‘And Forgive Us Our Debts’: Do Christian Moralities Influence Over-indebtedness of Individuals?
Iftekhar Hasan, Konstantin Kiesel, Felix Noth
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 8,
2019
Abstract
This paper analyses whether Christian moralities and rules formed differently by Catholics and Protestants impact the likelihood of households to become overindebted. We find that over-indebtedness is lower in regions in which Catholics outweigh Protestants, indicating that Catholics‘ forgiveness culture and a stricter enforcement of rules by Protestants serve as explanations for our results. Our results provide evidence that religion affects the financial situations of individuals and show that even 500 years after the split between Catholics and Protestants, the differences in the mind-sets of both denominations play an important role for situations of severe financial conditions.
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Banks Response to Higher Capital Requirements: Evidence from a Quasi-natural Experiment
Reint E. Gropp, Thomas Mosk, Steven Ongena, Carlo Wix
Review of Financial Studies,
No. 1,
2019
Abstract
We study the impact of higher capital requirements on banks’ balance sheets and their transmission to the real economy. The 2011 EBA capital exercise is an almost ideal quasi-natural experiment to identify this impact with a difference-in-differences matching estimator. We find that treated banks increase their capital ratios by reducing their risk-weighted assets, not by raising their levels of equity, consistent with debt overhang. Banks reduce lending to corporate and retail customers, resulting in lower asset, investment, and sales growth for firms obtaining a larger share of their bank credit from the treated banks.
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Senior Debt and Market Discipline: Evidence from Bank-to-bank Loans
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Liuling Liu, Haizhi Wang
Journal of Banking and Finance,
2019
Abstract
We empirically investigate whether taking senior bank loans would enhance market discipline and control risk-taking among borrowing banks. Controlling for endogeneity concern arising from borrowing bank self-select into taking senior bank debt, we document that both the spreads and covenants in loan contracts are sensitive to bank risk variables. Our analysis also reveals that borrowing banks reduce their risk exposure after their first issuance of senior bank debt. We also find that lending banks significantly increase their collaboration with borrowing banks and increase their presence in the home markets of borrowing banks.
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The Case for a European Rating Agency: Evidence from the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis
Marc Altdörfer, Carlos A. De las Salas Vega, Andre Guettler, Gunter Löffler
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money,
2019
Abstract
Politicians frequently voice that European bond issuers would benefit from the presence of a Europe-based rating agency. We take Fitch as a prototype for such an agency. With its ownership structure and a headquarter in London, Fitch is more European than Moody’s and S&P; during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, it also issued more favorable ratings. Fitch’s rating actions, however, were largely ignored by the bond market. Our results thus cast doubt on the benefits of a European credit rating agency.
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Politics, Banks, and Sub-sovereign Debt: Unholy Trinity or Divine Coincidence?
Michael Koetter, Alexander Popov
Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper,
No. 53,
2018
Abstract
We exploit election-driven turnover in State and local governments in Germany to study how banks adjust their securities portfolios in response to the loss of political connections. We find that local savings banks, which are owned by their host county and supervised by local politicians, increase significantly their holdings of home-State sovereign bonds when the local government and the State government are dominated by different political parties. Banks' holdings of other securities, like federal bonds, bonds issued by other States, or stocks, are not affected by election outcomes. We argue that banks use sub-sovereign bond purchases to gain access to politically distant government authorities.
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On the Risk of a Sovereign Debt Crisis in Italy
Oliver Holtemöller, Tobias Knedlik, Axel Lindner
Intereconomics,
No. 6,
2018
Abstract
The intention for the Italian government to stimulate business activity via large increases in government spending is not in line with the stabilisation of the public debt ratio. Instead, if such policy were implemented, the risk of a sovereign debt crisis would be high. In this article, we analyse the capacity of the Italian economy to shoulder sovereign debt under different scenarios. We conclude that focusing on growth enhancing structural reforms, would allow for moderate increases in public expenditure.
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Interactions Between Regulatory and Corporate Taxes: How Is Bank Leverage Affected?
Franziska Bremus, Kirsten Schmidt, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
Regulatory bank levies set incentives for banks to reduce leverage. At the same time, corporate income taxation makes funding through debt more attractive. In this paper, we explore how regulatory levies affect bank capital structure, depending on corporate income taxation. Based on bank balance sheet data from 2006 to 2014 for a panel of EU-banks, our analysis yields three main results: The introduction of bank levies leads to lower leverage as liabilities become more expensive. This effect is weaker the more elevated corporate income taxes are. In countries charging very high corporate income taxes, the incentives of bank levies to reduce leverage turn ineffective. Thus, bank levies can counteract the debt bias of taxation only partially.
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Zum Risiko einer Staatsschuldenkrise in Italien
Oliver Holtemöller, Tobias Knedlik, Axel Lindner
Abstract
Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung Italiens war in den vergangenen Jahren durch eine ausgesprochen schwache Produktivitätsentwicklung gekennzeichnet. Das Bruttoinlandsprodukt je Einwohner beträgt nur 92% des Niveaus im Jahr 2007, während es im Euroraum insgesamt (inklusive Italien) bei 103% des Vorkrisenniveaus von 2007 liegt. Die Staatsschuldenquote ist im Zeitraum von 2007 bis 2017 von 100% in Relation zum Bruttoinlandsprodukt um 30 Prozentpunkte auf 130% gestiegen. Es bestehen daher Zweifel, ob die Wirtschaftskraft Italiens ausreichend ist, um die weiter steigenden Staatsschulden künftig bedienen zu können. Diese Zweifel kommen zum Beispiel in der gegenwärtig (August 2018) um gut 3 Prozentpunkte höheren Umlaufsrendite 10-jähriger italienischer Staatsanleihen im Vergleich zu deutschen Staatsanleihen zum Ausdruck.
Die Regierung Italiens will der Wirtschaft durch expansive Finanzpolitik wieder auf die Beine helfen. Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird die Tragfähigkeit der italienischen Staatsverschuldung für verschiedene Szenarien analysiert. Dabei gibt es je nach den getroffenen Annahmen zu wichtigen Wirkungszusammenhängen eine ganze Bandbreite von möglichen Entwicklungen, die aber allesamt eine deutlich expansive Finanzpolitik für Italien nicht ratsam erscheinen lassen, weil sie insgesamt nicht förderlich für die Stabilisierung der Staatsverschuldung wäre. Vielmehr sollten produktivitätssteigernde Strukturreformen umgesetzt werden, die dann auch moderat höhere Staatsausgaben erlauben würden.
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