Marginal Returns to Talent for Material Risk Takers in Banking
Moritz Stieglitz, Konstantin Wagner
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 20,
2020
Abstract
Economies of scale can explain compensation differentials over time, across firms of different size, different hierarchy-levels, and different industries. Consequently, the most talented individuals tend to match with the largest firms in industries where marginal returns to their talent are greatest. We explore a new dimension of this size-pay nexus by showing that marginal returns also differ across activities within firms and industries. Using hand-collected data on managers in European banks well below the level of executive directors, we find that the size-pay nexus is strongest for investment banking business units and for banks with a market-based business model. Thus, managerial compensation is most sensitive to size increases for activities that can easily be scaled up.
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Banking Deregulation and Household Consumption of Durables
H. Evren Damar, Ian Lange, Caitlin McKennie, Mirko Moro
Abstract
We exploit the spatial and temporal variation of the staggered introduction of interstate banking deregulation across the U.S. to study the relationship between credit constraints and consumption of durables. Using the American Housing Survey from 1981 to 1993, we link the timing of these reforms with evidence of a credit expansion and household responses on many margins. We find robust evidence that households are more likely to purchase new appliances and invest in home renovations and modifications after the deregulation. These durable goods allowed households to consume less electricity and spend less time in domestic activities after the reforms.
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Epidemics in the Neoclassical and New Keynesian Models
Martin S. Eichenbaum, Sergio Rebelo, Mathias Trabandt
Abstract
We analyze the effects of an epidemic in three standard macroeconomic models. We find that the neoclassical model does not rationalize the positive comovement of consumption and investment observed in recessions associated with an epidemic. Introducing monopolistic competition into the neoclassical model remedies this shortcoming even when prices are completely flexible. Finally, sticky prices lead to a larger recession but do not fundamentally alter the predictions of the monopolistic competition model.
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The Effects of Fiscal Policy in an Estimated DSGE Model – The Case of the German Stimulus Packages During the Great Recession
Andrej Drygalla, Oliver Holtemöller, Konstantin Kiesel
Macroeconomic Dynamics,
No. 6,
2020
Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the effects of the stimulus packages adopted by the German government during the Great Recession. We employ a standard medium-scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model extended by non-optimizing households and a detailed fiscal sector. In particular, the dynamics of spending and revenue variables are modeled as feedback rules with respect to the cyclical components of output, hours worked and private investment. Based on the estimated rules, fiscal shocks are identified. According to the results, fiscal policy, in particular public consumption, investment, and transfers prevented a sharper and prolonged decline of German output at the beginning of the Great Recession, suggesting a timely response of fiscal policy. The overall effects, however, are small when compared to other domestic and international shocks that contributed to the economic downturn. Our overall findings are not sensitive to considering fiscal foresight.
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Private Equity and Portfolio Companies: Lessons From the Global Financial Crisis
Shai B. Bernstein, Josh Lerner, Filippo Mezzanotti
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,
No. 3,
2020
Abstract
Critics of private equity have warned that the high leverage often used in PE-backed companies could contribute to the fragility of the financial system during economic crises. The proliferation of poorly structured transactions during booms could increase the vulnerability of the economy to downturns. The alternative hypothesis is that PE, with its operating capabilities, expertise in financial restructuring, and massive capital raised but not invested ("dry powder"), could increase the resilience of PE-backed companies. In their study of PE-backed buyouts in the U.K. - which requires and thereby makes accessible more information about private companies than, say, in the U.S. - the authors report finding that, during the 2008 global financial crisis, PE-backed companies decreased their overall investments significantly less than comparable, non-PE firms. Moreover, such PE-backed firms also experienced greater equity and debt inflows, higher asset growth, and increased market share. These effects were especially notable among smaller, riskier PE-backed firms with less access to capital, and also for those firms backed by PE firms with more dry powder at the crisis onset. In a survey of the partners and staff of some 750 PE firms, the authors also present compelling evidence that PEs firms play active financial and operating roles in preserving or restoring the profitability and value of their portfolio companies.
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Drilling and Debt
Erik P. Gilje, Elena Loutskina, Daniel Murphy
Journal of Finance,
No. 3,
2020
Abstract
This paper documents a previously unrecognized debt‐related investment distortion. Using detailed project‐level data for 69 firms in the oil and gas industry, we find that highly levered firms pull forward investment, completing projects early at the expense of long‐run project returns and project value. This behavior is particularly pronounced prior to debt renegotiations. We test several channels that could explain this behavior and find evidence consistent with equity holders sacrificing long‐run project returns to enhance collateral values and, by extension, mitigate lending frictions at debt renegotiations.
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Zu den betrieblichen Effekten der Investitionsförderung im Rahmen der deutschen Regionalpolitik
Matthias Brachert, Eva Dettmann, Mirko Titze
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 1,
2020
Abstract
Die Wirtschaft in den Industrieländern unterliegt einem ständigen Anpassungsdruck. Wichtige aktuelle Treiber des Strukturwandels sind vor allem die Globalisierung, der technologische Fortschritt (insbesondere durch Digitalisierung und Automatisierung), die Demographie (durch Alterung und Schrumpfung der Bevölkerung) und der Klimawandel. Von diesem Anpassungsdruck sind jedoch die Regionen in Deutschland sehr unterschiedlich betroffen. Regionalpolitik verfolgt das Ziel, Regionen bei der Bewältigung des Strukturwandels zu unterstützen. Ein besonderer Fokus liegt dabei auf Regionen, die ohnehin durch Strukturschwächen gekennzeichnet sind. Die aktuelle Regionalförderung in Deutschland basiert im Wesentlichen auf der Förderung von Investitionen von Betrieben und Kommunen. Die Evaluierung dieser Programme muss integraler Bestandteil der Regionalpolitik sein – schließlich stellt sich immer die Frage nach einer alternativen Verwendung knapper öffentlicher Mittel. Eine Pilotstudie für Sachsen-Anhalt zeigt, dass die im Rahmen der Regionalpolitik gewährten Investitionszuschüsse einen positiven Effekt auf Beschäftigung und Investitionen der geförderten Betriebe haben; bei den Investitionen allerdings nur für die Dauer des Projekts. Effekte der Förderung auf Umsatz und Produktivität von Betrieben in Sachsen-Anhalt waren nicht nachweisbar.
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Asymmetric Investment Responses to Firm-specific Forecast Errors
Julian Berner, Manuel Buchholz, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
This paper analyses how firm-specific forecast errors derived from survey data of German manufacturing firms over 2007–2011 affect firms’ investment propensity. Understanding how forecast errors affect firm investment behaviour is key to mitigate economic downturns during and after crisis periods in which forecast errors tend to increase. Our findings reveal a negative impact of absolute forecast errors on investment. Strikingly, asymmetries arise depending on the size and direction of the forecast error. The investment propensity declines if the realised situation is worse than expected. However, firms do not adjust investment if the realised situation is better than expected suggesting that the uncertainty component of the forecast error counteracts positive effects of unexpectedly favorable business conditions. Given that the fraction of firms making positive forecast errors is higher after the peak of the recent financial crisis, this mechanism can be one explanation behind staggered economic growth and slow recovery following crises.
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