Industrial Relations: Worker Codetermination and Collective Wage Bargaining
Steffen Müller, Claus Schnabel
Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik,
No. 1,
2019
Abstract
Trade unions and employers’ associations, collective bargaining, and employee representation at the workplace are the cornerstones of industrial relations systems in many developed countries. Germany stands out as a country with powerful works councils and a high coverage rate of collective bargaining agreements, supported by encompassing interest groups of employees and employers and by the state. The German case and the perceived stability of its industrial relations regime have attracted considerable attention among researchers and politicians, which also has to do with the country’s high productivity, comparably few strikes, and relatively minor employment problems. However, in recent years industrial relations in many countries including Germany have come under pressure and the fact that there is no obvious and clearly superior alternative to the current regime of industrial and labour relations may not be sufficient to guarantee the survival of the present system.
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IWH-Subventionsdatenbank: Mikrodaten zu Programmen direkter Unternehmenssubventionen in Deutschland. Datendokumentation
Matthias Brachert, Alexander Giebler, Gerhard Heimpold, Mirko Titze, Dana Urban-Thielicke
IWH Technical Reports,
No. 2,
2018
Abstract
Nahezu alle entwickelten Volkswirtschaften haben Programme zur Förderung von Projekten in Unternehmen im Rahmen von Industriepolitik eingeführt. Allerdings ist sehr wenig darüber bekannt, welche Programme eigentlich genau zur Anwendung kommen, welche finanziellen Mittel dafür aufgebracht werden und ob die Programme in der Art und Weise wirken, wie sie ursprünglich intendiert waren. Evaluationsstudien, die auf kausalen Untersuchungsdesigns basieren, können einen wertvollen Beitrag zur Beantwortung der Frage leisten, ob ein Programm tatsächlich Wirkungen entfaltet und welcher der verschiedenen Ansätze am erfolgversprechendsten ist. Dieser Datenreport stellt die vom Zentrum für evidenzbasierte Politikberatung am Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH-CEP) entwickelte IWH-Subventionsdatenbank vor. Die Datenbank enthält (Stand November 2018) zehn Programme industriepolitischer Maßnahmen, die in Deutschland zur Anwendung kamen bzw. kommen. Der Report geht auf die Förderregeln dieser Programme ein und beschreibt die Prozeduren der Zusammenführung zu einer Masterdatei. Ferner diskutiert der Report Möglichkeiten der Verknüpfung der Förderdaten mit externen Unternehmensdatensätzen, die eine zwingende Voraussetzung für die Durchführung von Wirkungsanalysen darstellen, da die administrativen Förderdaten nicht alle Informationen enthalten, die für kausale Untersuchungsdesigns notwendig sind.
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The Political Economy of Financial Systems: Evidence from Suffrage Reforms in the Last Two Centuries
Hans Degryse, Thomas Lambert, Armin Schwienbacher
Economic Journal,
No. 611,
2018
Abstract
Voting rights were initially limited to wealthy elites providing political support for stock markets. The franchise expansion induces the median voter to provide political support for banking development, as this new electorate has lower financial holdings and benefits less from the riskiness and financial returns from stock markets. Our panel data evidence covering the years 1830–1999 shows that tighter restrictions on the voting franchise induce greater stock market development, whereas a broader voting franchise is more conducive to the banking sector, consistent with Perotti and von Thadden (2006). The results are robust to controlling for other institutional arrangements and endogeneity.
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The Efficiency of Local Public-service Production: The Effect of Political Institutions
Peter Bönisch, Peter Haug
FinanzArchiv,
No. 2,
2018
Abstract
Reforms replacing municipal cooperations by centralized municipalities often aim at increasing municipal efficiency. Empirical evidence supporting this aim, however, is ambiguous. Our paper analyzes the effect of institutions on municipal efficiency. In particular, we distinguish two archetypal institutional settings, a centralized and a confederal one, and argue that bureaucrats in a centralized setting are able to increase the fiscal residual. Our empirical test case is the German federal state of Saxony-Anhalt. We test the effect of the institutional setup using the bootstrap approach suggested by Simar and Wilson (2007), concluding that a decentralized institutional setting improves the efficiency of municipal production.
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Expertisen zur Evaluation der Gemeinschaftsaufgabe „Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur“ (GRW) in Sachsen-Anhalt
Matthias Brachert, Claudia M. Buch, Eva Dettmann, Gerhard Heimpold, Mirko Titze, Antje Weyh
IWH Online,
No. 2,
2018
Abstract
Investitionszuschüsse im Rahmen der Gemeinschaftsaufgabe „Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur“ (GRW) haben eine hohe Bedeutung im Rahmen der Wirtschaftsförderung des Landes Sachsen-Anhalt. Die Ziele der GRW-Förderung in Sachsen-Anhalt umfassen den Aufbau einer breitgefächerten, modernen Wirtschaftsstruktur, die Modernisierung und Erneuerung des Kapitalstocks, die Steigerung der Arbeitsproduktivität und die Schaffung neuer wettbewerbsfähiger Arbeitsplätze. Die vorliegenden drei Expertisen evaluieren diese Förderung mit Blick auf die GRW-Landesregeln, den Zusammenhang zwischen den wirtschaftspolitischen Maßnahmen und deren Wirkung sowie die Beschäftigungseffekte als einen Schwerpunkt der gewerblichen Förderung.
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Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Financial Performance: The Mediating Role of Productivity
Iftekhar Hasan, Nada Kobeissi, Liuling Liu, Haizhi Wang
Journal of Business Ethics,
No. 3,
2018
Abstract
This study treats firm productivity as an accumulation of productive intangibles and posits that stakeholder engagement associated with better corporate social performance helps develop such intangibles. We hypothesize that because shareholders factor improved productive efficiency into stock price, productivity mediates the relationship between corporate social and financial performance. Furthermore, we argue that key stakeholders’ social considerations are more valuable for firms with higher levels of discretionary cash and income stream uncertainty. Therefore, we hypothesize that those two contingencies moderate the mediated process of corporate social performance with financial performance. Our analysis, based on a comprehensive longitudinal dataset of the U.S. manufacturing firms from 1992 to 2009, lends strong support for these hypotheses. In short, this paper uncovers a productivity-based, context-dependent mechanism underlying the relationship between corporate social performance and financial performance.
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Do Director Elections Matter?
Vyacheslav Fos, Kai Li, Margarita Tsoutsoura
Review of Financial Studies,
No. 4,
2018
Abstract
Using a hand-collected sample of election nominations for more than 30,000 directors over the period 2001–2010, we construct a novel measure of director proximity to elections called Years-to-election. We find that the closer directors of a board are to their next elections, the higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is. A series of tests, including one that exploits variation in Years-to-election that comes from other boards, supports a causal interpretation. Further analyses show that other governance mechanisms do not drive the relation between board Years-to-election and CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. We conclude that director elections have important implications for corporate governance.
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Private Benefits of Control and Bank Loan Contracts
Chih-Yung Lin, Wei-Che Tsai, Iftekhar Hasan, Le Quoc Tuan
Journal of Corporate Finance,
2018
Abstract
This paper investigates whether or not private benefits of control by managers and large shareholders influence the financing cost of firms. Evidence shows that lending banks demand a significantly higher loan spread, higher fees, shorter loan maturity, smaller loan size, stricter covenants, and greater collateral on firms with greater private benefits of control. Results are stronger for firms with weak corporate governance quality, supporting the agency cost viewpoint. Such evidence implies that banks consider higher private benefits of control as a type of agency problem when they make lending decisions.
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State Enforceability of Noncompete Agreements: Regulations that Stifle Productivity!
S. Anand, Iftekhar Hasan, P. Sharma, Haizhi Wang
Human Resource Management,
No. 1,
2018
Abstract
Noncompete agreements (also known as covenants not to compete [CNCs]) are frequently used by many businesses in an attempt to maintain their competitive advantage by safeguarding their human capital and the associated business secrets. Although the choice of whether to include CNCs in employment contracts is made by firms, the real extent of their restrictiveness is determined by the state laws. In this article, we explore the effect of state‐level CNC enforceability on firm productivity. We assert that an increase in state level CNC enforceability is detrimental to firm productivity, and this relationship becomes stronger as comparable job opportunities become more concentrated in a firm's home state. On the other hand, this negative relationship is weakened as employee compensation tends to become more long‐term oriented. Results based on hierarchical linear modeling analysis of 21,134 firm‐year observations for 3,027 unique firms supported all three hypotheses.
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