Central and Eastern European Countries in the Global Financial Crisis: A Typical Twin Crisis?
Diemo Dietrich, Tobias Knedlik, Axel Lindner
Post-Communist Economies,
No. 4,
2011
Abstract
This paper shows that during the Great Recession, banking and currency crises occurred simultaneously in Central and Eastern Europe. Events, however, differed widely from what happened during the Asian crisis that usually serves as the model case for the concept of twin crises. We look at three elements that help explaining the nature of events in Central and Eastern Europe: the problem of currency mismatches, the relation between currency and banking crises, and the importance of multinational banks for financial stability. It is shown that theoretical considerations concerning internal capital markets of multinational banks help understand what happened on capital markets and in the financial sector of the region. We discuss opposing effects of multinational banking on financial stability and find that institutional differences are the key to understand differing effects of the global financial crisis. In particular, we argue that it matters if international activities are organized by subsidiaries or by cross-border financial services, how large the share of foreign currency-denominated credit is and whether the exchange rate is fixed or flexible. Based on these three criteria we give an explanation why the pattern of the crisis in the Baltic States differed markedly from that in Poland and the Czech Republic, the two largest countries of the region.
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On the Institutional Safeguarding of Monetary Policy – a Post-Keynesian Perspective
A. Heise, Toralf Pusch
International Journal of Public Policy,
No. 1,
2011
Abstract
The paper takes a fresh look at the governance of the most important macroeconomic objectives: price stability and full employment. On the basis of a post-Keynesian market constellations approach, the necessity and institutional requirements of the coordination of macroeconomic policy areas in general and an optimal central bank setting in particular are analysed, and an amelioration of monetary policy of the neo-Keynesian ‘new macroeconomic consensus’ is provided.
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Central Banks, Trade Unions and Reputation – Is there Room for an Expansionist Manoeuvre in the European Union?
Toralf Pusch, A. Heise
Journal of Post Keynesian Economics,
2010
Abstract
Seit der Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion hat sich am Problem der hohen Arbeitslosigkeit in der Eurozone wenig geändert. Der überwiegenden Sichtweise zufolge ist dies vor allem auf dysfunktionale Arbeitsmärkte zurückzuführen. In diesem Beitrag gehen wir der Frage nach, welche Änderungen sich ergeben können, wenn Gewerkschaften und Zentralbank in einem Klima der Unsicherheit zwischen verschiedenen Optionen wählen können. Das wahrscheinlichste Ergebnis im einstufigen Spiel ist eine hohe Arbeitslosenquote. Bei einer Wiederholung des Spiels können sich die Ergebnisse deutlich ändern. Dies wird allerdings dann unwahrscheinlich, wenn die Zentralbank ein außerordentlich hohes Gewicht auf Preisstabilität legt. Zweitens erfordert ein Vollbeschäftigungs-Gleichgewicht ein Mindestmaß an Kooperationsbereitschaft bzw. Koordinierungspotential auf Seiten der Gewerkschaften.
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A Cost Efficient International Lender of Last Resort
Tobias Knedlik
International Research Journal of Finance and Economics,
2010
Abstract
The current reform of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) lending instruments has transformed the Fund towards an international lender of last resort (ILOLR). Current research discusses various general frameworks for installing an ILOLR. However, it remains unclear how the ILOLR should actually operate. This paper discusses six different options for the construction of an ILOLR that supports central banks during currency crises. The paper concludes that the most cost efficient version of the ILOLR would be direct intervention by the IMF using IMF resources, with the option of using additional reserves from central banks. The paper considers measures of cost efficiency, such as cost of borrowing, intervention, and sterilization and moral hazard problems.
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The Extreme Risk Problem for Monetary Policies of the Euro-Candidates
Hubert Gabrisch, Lucjan T. Orlowski
Abstract
We argue that monetary policies in euro-candidate countries should also aim at mitigating excessive instability of the key target and instrument variables of monetary policy during turbulent market periods. Our empirical tests show a significant degree of leptokurtosis, thus prevalence of tail-risks, in the conditional volatility series of such variables in the euro-candidate countries. Their central banks will be well-advised to use both standard and unorthodox (discretionary) tools of monetary policy to mitigate such extreme risks while steering their economies out of the crisis and through the euroconvergence process. Such policies provide flexibility that is not embedded in the Taylor-type instrument rules, or in the Maastricht convergence criteria.
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Banking Integration, Bank Stability, and Regulation: Introduction to a Special Issue of the International Journal of Central Banking
Reint E. Gropp, H. Shin
International Journal of Central Banking,
No. 1,
2009
Abstract
The link between banking integration and financial stability has taken center stage in the wake of the current financial crisis. To what extent is the banking system in Europe integrated? What role has the introduction of the common currency played in this context? Are integrated banking markets more vulnerable to contagion and financial instability? Does the fragmented regulatory framework in Europe pose special problems in resolving bank failures? What policy reforms may become necessary? These questions are of considerable policy interest as evidenced by the extensive discussions surrounding the design and implementation of a new regulatory regime and by the increasing attention coming from academia.
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Monetary Policy and Financial (In)stability: An Integrated Micro–Macro Approach
Ferre De Graeve, Thomas Kick, Michael Koetter
Journal of Financial Stability,
No. 3,
2008
Abstract
Evidence on central banks’ twin objective, monetary and financial stability, is scarce. We suggest an integrated micro–macro approach with two core virtues. First, we measure financial stability directly at the bank level as the probability of distress. Second, we integrate a microeconomic hazard model for bank distress and a standard macroeconomic model. The advantage of this approach is to incorporate micro information, to allow for non-linearities and to permit general feedback effects between financial distress and the real economy. We base the analysis on German bank and macro data between 1995 and 2004. Our results confirm the existence of a trade-off between monetary and financial stability. An unexpected tightening of monetary policy increases the probability of distress. This effect disappears when neglecting microeffects and non-linearities, underlining their importance. Distress responses are largest for small cooperative banks, weak distress events, and at times when capitalization is low. An important policy implication is that the separation of financial supervision and monetary policy requires close collaboration among members in the European System of Central Banks and national bank supervisors.
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Does too much Transparency of Central Banks Prevent Agents from Using their Private Information Efficiently?
Axel Lindner
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 16,
2007
Abstract
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects of different communication strategies of a central bank: it can either publish no more than its overall assessment of the economy or be more transparent, giving detailed reasons for this assessment. The latter strategy is shown to be superior because it enables agents to use private information and to be less dependent on common knowledge. This result holds true even if the strategies of agents are strategic complements, for which case it has been argued that too much transparency might induce agents to neglect their private knowledge.
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