic risk are similar at the national and euro-area level, whereas the quantitative importance of some determinants differs.
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