Coordination between Municipalities and Local Non-Municipal Public Units (NMPUs) for Supporting Urban Economic Development: Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Evidence for the Example of Universities in Germany
Martin T. W. Rosenfeld, J. Hinz
Koordination raumwirksamer Politik: Mehr Effizienz und Wirksamkeit von Politik durch abgestimmte Arbeitsteilung,
2015
Abstract
In zahlreichen europäischen Städten gibt es Versuche, der lokalen Wirtschaftsentwicklung eine neue Richtung zu geben, u.a. durch die Ansiedlung von Nicht-Kommunalen Öffentlichen Einrichtungen (NKOE), z.B. Bundesagenturen, Gerichte, Rechnungshöfe, Landesmuseen oder Universitäten. Allerdings liegen die Kompetenzen für solche NKOE nicht bei den Kommunen, sondern zumeist bei den höheren staatlichen Ebenen. Deshalb haben die Kommunen keinen unmittelbaren Einfluss auf die Ansiedlung von NKOE. Sobald aber eine entsprechende Entscheidung gefallen ist, können die Kommunen die weitere Entwicklung von NKOE begünstigen. Im Beitrag wird zunächst eine Kategorisierung von NKOE durchgeführt, und zwar sowohl gemäß der Bedeutung von NKOE für die lokale Wirtschaftsentwicklung als auch hinsichtlich des Einflusses lokaler Maßnahmen auf die Leistungsfähigkeit von NKOE. Es wird gezeigt, dass Universitäten zu jener Kategorie von NKOE zählen, für die eine Koordination der eigenen Aktivitäten mit jenen der Kommunen besonders wichtig sein dürfte. Die Effekte von Universitäten für die lokale Wirtschaftsentwicklung wurden bereits vielfach diskutiert. Die Fähigkeit der Universitäten, das für ihre Effektivität erforderliche Humankapital zu attrahieren, hängt von verschiedenen lokalen Faktoren ab. Folglich gibt es eine reziproke Beziehung zwischen Kommunen und Universitäten. Eine Koordinierung der jeweiligen Aktivitäten wäre deshalb für beide Seiten von Vorteil. Dies gilt z.B. für den Bereich der Informationspolitik. Eine Kommune sollte nach innen wie nach außen die Vorzüge der örtlichen Universitäten kommunizieren; umgekehrt sollte auch eine Universität die Stärken des lokalen Umfelds deutlich machen. Da für den Bereich der Informationspolitik empirische Daten leicht zugänglich sind, konzentriert sich der empirische Teil des Beitrags auf eine empirische Untersuchung der Internetpräsentationen ausgewählter Städte und Universitäten. Es zeigt sich, dass in den meisten betrachteten Städten die Koordinierung zwischen Kommunen und Universitäten zu wünschen übrig lässt. Eine Verbesserung dieser Situation ließe sich z.B. durch die Einführung
finanzieller Anreizmechanismen erreichen.
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Linking Distress of Financial Institutions to Macrofinancial Shocks
Alexander Al-Haschimi, Stéphane Dées, Filippo di Mauro, Martina Jančoková
ECB Working Paper,
No. 1749,
2014
Abstract
This paper links granular data of financial institutions to global macroeconomic variables using an infinite-dimensional vector autoregressive (IVAR) model framework. The approach taken allows for an assessment of the two-way links between the financial system and the macroeconomy, while accounting for heterogeneity among financial institutions and the role of international linkages in the transmission of shocks. The model is estimated using macroeconomic data for 21 countries and default probability estimates for 35 euro area financial institutions. This framework is used to assess the impact of foreign macroeconomic shocks on default risks of euro area financial firms. In addition, spillover effects of firm-specific shocks are investigated. The model captures the important role of international linkages, showing that economic shocks in the US can generate a rise in the default probabilities of euro area firms that are of a significant magnitude compared to recent historical episodes such as the financial crisis. Moreover, the potential heterogeneity across financial firms.
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Financial Stability and Central Bank Governance
Michael Koetter, Kasper Roszbach, G. Spagnolo
International Journal of Central Banking,
No. 4,
2014
Abstract
The financial crisis has ignited a debate about the appropriate objectives and the governance structure of Central Banks. We use novel survey data to investigate the relation between these traits and banking system stability focusing in particular on their role in micro-prudential supervision. We find that the separation of powers between single and multiple bank supervisors cannot explain credit risk prior or during the financial crisis. Similarly, a large number of Central Bank governance traits do not correlate with system fragility. Only the objective of currency stability exhibits a significant relation with non-performing loan levels in the run-up to the crisis. This effect is amplified for those countries with most frequent exposure to IMF missions in the past. Our results suggest that the current policy discussion whether to centralize prudential supervision under the Central Bank and the ensuing institutional changes some countries are enacting may not produce the improvements authorities are aiming at. Whether other potential improvements in prudential supervision due to, for example, external disciplinary devices, such as IMF conditional lending schemes, are better suited to increase financial stability requires further research.
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Taxes, Banks and Financial Stability
Reint E. Gropp
R. de Mooij and G. Nicodème (eds), Taxation and Regulation of the Financial Sector. MIT Press,
2014
Abstract
In response to the financial crisis of 2008/2009, numerous new taxes on financial institutions have been discussed or implemented around the world. This paper discusses the connection between the incidence of the taxes, their incentive effects, and policy makers’ objectives. Combining basic insights from banking theory with standard models of tax incidence shows that the incidence of such taxes will disproportionately fall on small and medium size enterprises. The arguments presented suggest it is unlikely that the taxes will have a beneficial impact on financial stability or raise significant amounts of revenue without increasing the cost of capital to bank dependent firms significantly.
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Im Fokus: Die Entwicklung der Kernkapitalquoten der deutschen Banken seit der Finanzkrise
Manuel Buchholz, Felix Noth
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 3,
2014
Abstract
Das Eigenkapital einer Bank dient aus aufsichtsrechtlicher Sicht zwei Zielen: zum einen dem Ausgleich von Verlusten aus laufenden Geschäften oder der Begleichung von Gläubigeransprüchen im Insolvenzfall, zum anderen der Begrenzung von Verlustrisiken aus bestimmten Geschäften. Ein wichtiger Bestandteil des Eigenkapitals ist dabei das Kernkapital. Das Kernkapital ist der Anteil des Eigenkapitals einer Bank, der dem Institut dauerhaft zur Verfügung steht und somit als echter Verlustpuffer dienen kann. Bestandteile sind unter anderem das Stammkapital, Kapitalrücklagen, Gewinnrücklagen oder eigene Aktien der Bank. Aus dem Kernkapital ergibt sich eine wichtige aufsichtsrechtliche Kenngröße: die Kernkapitalquote (Tier 1 Capital Ratio). Diese berechnet sich als das Verhältnis von Kernkapital zur Summe der Risikoaktiva einer Ba
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Taxing Banks: An Evaluation of the German Bank Levy
Claudia M. Buch, Björn Hilberg, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
Bank distress can have severe negative consequences for the stability of the financial system, the real economy, and public finances. Regimes for restructuring and restoring banks financed by bank levies and fiscal backstops seek to reduce these costs. Bank levies attempt to internalize systemic risk and increase the costs of leverage. This paper evaluates the effects of the German bank levy implemented in 2011 as part of the German bank restructuring law. Our analysis offers three main insights. First, revenues raised through the bank levy are minimal, because of low tax rates and high thresholds for tax exemptions. Second, the bulk of the payments were contributed by large commercial banks and the head institutes of savings banks and credit unions. Third, the levy had no effect on the volume of loans or interest rates for the average German bank. For the banks affected most by the levy, we find evidence of fewer loans, higher lending rates, and lower deposit rates.
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Spillover Effects among Financial Institutions: A State-dependent Sensitivity Value-at-Risk Approach
Z. Adams, R. Füss, Reint E. Gropp
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
No. 3,
2014
Abstract
In this paper, we develop a state-dependent sensitivity value-at-risk (SDSVaR) approach that enables us to quantify the direction, size, and duration of risk spillovers among financial institutions as a function of the state of financial markets (tranquil, normal, and volatile). For four sets of major financial institutions (commercial banks, investment banks, hedge funds, and insurance companies) we show that while small during normal times, equivalent shocks lead to considerable spillover effects in volatile market periods. Commercial banks and, especially, hedge funds appear to play a major role in the transmission of shocks to other financial institutions.
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How Important are Hedge Funds in a Crisis?
Reint E. Gropp
FRBSF Economic Letters,
No. 11,
2014
Abstract
Before the 2007–09 crisis, standard risk measurement methods substantially underestimated the threat to the financial system. One reason was that these methods didn’t account for how closely commercial banks, investment banks, hedge funds, and insurance companies were linked. As financial conditions worsened in one type of institution, the effects spread to others. A new method that more accurately accounts for these spillover effects suggests that hedge funds may have been central in generating systemic risk during the crisis.
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The Ex Ante versus Ex Post Effect of Public Guarantees
H. Evren Damar, Reint E. Gropp, Adi Mordel
D. Evanoff, C. Holthausen, G. Kaufman and M. Kremer (eds), The Role of Central Banks in Financial Stability: How has it Changed? World Scientific Studies in International Economics 30,
2013
Abstract
In October 2006, Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS) introduced new ratings for banks that account for the potential of government support. The rating changes are not a reflection of any changes in the respective banks’ credit fundamentals. We use this natural experiment to evaluate the consequences of bail out expectations for bank behavior using a difference in differences approach. The results suggest a striking difference between the effects of bail out probabilities during calm times (“ex ante”) versus during crisis times (“ex post”). During calm times, higher bail-out probabilities result in higher risk taking, consistent with the moral hazard view and much of the empirical literature. However, in crisis times, we find that banks with higher bail out probabilities tend to increase their risk taking less compared to banks that were ex ante unlikely to be bailed-out. Charter values are one part of the explanation: Supported banks may have a funding advantage relative to non-supported banks during the crisis. However, we cannot rule out that other factors also may be playing a role, including tighter supervision of supported banks in crisis times.
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Towards Deeper Financial Integration in Europe: What the Banking Union Can Contribute
Claudia M. Buch, T. Körner, Benjamin Weigert
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 13,
2013
Abstract
The agreement to establish a Single Supervisory Mechanism in Europe is a major step towards a Banking Union, consisting of centralized powers for the supervision of banks, the restructuring and resolution of distressed banks, and a common deposit insurance system. In this paper, we argue that the Banking Union is a necessary complement to the common currency and the Internal Market for capital. However, due care needs to be taken that steps towards a Banking Union are taken in the right sequence and that liability and control remain at the same level throughout. The following elements are important. First, establishing a Single Supervisory Mechanism under the roof of the ECB and within the framework of the current EU treaties does not ensure a sufficient degree of independence of supervision and monetary policy. Second, a European institution for the restructuring and resolution of banks should be established and equipped with sufficient powers. Third, a fiscal backstop for bank restructuring is needed. The ESM can play a role but additional fiscal burden sharing agreements are needed. Direct recapitalization of banks through the ESM should not be possible until legacy assets on banks’ balance sheets have been cleaned up. Fourth, introducing European-wide deposit insurance in the current situation would entail the mutualisation of legacy assets, thus contributing to moral hazard.
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