Towards Deeper Financial Integration in Europe: What the Banking Union Can Contribute
Claudia M. Buch, T. Körner, Benjamin Weigert
German Council of Economic Experts Working Paper,
No. 2,
2013
Abstract
Der Beitrag wurde anlässlich des gemeinsamen Workshops des Conseil d'Analyse Économique (CAE) und des Sachverständigenrates zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung zum Thema fiskalische und ökonomische Integration des Euroraums verfasst. Er diskutiert die makroökonomischen Wirkungen einer Bankenunion und mögliche Ausgestaltungsvarianten vor dem Hintergrund der aktuell diskutierten Vorschläge.
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Do Banks Benefit from Internationalization? Revisiting the Market Power–Risk Nexus
Claudia M. Buch, C. T. Koch, Michael Koetter
Review of Finance,
No. 4,
2013
Abstract
We analyze the impact of bank internationalization on domestic market power (Lerner index) and risk for German banks. Risk is measured by the official declaration of regulatory authorities that a bank is distressed. We distinguish the volume of foreign assets, the number of foreign countries, and different modes of foreign entry. Our analysis has three main results. First, higher market power is associated with lower risk. Second, holding assets in many countries reduce market power at home, but banks with a higher share of foreign assets exhibit higher market power. Third, bank internationalization is only weakly related to bank risk.
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Makroökonomische Faktoren und mikroökonomische Risiken von Banken
Claudia M. Buch, S. Eickmeier, Esteban Prieto
Ökonomenstimme,
2010
Abstract
Die jüngste Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise hat gezeigt, dass Entwicklungen im Bankensektor und makroökonomische Entwicklungen oftmals sehr eng miteinander verwoben sind. Banken reagieren auf eine expansive Geldpolitik, in dem sie ihre Kreditvergabe ausweiten und dabei unter Umständen höhere Risiken eingehen; umgekehrt reagiert die Geldpolitik auf Liquiditätsengpässe im Bankensektor, in dem sie zusätzliche Liquidität bereitstellt. Diese und andere Anpassungsmuster spielen sich aber nicht nur auf aggregierter Ebene ab; vielmehr liegen ihnen eine Vielzahl von zum Teil sehr unterschiedlichen Anpassungsmustern auf der Ebene der einzelnen Bank zu Grunde. Banken unterscheiden sich beispielsweise im Grad ihrer Abhängigkeit der Refinanzierung über den Interbankenmarkt, sie sind in ihrem Geschäft Zinsänderungsrisiken in unterschiedlichem Ausmaß aufgesetzt, und sie sind unterschiedlich stark im Ausland engagiert und damit von makroökonomischen Entwicklungen im Inland abhängig.
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Does It Pay to Have Friends? Social Ties and Executive Appointments in Banking
Allen N. Berger, Thomas Kick, Michael Koetter, Klaus Schaeck
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 6,
2013
Abstract
We exploit a unique sample to analyze how homophily (affinity for similar others) and social ties affect career outcomes in banking. We test if these factors increase the probability that the appointee to an executive board is an outsider without previous employment at the bank compared to being an insider. Homophily based on age and gender increase the chances of the outsider appointments. Similar educational backgrounds, in contrast, reduce the chance that the appointee is an outsider. Greater social ties also increase the probability of an outside appointment. Results from a duration model show that larger age differences shorten tenure significantly, whereas gender similarities barely affect tenure. Differences in educational backgrounds affect tenure differently across the banking sectors. Maintaining more contacts to the executive board reduces tenure. We also find weak evidence that social ties are associated with reduced profitability, consistent with cronyism in banking.
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Hidden Gems and Borrowers with Dirty Little Secrets: Investment in Soft Information, Borrower Self-Selection and Competition
Reint E. Gropp, C. Gruendl, Andre Guettler
Abstract
This paper empirically examines the role of soft information in the competitive interaction between relationship and transaction banks. Soft information can be interpreted as a private signal about the quality of a firm that is observable to a relationship bank, but not to a transaction bank. We show that borrowers self-select to relationship banks depending on whether their privately observed soft information is positive or negative. Competition affects the investment in learning the private signal from firms by relationship banks and transaction banks asymmetrically. Relationship banks invest more; transaction banks invest less in soft information, exacerbating the selection effect. Finally, we show that firms where soft information was important in the lending decision were no more likely to default compared to firms where only financial information was used.
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Effects of Specification Choices on Efficiency in DEA and SFA
Michael Koetter, Aljar Meesters
Efficiency and Productivity Growth: Modelling in the Financial Services Industry,
2013
Abstract
This chapter assesses the sensitivity of bank cost-efficiency scores obtained with stochastic frontier analysis and data envelopment analysis. We compare CE scores of either type for a large cross-country sample of EU banks from 1996 until 2010. The results show that CE measures differ considerably depending on specification choices across parametric and nonparametric methods. The chapter documents the reasons for these differences in terms of theoretical, sample, and further specification choices.
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Sovereign Credit Risk Co-movements in the Eurozone: Simple Interdependence or Contagion?
Manuel Buchholz, Lena Tonzer
UniCredit & Universities Foundation, Working Paper Series No. 47,
No. 47,
2013
published in: International Finance
Abstract
We investigate credit risk co-movements and contagion in sovereign debt markets of 17 industrialized countries for the period 2008-2012. We use dynamic conditional correlations of sovereign CDS spreads to detect contagion. This approach allows separating the channels through which contagion occurs from the determinants of simple interdependence. The results show that, first, sovereign credit risk comoves considerably, in particular among eurozone countries and during the sovereign debt crisis. Second, contagion cannot be attributed to one moment in time but varies across time and countries. Third, similarities in economic fundamentals, cross-country linkages in banking, and common market sentiment constitute the main channels of contagion.
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Big Banks and Macroeconomic Outcomes: Theory and Cross-Country Evidence of Granularity
Franziska Bremus, Claudia M. Buch, K. Russ, Monika Schnitzer
NBER Working Paper No. 19093,
2013
Abstract
Does the mere presence of big banks affect macroeconomic outcomes? In this paper, we develop a theory of granularity (Gabaix, 2011) for the banking sector, introducing Bertrand competition and heterogeneous banks charging variable markups. Using this framework, we show conditions under which idiosyncratic shocks to bank lending can generate aggregate fluctuations in the credit supply when the banking sector is highly concentrated. We empirically assess the relevance of these granular effects in banking using a linked micro-macro dataset of more than 80 countries for the years 1995-2009. The banking sector for many countries is indeed granular, as the right tail of the bank size distribution follows a power law. We then demonstrate granular effects in the banking sector on macroeconomic outcomes. The presence of big banks measured by high market concentration is associated with a positive and significant relationship between bank-level credit growth and aggregate growth of credit or gross domestic product.
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Competitive Distortions of Bank Bailouts
Michael Koetter, Felix Noth
Abstract
This study investigates if the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) distorted price competition in U.S. banking. Political indicators reveal bailout expectations after 2009, manifested as beliefs about the predicted probability of receiving equity support relative to failing during the TARP disbursement period. In addition, the TARP affected the competitive conduct of unsupported banks after the program stopped in the fourth quarter of 2009. Loan rates were higher, and the risk premium required by depositors was lower for banks with higher bailout expectations. The interest margins of unsupported banks increased in the immediate aftermath of the TARP disbursement but not after 2010. No effects emerged for loan or deposit growth, which suggests that protected banks did not increase their market shares at the expense of less protected banks.
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Corporate Boards and Bank Loan Contracting
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Michael Koetter, Qiang Wu
Journal of Financial Research,
No. 4,
2012
Abstract
We investigate the role of corporate boards in bank loan contracting. We find that when corporate boards are more independent, both price and nonprice loan terms (e.g., interest rates, collateral, covenants, and performance-pricing provisions) are more favorable, and syndicated loans comprise more lenders. In addition, board size, audit committee structure, and other board characteristics influence bank loan prices. However, they do not consistently affect all nonprice loan terms except for audit committee independence. Our study provides strong evidence that banks recognize the benefits of board monitoring in mitigating information risk ex ante and controlling agency risk ex post, and they reward higher quality boards with more favorable loan contract terms.
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