Banking Integration, Bank Stability, and Regulation: Introduction to a Special Issue of the International Journal of Central Banking
Reint E. Gropp, H. Shin
International Journal of Central Banking,
No. 1,
2009
Abstract
The link between banking integration and financial stability has taken center stage in the wake of the current financial crisis. To what extent is the banking system in Europe integrated? What role has the introduction of the common currency played in this context? Are integrated banking markets more vulnerable to contagion and financial instability? Does the fragmented regulatory framework in Europe pose special problems in resolving bank failures? What policy reforms may become necessary? These questions are of considerable policy interest as evidenced by the extensive discussions surrounding the design and implementation of a new regulatory regime and by the increasing attention coming from academia.
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Monetary Policy and Financial (In)stability: An Integrated Micro–Macro Approach
Ferre De Graeve, Thomas Kick, Michael Koetter
Journal of Financial Stability,
No. 3,
2008
Abstract
Evidence on central banks’ twin objective, monetary and financial stability, is scarce. We suggest an integrated micro–macro approach with two core virtues. First, we measure financial stability directly at the bank level as the probability of distress. Second, we integrate a microeconomic hazard model for bank distress and a standard macroeconomic model. The advantage of this approach is to incorporate micro information, to allow for non-linearities and to permit general feedback effects between financial distress and the real economy. We base the analysis on German bank and macro data between 1995 and 2004. Our results confirm the existence of a trade-off between monetary and financial stability. An unexpected tightening of monetary policy increases the probability of distress. This effect disappears when neglecting microeffects and non-linearities, underlining their importance. Distress responses are largest for small cooperative banks, weak distress events, and at times when capitalization is low. An important policy implication is that the separation of financial supervision and monetary policy requires close collaboration among members in the European System of Central Banks and national bank supervisors.
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Does too much Transparency of Central Banks Prevent Agents from Using their Private Information Efficiently?
Axel Lindner
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 16,
2007
Abstract
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects of different communication strategies of a central bank: it can either publish no more than its overall assessment of the economy or be more transparent, giving detailed reasons for this assessment. The latter strategy is shown to be superior because it enables agents to use private information and to be less dependent on common knowledge. This result holds true even if the strategies of agents are strategic complements, for which case it has been argued that too much transparency might induce agents to neglect their private knowledge.
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Does Post-Crisis Restructuring Decrease the Availability of Banking Services? The Case of Turkey
H. Evren Damar
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 9,
2007
Abstract
This study examines the relationship between post-crisis bank consolidation and the number of bank branches in Turkey. Using a unique data set, the analysis addresses several issues related to the impact of market characteristics on branching behavior. The findings suggest that sales of failed institutions by the central authority lead to branch closures in small and uncompetitive markets where the buyer does not have a prior presence. Contrary to popular belief, mergers between healthy institutions do not always cause a decrease in the number of branches; rather, they are shown to increase the availability of banking services in concentrated markets.
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Geldpolitische Strategien im Umbruch
Diemo Dietrich, Albrecht F. Michler
Systeme monetärer Steuerung - Analyse und Vergleich geldpolitischer Strategien. Schriften zu Ordnungsfragen der Wirtschaft, Band 86,
No. 86,
2007
Abstract
Geldpolitische Strategien, insbesondere die der EZB, sind in jüngerer Vergangenheit verstärkt in den Fokus der öffentlichen und wissenschaftlichen Debatte gelangt. Nach einer Einführung in konzeptionelle Grundlagen geldpolitischer Strategien vergleicht die vorliegende Arbeit mit Inflationssteuerung und Geldmengensteuerung die beiden vorherrschenden geldpolitischen Stratgien. Kriterien sind hierbei unter anderem die Modellierung des Transmissionsmechanismus, die Rolle von Erwartungen, die Bedeutung nominaler Anker sowie Transparenz und Verantwortlichkeit. Den Abschluß bildet eine kritische Würdigung der aktuellen EZB-Strategie.
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Does Transparency of Central Banks produce Multiple Equilibria on Currency Markets?
Axel Lindner
Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
No. 1,
2006
Abstract
A recent strand of literature shows that multiple equilibria in models of markets for pegged currencies vanish if there is slightly diverse information among traders; see Morris and Shin (2001). It is known that this approach works only if the common knowledge in the market is not too precise. This has led to the conclusion that central banks should try to avoid making their information common knowledge. We develop a model in which more transparency of the central bank implies better private information, because each trader utilises public information according to her own private information. Thus, transparency makes multiple equilibria less likely.
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Bank Market Discipline
Reint E. Gropp, M. Schleicher
ECB Monthly Bulletin,
2005
Abstract
This article reviews the conceptual issues surrounding market discipline for banks and describes to what extent market discipline could complement supervisory activities. The potential of market discipline has been explicitly recognised in the New Basel Accord. In addition to capital requirements (Pillar I) and supervisory review (Pillar II), the Accord provides for a greater role of financial markets in complementing traditional supervisory activities by asking banks for increased transparency with regard to their operations (Pillar III). This article puts Pillar III in the broader context of direct and indirect market discipline. It is argued that both direct and indirect market discipline should be enhanced by the transparency requirements of the New Capital Accord, but that other conditions may also need to be met in order for market discipline to become more effective. Nevertheless, the article also shows that aggregated market prices can play a useful role in monitoring banking sector stability.
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Technological capability of foreign and West German investors in East Germany
Jutta Günther
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 189,
2004
Abstract
Foreign direct investment (FDI) plays an important role for countries or regions in the process of economic catching-up since it is assumed – among other things – that FDI brings in new production technology and knowledge. This paper gives an overview about the development of FDI in East Germany based on official data provided by the Federal Bank of Germany. The investigation also includes a comparison of FDI in East Germany to Central East European countries. But the main focus of the paper is an analysis of the technological capability comparing majority foreign and West German owned firms to majority East German owned firms. It shows that foreign and West German subsidiaries in East Germany are indeed characterized by superior technological capability with respect to all indicators looked at (product innovation, research & development, organizational changes etc.).
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Why do we have an interbank money market?
Jürgen Wiemers, Ulrike Neyer
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 182,
2003
Abstract
The interbank money market plays a key role in the execution of monetary policy. Hence, it is important to know the functioning of this market and the determinants of the interbank money market rate. In this paper, we develop an interbank money market model with a heterogeneous banking sector. We show that besides for balancing daily liquidity fluctuations banks participate in the interbank market because they have different marginal costs of obtaining funds from the central bank. In the euro area, which we refer to, these cost differences occur because banks have different marginal cost of collateral which they need to hold to obtain funds from the central bank. Banks with relatively low marginal costs act as intermediaries between the central bank and banks with relatively high marginal costs. The necessary positive spread between the interbank market rate and the central bank rate is determined by transaction costs and credit risk in the interbank market, total liquidity needs of the banking sector, costs of obtaining funds from the central bank, and the distribution of the latter across banks.
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