Environmental Protection and the Private Provision of International Public Goods
Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher, Dirk T. G. Rübbelke, E. Sheshinski
Economica,
2010
Abstract
International environmental protection like the combat of global warming exhibits properties of public goods. In the international arena, no coercive authority exists that can enforce measures to overcome free-rider incentives. Therefore decentralized negotiations between individual regions serve as an approach to pursue efficient international environmental protection. We propose a scheme which is based on the ideas of Coasean negotiations and Pigouvian taxes. The negotiating entities offer side-payments to counterparts in order to influence their taxation of polluting consumption. Side-payments, in turn, are self-financed by means of externality-correcting taxes. As we show, a Pareto-efficient outcome can be attained.
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Preventing Innovative Cooperations: The Legal Exemptions Unintended Side Effect
Christian Growitsch, Nicole Nulsch, Margarethe Rammerstorfer
European Journal of Law and Economics,
No. 1,
2012
Abstract
In 2004, European competition law had been considerable changed by the introduction of the new Council Regulation No. 1/2003. One of the major renewals was the replacement of the centralized notification system for inter-company cooperations in favor of a so-called legal exemption system. We analyze the implications of this reform and its arising uncertainty on the agreements firms implement, especially on innovative agreements like vertical R&D agreements. By means of a decision theoretic approach, we show that the law’s intention to reduce the incentive to establish illegal cartels will be reached but innovating cooperations might be prevented. To avoid this unintended side effect, fines but not the monitoring activities should be increased.
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The Dilemma of Delegating Search: Budgeting in Public Employment Services
Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher, J. T. Addison, T. Kuhn
IZA Discussion Papers, No. 5170,
No. 5170,
2010
Abstract
The poor performance often attributed to many public employment services may be explained in part by a delegation problem between the central office and local job centers. In markets characterized by frictions, job centers function as match-makers, linking job seekers with relevant vacancies. Because their search intensity in contacting employers and collecting data is not verifiable by the central authority, a typical moral hazard problem can arise. To overcome the delegation problem and provide high-powered incentives for high levels of search effort on the part of job centers, we propose output-related schemes that assign greater staff capacity to agencies achieving high strike rates.
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Urban Development by Protecting Historic Buildings? An Analysis of Incentives and Regulations in Heritage Conservation
Peter Franz
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 6,
2010
Abstract
Für die Stadtentwicklung in Ostdeutschland spielen die Regularien des Denkmalschutzes eine hervorgehobene Rolle. Zahlreiche Städte verfügen noch über ein stadtbildprägendes bauliches kulturelles Erbe. Als Reaktion auf den in der DDR-Zeit vorangeschrittenen Verfall dieser historischen Bausubstanz sind in den Neuen Ländern vergleichsweise rigide Denkmalschutzgesetze erlassen worden. Zusätzlich wurde im Jahr 1991 das Bund-Länder-Programm „Städtebaulicher Denkmalschutz“ speziell für die ostdeutschen Städte ins Leben gerufen. In vielen Städten haben Denkmalschutzaktivitäten zu attraktiven Stadtzentren geführt. Auf der anderen Seite mehren sich die Anzeichen, dass eine „überzogene“ Denkmalschutzpolitik einen Hemmfaktor für die Stadtentwicklung bilden kann. Zum Auftakt dieses neu in den Fokus genommenen Forschungsthemas wird in dem Beitrag das Konzept eines ökonomischen Zugangs zum Thema des Denkmalschutzes dargelegt. Darüber hinaus erfolgt eine systematisierende Analyse dieses Politikfeldes im Hinblick auf die verschiedenen involvierten politischen Ebenen, Akteure und Regulierungen. Die Finanzierung des Denkmalschutzes, seine verschiedenen Instrumente und erkennbare nicht intendierte Effekte bilden weitere Schwerpunkte der Analyse. Die Befunde zeigen, dass in den Neuen Ländern ein höherer Anteil an Gebäuden unter Denkmalschutz steht und dass pro Kopf mehr öffentliche Mittel in den Denkmalschutz fließen als in Westdeutschland. Allerdings erweist es sich als sehr schwierig, festzustellen, wann ein optimaler oder zumindest ausreichender Stand des Denkmalschutzes in einer Stadt erreicht worden ist. Die Suche nach entsprechenden Indikatoren impliziert weiteren Forschungsbedarf.
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What Happened to the East German Housing Market? A Historical Perspective on the Role of Public Funding
Claus Michelsen, Dominik Weiß
Post-Communist Economies,
2010
Abstract
The paper analyses the development of the East German housing market after the reunification of the former German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1990. We analyse the dynamics of the East German housing market within the framework of the well-known stock-flow model, proposed by DiPasquale and Wheaton. We show that the today observable disequilibrium to a large extend is caused by post-unification housing policy and its strong fiscal incentives to invest into the housing stock. Moreover, in line with the stylized empirical facts, we show that ‘hidden reserves’ of the housing market were reactivated since the economy of East Germany became market organized. Since initial undersupply was overcome faster than politicians expected, the implemented fiscal stimuli were too strong. In contrast to the widespread opinion that outward migration caused the observable vacancies, this paper shows that not weakness of demand but supply side policies caused the observable disequilibrium.
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What Happened to the East German Housing Market? – A Historical Perspective on the Role of Public Funding –
Claus Michelsen, Dominik Weiß
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 20,
2009
Abstract
The paper analyses the development of the East German housing market after the reunification of the former German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1990. We analyse the dynamics of the East German housing market within the framework of the well-known stock-flow model, proposed by DiPasquale and Wheaton. We show that the today observable disequilibrium to a large extend is caused by post-unification housing policy and its strong fiscal incentives to invest into the housing stock. Moreover, in line with the stylized empirical facts, we show that ‘hidden reserves’ of the housing market were reactivated since the economy of East Germany became market organized. Since initial undersupply was overcome faster than politicians expected, the implemented fiscal stimuli were too strong. In contrast to the widespread opinion that outward migration caused the observable vacancies, this paper shows that not weakness of demand but supply side policies caused the observable disequilibrium.
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Monopolistic Competition and Costs in the Health Care Sector
Ingmar Kumpmann
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 17,
2009
Abstract
Competition among health insurers is widely considered to be a means of enhancing efficiency and containing costs in the health care system. In this paper, it is argued that this could be unsuccessful since health care providers hold a strong position on the market for health care services. Physicians exert a type of monopolistic power which can be described by Chamberlin’s model of monopolistic competition. If many health insurers compete with one another, they cannot counterbalance the strong bargaining position of the physicians. Thus, health care expenditure is higher, financing either extra profits for physicians or a higher number of them. In addition, health insurers do not have an incentive to contract selectively with health care providers as long as there are no price differences between physicians. A monopolistic health insurer is able to counterbalance the strong position of physicians and to achieve lower costs.
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Size and Focus of a Venture Capitalist's Portfolio
Paolo Fulghieri, Merih Sevilir
Review of Financial Studies,
No. 11,
2009
Abstract
We take a portfolio approach to analyze the investment strategy of a venture capitalist (VC) and show that portfolio size and scope affect both the entrepreneurs' and the VC's incentives to exert effort. A small portfolio improves entrepreneurial incentives because it allows the VC to concentrate the limited human capital on a smaller number of startups, adding more value. A large and focused portfolio is beneficial because it allows the VC to reallocate the limited resources and human capital in the case of startup failure and allows the VC to extract greater rents from the entrepreneurs. We show that the VC finds it optimal to limit portfolio size when startups have higher payoff potential - that is, when providing strong entrepreneurial incentives is most valuable. The VC expands portfolio size only when startup fundamentals are more moderate and when he can form a sufficiently focused portfolio. Finally, we show that the VC may find it optimal to engage in portfolio management by divesting some of the startups early since this strategy allows him to extract a greater surplus.
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Lending Technology, Bank Organization and Competition
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena, Günseli Tümer-Alkan
Journal of Financial Transformation,
2009
Abstract
This paper reviews recent theoretical and empirical studies investigating how both bank technology and organization shape bank-borrower interactions. We refer to two related concepts for bank technology. First, the technologies banks employ in loan granting decisions and second, the advances in information technology linked to the bank's lending technology. We also summarize and interpret the theoretical and empirical work on bank organization and its influence on lending technologies. We show that the choice of lending technology and bank organization depend heavily on the availability of information, the technological progress in the collection of information, as well as the banking market structure and the legal environment. We draw important policy conclusions from the literature. Competition authorities and supervisors have to remain alert to the consequences of the introduction of any new technology because: (1) advances in technology do not necessarily lead to more intense banking competition, and (2) the impact of technological and financial innovation on financial efficiency and stability depends on the incentives of the entire „loan production chain.‟
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Keeping the Bubble Alive! The Effects of Urban Renewal and Demolition Subsidies in the East German Housing Market
Dominik Weiß
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 11,
2009
Abstract
German urban renewal programs are favoring the cities in the Eastern part since the re-unification in 1990. This was accompanied additionally by attractive tax incentives, designed as an accelerated declining balance method of depreciation for housing investments during the late 1990s. The accumulated needs for comfortable housing after 40 years of a disastrous housing policy of the GDR era were generally accepted as justification for the subvention policy. But various subsidies and tax incentives caused a construction boom, false allocations, and a price bubble in Eastern Germany. After recognizing that the expansion of housing supply was not in line with the demographic development and that high vacancy rates were jeopardizing housing companies and their financial backers, policy changed in 2001. Up to now, the government provides demolition grants to reduce the vast oversupply. By means of a real option approach, it is ex-plained how different available forms of subsidies and economic incentives for landlords lift real estate values. The option value representing growth expectations and opportunities is calculated as an observable market value less an estimated fundamental value. Empirical results disclose higher option premiums for cities in Eastern Germany and a strong correlation of the option premium with urban renewal spending.
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