Financial Crisis Risk, ECB “Non-standard“ Measures, and the External Value of the Euro
Stefan Eichler
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance,
No. 3,
2012
Abstract
I study the impact of banking and sovereign debt crisis risk of EMU member states on the external value of the euro. Using a regime switching model, I find that the external value of the euro has significantly responded to financial crisis risk during the period of November 2008–November 2011, while no significant effect is found for the period from February 2006 to October 2008. This suggests that the monetary expansion and interest rate cuts associated with the ECB's “non-standard” measures may have reduced the external value of the euro.
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What Drives Banking Sector Fragility in the Eurozone? Evidence from Stock Market Data
Stefan Eichler, Karol Sobanski
Journal of Common Market Studies,
No. 4,
2012
Abstract
This article explores the determinants of banking sector fragility in the eurozone. For this purpose, a stock-market-based banking sector fragility indicator is calculated for eight member countries from 1999 to 2009 using the Merton model (1974). Using a panel framework, it is found that the macroeconomic environment, the structure of the banking sector and the intensity of banking regulation all have an effect on banking sector fragility in the eurozone.
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Predicting Financial Crises: The (Statistical) Significance of the Signals Approach
Makram El-Shagi, Tobias Knedlik, Gregor von Schweinitz
Abstract
The signals approach as an early warning system has been fairly successful in detecting crises, but it has so far failed to gain popularity in the scientific community because it does not distinguish between randomly achieved in-sample fit and true predictive power. To overcome this obstacle, we test the null hypothesis of no correlation between indicators and crisis probability in three applications of the signals approach to different crisis types. To that end, we propose bootstraps specifically tailored to the characteristics of the respective datasets. We find (1) that previous applications of the signals approach yield economically meaningful and statistically significant results and (2) that composite
indicators aggregating information contained in individual indicators add value to the signals approach, even where most individual indicators are not statistically significant on their own.
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Does the ECB Act as a Lender of Last Resort During the Subprime Lending Crisis?: Evidence from Monetary Policy Reaction Models
Stefan Eichler, K. Hielscher
Journal of International Money and Finance,
No. 3,
2012
Abstract
We investigate whether the ECB aligns its monetary policy with financial crisis risk in EMU member countries. We find that since the outbreak of the subprime crisis the ECB has significantly increased net lending and reduced interest rates when banking and sovereign debt crisis risk in vulnerable EMU countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) increases, while no significant effect is identified for the pre-crisis period and relatively tranquil EMU countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands). These findings suggest that the ECB acts as a Lender of Last Resort for vulnerable EMU countries.
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The Financial Crisis from a Forecaster's Perspective
Katja Drechsel, Rolf Scheufele
Kredit und Kapital,
No. 1,
2012
Abstract
This paper analyses the recession in 2008/2009 in Germany. This recession is very different from previous recessions in particular regarding their causes and magnitude. We show to what extent forecasters and forecasts based on leading indicators fail to detect the timing and the magnitude of the recession. This study shows that large forecast errors for both expert forecasts and forecasts based on leading indicators resulted during this recession which implies that the recession was very difficult to forecast. However, some leading indicators (survey data, risk spreads, stock prices) have indicated an economic downturn and hence, beat univariate time series models. Although the combination of individual forecasts provides an improvement compared to the benchmark model, the combined forecasts are worse than several individual models. A comparison of expert forecasts withthe best forecasts based on leading indicators shows only minor deviations. Overall, the range for an improvement of expert forecasts in the crisis compared to indicator forecasts is small.
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Protect and Survive? Did Capital Controls Help Shield Emerging Markets from the Crisis?
Makram El-Shagi
Economics Bulletin,
No. 1,
2012
Abstract
Using a new dataset on capital market regulation, we analyze whether capital controls helped protect emerging markets from the real economic consequences of the 2009 financial and economic crisis. The impact of the crisis is measured by the 2009 forecast error of a panel state space model, which analyzes the business cycle dynamics of 63 middle-income countries. We find that neither capital controls in general nor controls that were specifically targeted to derivatives (that played a crucial role during the crisis) helped shield economies. However, banking regulation that limits the exposure of banks to global risks has been highly successful.
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Macroeconomic Imbalances as Indicators for Debt Crises in Europe
Tobias Knedlik, Gregor von Schweinitz
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 10,
2011
Abstract
Die Schulden- und Vertrauenskrise in Europa hat eine intensive Diskussion über die makroökonomische Koordinierung ausgelöst. Die bestehenden Institutionen, darunter auch der Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt, haben sich als Krisenpräventions- und Krisenmanagementinstrumente nicht bewährt. Ein Vorschlag in der gegenwärtigen Debatte lautet, anhand geeigneter Frühindikatoren eine regelmäßige und systematische makroökonomische
Überwachung vorzunehmen, um sich anbahnende Krisen früh erkennen und darauf reagieren zu können. Dieser Beitrag stellt die Prognosegüte von vier vorgeschlagenen Indikatorensets vergleichend dar, wobei sowohl die Güte
von Einzelindikatoren als auch die Güte aggregierter Gesamtindikatoren betrachtet werden. Die verschiedenen Einzelindikatoren weisen eine sehr unterschiedliche Prognosequalität auf, wobei sich neben dem Staatsdefizit
besonders die Arbeitsmarktindikatoren, die private Verschuldung und der Leistungsbilanzsaldo durch eine hohe Prognosegüte auszeichnen. Unter den Gesamtindikatoren schneiden besonders jene gut ab, die sowohl viele unterschiedliche als auch besonders gute Einzelindikatoren beinhalten. Deshalb wird für den Einsatz eines breit basierten Gesamtindikators bei der makroökonomischen Überwachung plädiert. Dieser sollte zudem aus gleichgewichteten Einzelindikatoren zusammengesetzt sein, um der Tatsache Rechnung zu tragen, dass die Ursachen künftiger Krisen vorab nicht bekannt sind.
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Labor Demand During the Crisis: What Happened in Germany?
Claudia M. Buch
IZA. Discussion Paper No. 6074,
2011
Abstract
In Germany, the employment response to the post-2007 crisis has been muted compared to other industrialized countries. Despite a large drop in output, employment has hardly changed. In this paper, we analyze the determinants of German firms’ labor demand during the crisis using a firm-level panel dataset. Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we estimate a dynamic labor demand function for the years 2000-2009 accounting for the degree of working time flexibility and the presence of works councils. Second, on the basis of these
estimates, we use the difference between predicted and actual employment as a measure of labor hoarding as the dependent variable in a cross-sectional regression for 2009. Apart from total labor hoarding, we also look at the determinants of subsidized labor hoarding through short-time work. The structural characteristics of firms using these channels of adjustment differ. Product market competition has a negative impact on total labor hoarding but a positive effect on the use of short-time work. Firm covered by collective agreements hoard less labor overall; firms without financial frictions use short-time work less intensively.
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