Are Bank Capital Requirements Optimally Set? Evidence from Researchers’ Views
Gene Ambrocio, Iftekhar Hasan, Esa Jokivuolle, Kim Ristolainen
Journal of Financial Stability,
October
2020
Abstract
We survey 149 leading academic researchers on bank capital regulation. The median (average) respondent prefers a 10% (15%) minimum non-risk-weighted equity-to-assets ratio, which is considerably higher than the current requirement. North Americans prefer a significantly higher equity-to-assets ratio than Europeans. We find substantial support for the new forms of regulation introduced in Basel III, such as liquidity requirements. Views are most dispersed regarding the use of hybrid assets and bail-inable debt in capital regulation. 70% of experts would support an additional market-based capital requirement. When investigating factors driving capital requirement preferences, we find that the typical expert believes a five percentage points increase in capital requirements would “probably decrease” both the likelihood and social cost of a crisis with “minimal to no change” to loan volumes and economic activity. The best predictor of capital requirement preference is how strongly an expert believes that higher capital requirements would increase the cost of bank lending.
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14.10.2020 • 22/2020
Economic slump in East Germany not as severe as in Germany as a whole ‒ Implications of the Joint Economic Forecast and new data for East Germany
The German economy started recovering quickly after the drastic pandemic-related slump in spring 2020. The recovery, however, loses much of its momentum in the second half of the year. The Joint Economic Forecast predicts that production levels seen before the crisis will not be reached again until the second half of 2021. In principle, the East German economy is following this pattern, although the economic slump is likely to be somewhat milder.
Oliver Holtemöller
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ekordschulden gegen Corona-Folgen sind finanzierbar – schuldenfinanzierte Konsumstimulierung aber nicht zielführend
Oliver Holtemöller
ifo Schnelldienst,
No. 8,
2020
Abstract
Auf große Wirtschaftskrisen reagiert die Finanzpolitik häufig mit einer massiven Ausweitung der öffentlichen Verschuldung, so auch in der gegenwärtigen Coronakrise. In diesem Beitrag wird gezeigt, dass die deutsche Schuldenbremse die Tragfähigkeit der öffentlichen Finanzen auch dann gewährleistet, wenn im Abstand von zehn Jahren Krisen auftreten, in denen die Neuverschuldungsgrenze außer Kraft gesetzt wird. Die Tragfähigkeit zusätzlicher Staatsschulden begründet jedoch nicht deren Sinnhaftigkeit. Diskretionäre Finanzpolitik zur Stimulierung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Nachfrage leistet insgesamt einen eher kleinen Anteil zur Stabilisierung der realwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung. Maßnahmen zur Eindämmung der Corona-Epidemie, für den Ausgleich tatsächlicher sozialer und wirtschaftlicher Schäden und für die Aufrechterhaltung des Bildungsbetriebs unter den Bedingungen einer Epidemie könnten einen wichtigeren Beitrag zur Krisenbekämpfung leisten als kurzfristige Nachfragestimulierung.
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16.09.2020 • 18/2020
Economy recovers from the shutdown – but a quick return to pre-crisis normality is unlikely
The German economy has bounced back strongly over the summer, recovering a considerable part of the production slump caused by the shutdown in spring. Nevertheless, real gross domestic product in 2020 is likely to contract by 5.7%. In 2021, growth is expected to average 3.2% according to IWH autumn economic forecast. The decline in production in 2020 is likely to be less pronounced in East Germany com¬pared to Germany as a whole.
Oliver Holtemöller
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Do Conventional Monetary Policy Instruments Matter in Unconventional Times?
Manuel Buchholz, Kirsten Schmidt, Lena Tonzer
Journal of Banking and Finance,
September
2020
Abstract
This paper investigates how declines in the deposit facility rate set by the ECB affect euro area banks’ incentives to hold reserves at the central bank. We find that, in the face of lower deposit rates, banks with a more interest-sensitive business model are more likely to reduce reserve holdings and allocate freed-up liquidity to loans. The result is driven by banks in the non-GIIPS countries of the euro area. This reveals that conventional monetary policy instruments have limited effects in restoring monetary policy transmission during times of crisis.
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Private Equity and Portfolio Companies: Lessons From the Global Financial Crisis
Shai B. Bernstein, Josh Lerner, Filippo Mezzanotti
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,
No. 3,
2020
Abstract
Critics of private equity have warned that the high leverage often used in PE-backed companies could contribute to the fragility of the financial system during economic crises. The proliferation of poorly structured transactions during booms could increase the vulnerability of the economy to downturns. The alternative hypothesis is that PE, with its operating capabilities, expertise in financial restructuring, and massive capital raised but not invested ("dry powder"), could increase the resilience of PE-backed companies. In their study of PE-backed buyouts in the U.K. - which requires and thereby makes accessible more information about private companies than, say, in the U.S. - the authors report finding that, during the 2008 global financial crisis, PE-backed companies decreased their overall investments significantly less than comparable, non-PE firms. Moreover, such PE-backed firms also experienced greater equity and debt inflows, higher asset growth, and increased market share. These effects were especially notable among smaller, riskier PE-backed firms with less access to capital, and also for those firms backed by PE firms with more dry powder at the crisis onset. In a survey of the partners and staff of some 750 PE firms, the authors also present compelling evidence that PEs firms play active financial and operating roles in preserving or restoring the profitability and value of their portfolio companies.
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IWH-Flash-Indikator III. Quartal und IV. Quartal 2020
Katja Heinisch, Oliver Holtemöller, Axel Lindner, Birgit Schultz
IWH-Flash-Indikator,
No. 3,
2020
Abstract
Die Corona-Pandemie hat die deutsche Wirtschaft im Frühjahr 2020 in eine tiefe Rezession gerissen. Das Bruttoinlandsprodukt sank im zweiten Quartal 2020 um 10,1%, nach einem Rückgang von 2,0% im Quartal zuvor. Dieser massive Wirtschaftseinbruch war insbesondere den Lockdown-Maßnahmen geschuldet, die das öffentliche und wirtschaftliche Leben zeitweise auf ein Minimum reduzierten. Seit Anfang Mai wurden die Restriktionen zur Eindämmung der Pandemie gelockert, und die wirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten haben wieder deutlich zugenommen. Der Tiefpunkt der Rezession ist also durchschritten, allerdings dürfte die Rückkehr zum Vorkrisenniveau auch aufgrund der wieder höheren Fallzahlen und der damit verbundenen Unsicherheit noch länger auf sich warten lassen. Die Wirtschaft dürfte im dritten Quartal 2020 um 4,6% und im vierten Quartal dann um 4,0% expandieren. (vgl. Abbildung).
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The Cleansing Effect of Banking Crises
Reint E. Gropp, Steven Ongena, Jörg Rocholl, Vahid Saadi
Abstract
We assess the cleansing effects of the recent banking crisis. In U.S. regions with higher levels of supervisory forbearance on distressed banks during the crisis, there is less restructuring in the real sector and the banking sector remains less healthy for several years after the crisis. Regions with less supervisory forbearance experience higher productivity growth after the crisis with more firm entries, job creation, and employment, wages, patents, and output growth. Supervisory forbearance is greater for state-chartered banks and in regions with weaker banking competition and more independent banks, while recapitalisation of distressed banks through TARP does not facilitate cleansing.
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The Cleansing Effect of Banking Crises
Reint E. Gropp, Steven Ongena, Jörg Rocholl, Vahid Saadi
Abstract
We assess the cleansing effects of the recent banking crisis. In U.S. regions with higher levels of supervisory forbearance on distressed banks during the crisis, there is less restructuring in the real sector and the banking sector remains less healthy for several years after the crisis. Regions with less supervisory forbearance experience higher productivity growth after the crisis with more firm entries, job creation, and employment, wages, patents, and output growth. Supervisory forbearance is greater for state-chartered banks and in regions with weaker banking competition and more independent banks, while recapitalization of distressed banks through TARP does not facilitate cleansing.
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06.07.2020 • 13/2020
IWH issues warning of a new banking crisis
The coronavirus recession could mean the end for dozens of banks across Germany – even if Germany survives the economic crisis relatively unscathed. An analysis by the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) shows that many savings banks and cooperative banks are particularly at risk. Loans worth hundreds of billions of euros are on the balance sheets of the financial institutions concerned. IWH President Gropp warns of a potentially high additional burden for the already weakened real economy.
Reint E. Gropp
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