Did TARP Distort Competition Among Sound Unsupported Banks?
Michael Koetter, Felix Noth
Economic Inquiry,
No. 2,
2016
Abstract
This study investigates if the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) distorted price competition in U.S. banking. Political indicators reveal bailout expectations after 2009, manifested as beliefs about the predicted probability of receiving equity support relative to failing during the TARP disbursement period. In addition, the TARP affected the competitive conduct of unsupported banks after the program stopped in the fourth quarter of 2009. Loan rates were higher, and the risk premium required by depositors was lower for banks with higher bailout expectations. The interest margins of unsupported banks increased in the immediate aftermath of the TARP disbursement but not after 2010. No effects emerged for loan or deposit growth, which suggests that protected banks did not increase their market shares at the expense of less protected banks.
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A Market-based Indicator of Currency Risk: Evidence from American Depositary Receipts
Stefan Eichler, Ingmar Roevekamp
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 4,
2016
Abstract
We introduce a novel currency risk measure based on American Depositary Receipts(ADRs). Using a multifactor pricing model, we exploit ADR investors’ exposure to potential devaluation losses to derive an indicator of currency risk. Using weekly data for a sample of 831 ADRs located in 23 emerging markets over the 1994-2014 period, we find that a deterioration in the fiscal and current account balance, as well as higher inflation, increases currency risk. Interaction models reveal that these macroeconomic fundamentals drive currency risk, particularly in countries with managed exchange rates, low levels of foreign exchange reserves and a poor sovereign credit rating.
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To Separate or not to Separate Investment from Commercial Banking? An Empirical Analysis of Attention Distortion under Multiple Tasks
Reint E. Gropp, K. Park
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 2,
2016
Abstract
In the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis, a number of policy reports (Vickers, Liikanen, Volcker) proposed to separate investment banking from commercial banking to increase financial stability. This paper empirically examines one theoretical justification for these proposals, namely attention distortion under multiple tasks as in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). Universal banks can be viewed as combining two different tasks (investment banking and commercial banking) in the same organization. We estimate pay-performance sensitivities for different segments within universal banks and for pure investment and commercial banks. We show that the pay-performance sensitivity is higher in investment banking than in commercial banking, no matter whether it is organized as part of a universal bank or in a separate institution. Next, the paper shows that relative pay-performance sensitivities of investment and commercial banking are negatively related to the quality of the loan portfolio in universal banks. Depending on the specification, we obtain a reduction in problem loans when investment banking is removed from commercial banks of up to 12 percent. We interpret the evidence to imply that the higher pay-performance sensitivity in investment banking directs the attention of managers away from commercial banking within universal banks, consistent with Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). Separation of investment banking and commercial banking may indeed be associated with a reduction in risk in commercial banking.
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Abnormal Real Operations, Real Earnings Management, and Subsequent Crashes in Stock Prices
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Lingxiang Li
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting,
No. 2,
2016
Abstract
We study the impact of firms’ abnormal business operations on their future crash risk in stock prices. Computed based on real earnings management (REM) models, firms’ deviation in real operations (DROs) from industry norms is shown to be positively associated with their future crash risk. This association is incremental to that between discretionary accruals (DAs) and crash risk found by prior studies. Moreover, after Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, DRO’s predictive power for crash risk strengthens substantially, while DA’s predictive power essentially dissipates. These results are consistent with the prior finding that managers shift from accrual earnings management to REM after SOX. We further develop a suspect-firm approach to capture firms’ use of DRO for REM purposes. This analysis shows that REM-firms experience a significant increase in crash risk in the following year. These findings suggest that the impact of DRO on crash risk is at least partially through REM.
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Determinants of the Size of the Sovereign Credit Default Swap Market
Tobias Berg, Daniel Streitz
Journal of Fixed Income,
No. 3,
2016
Abstract
We analyze the sovereign credit default swap (CDS) market for 57 countries, using a novel dataset comprising weekly positions and turnover data. We document that CDS markets—measured relative to a country’s debt—are larger for smaller countries, countries with a rating just above the investment-grade cutoff, and countries with weaker creditor rights. Analyzing changes in credit risk, we find that rating changes matter but only for negative rating events (downgrades and negative outlooks). In particular, weeks with downgrades and negative outlooks are associated with a significantly higher turnover in the sovereign CDS market, even after controlling for changes in sovereign CDS spreads. We conclude that agencies’ ratings are a major determinant of the size of the sovereign CDS market.
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International Banking and Liquidity Risk Transmission: Evidence from Canada
James Chapman, H. Evren Damar
IMF Economic Review,
No. 3,
2015
Abstract
This paper investigates how liquidity conditions in Canada may affect domestic and/or foreign lending of globally active Canadian banks, and whether this transmission is influenced by individual bank characteristics. It finds that Canadian banks expanded their foreign lending during the recent financial crisis, often through acquisitions of foreign banks. It also finds evidence that internal capital markets play a role in the lending activities of globally active Canadian banks during times of heightened liquidity risk.
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Banks and Sovereign Risk: A Granular View
Claudia M. Buch, Michael Koetter, Jana Ohls
Abstract
We identify the determinants of all German banks’ sovereign debt exposures between 2005 and 2013 and test for the implications of these exposures for bank risk. Larger, more capital market affine, and less capitalised banks hold more sovereign bonds. Around 15% of all German banks never hold sovereign bonds during the sample period. The sensitivity of sovereign bond holdings by banks to eurozone membership and inflation increased significantly since the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Since the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis, banks prefer sovereigns with lower debt ratios and lower bond yields. Finally, we find that riskiness of government bond holdings affects bank risk only since 2010. This confirms the existence of a nexus between government debt and bank risk.
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Censored Fractional Response Model: Estimating Heterogeneous Relative Risk Aversion of European Households
Qizhou Xiong
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 11,
2015
Abstract
This paper estimates relative risk aversion using the observed shares of risky assets and characteristics of households from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey of the European Central Bank. Given that the risky share is a fractional response variable belonging to [0, 1], this paper proposes a censored fractional response estimation method using extremal quantiles to approximate the censoring thresholds. Considering that participation in risky asset markets is costly, I estimate both the heterogeneous relative risk aversion and participation cost using a working sample that includes both risky asset holders and non-risky asset holders by treating the zero risky share as the result of heterogeneous self-censoring. Estimation results show lower participation costs and higher relative risk aversion than what was previously estimated. The estimated median relative risk aversions of eight European countries range from 4.6 to 13.6. However, the results are sensitive to households’ perception of the risky asset market return and volatility.
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