On the Economics of Ex-Post Transfers in a Federal State: A Mechanism Design Approach
Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher, T. Kuhn
WWDP, 95,
No. 95,
2008
Abstract
As a common feature in many federal states grants-in aid are payed to jurisdictions ex post, i.e. after local policy measures have chosen. We show that the central government cannot offer grants ex ante in a federal states with informational asymmetries as well as inter-temporal commitment problems. Local governments’ incentives to provide public goods are distorted if they rely on federal grants-in-aid offered ex post. Furthermore it becomes obvious that local governments are apt to substitute tax revenue for higher grants-in-aid if relevant local data are unobservable for the central government. To which extend ex post transfers mitigate local governments’ incentives crucially depends on the information structure predominant in the federation.
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Inventory and analysis of national public policies that stimulate research in biotechnology, its exploitation and commercialisation by industry in Europe in the period 2002–2005.
C. Enzing, A. van der Guissen, Sander van der Molen
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities,
2007
Abstract
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Inventory and analysis of national public policies that stimulate biotechnology research, its exploitation and commercialisation by industry in Europe in the period 2002–2005: Final Report
Inventory and analysis of national public policies that stimulate research in biotechnology, its exploitation and commercialisation by industry in Europe in the period 2002–2005,
2007
Abstract
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Spillover Effects of Spatial Growth Poles - a Reconciliation of Conflicting Policy Targets?
Alexander Kubis, Mirko Titze, Joachim Ragnitz
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 8,
2007
Abstract
Regional economic policy faces the challenge of two competing policy goals - reducing regional economic disparities vs. promoting economic growth. The allocation of public funds has to weigh these goals particularly under the restriction of scarce financial re- sources. If, however, some region turns out to be a regional growth pole with positive spillovers to its disadvantaged periphery, regional policies could be designed to recon- cile the conflicting targets. In this case, peripheral regions could indirectly participate in the economic development of their growing cores. We start our investigation by defining and identifying such growth poles among German regions on the NUTS 3 administrative level based on spatial and sectoral effects. Using cluster analysis, we determine significant characteristics for the general identification of growth poles. Patterns in the sectoral change are identified by means of the change in the employment. Finally, we analyze whether and to what extent these growth poles ex- ert spatial spillover effects on neighbouring regions and thus mitigate contradictory in- terests in regional public policy. For this purpose, we apply a Spatial-Cross-Regressive- Model (SCR-Model) including the change in the secondary sector which allows to con- sider functional economic relations on the administrative level chosen (NUTS 3).
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Local Public Utilities' Profits and Municipal Expenses in Germany: An Empirical Analysis
Peter Haug, Birger Nerré
Proceedings of the 99th Annual Conference on Taxation (November 16-18), Washington DC,
2006
Abstract
The article offers information on profits and municipal expenses of local public utilities in Germany. It reveals that cities and municipalities faced rising expenses over the last years and the only way for local governments to avoid budgetary bottlenecks is to postpone infrastructure investment and increase short-term borrowing. The countries municipalities tried to overcome such difficulties by increasing local public utilities' profits.
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Investment and Internal Finance: Asymmetric Information or Managerial Discretion?
Hans Degryse, Abe de Jong
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
No. 1,
2006
Abstract
This paper examines the investment-cash flow sensitivity of publicly listed firms in The Netherlands. Investment-cash flow sensitivities can be attributed to overinvestment resulting from the abuse of managerial discretion, but also to underinvestment due to information problems. The Dutch corporate governance structure presents a number of distinctive features, in particular the limited influence of shareholders, the presence of large blockholders, and the importance of bank ties. We expect that in The Netherlands, the managerial discretion problem is more important than the asymmetric information problem. We use Tobin's Q to discriminate between firms with these problems, where LOW Q firms face the managerial discretion problem and HIGH Q firms the asymmetric information problem. As hypothesized, we find substantially larger investment-cash flow sensitivity for LOW Q firms. Moreover, specifically in the LOW Q sample, we find that firms with higher (bank) debt have lower investment-cash flow sensitivity. This finding shows that leverage, and particularly bank debt, is a key disciplinary mechanism which reduces the managerial discretion problem.
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Non-market Allocation in Transport: A Reassessment of its Justification and the Challenge of Institutional Transition
Ulrich Blum
50 Years of Transport Research: Experiences Gained and Major Challenges Ahead,
2005
Abstract
Economic theory knows two systems of coordination: through public choice or through the market principle. If the market is chosen, then it may either be regulated, or it may be fully competitive (or be in between these two extremes). This paper first inquires into the reasons for regulation, it analyses the reasons for the important role of government in the transportation sector, especially in the procurement of infrastructure. Historical reasons are seen as important reasons for bureaucratic objections to deregulation. Fundamental economic concepts are forwarded that suggest market failure and justify a regulatory environment. The reasons for regulation cited above, however, may be challenged; we forward theoretical concepts from industrial organization theory and from institutional economics which suggest that competition is even possible on the level of infrastructure. The transition from a strongly regulated to a competitive environment poses problems that have given lieu to numerous failures in privatization and deregulation. Structural inertia plays an important role, and the incentive-compatible management of infrastructure is seen as the key element of any liberal transportation policy. It requires that the setting of rules on the meta level satisfies both local and global efficiency ends. We conclude that, in market economies, competition and regulation should not be substitutes but complements. General rules, an "ethic of competition" have to be set that guarantee a level playing field to agents; it is complimented by institutions that provide arbitration in case of misconduct.
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Negotiated Third Party Access - an Industrial Organisation Perspective
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
European Journal of Law and Economics,
2005
Abstract
In the course of the liberalization of European energy markets, the German government opted – diverging from all other European countries – for Negotiated Third-Party Access. In this article we analyze if, theoretically, this institutional regime can be superior to regulation. We review empirically whether certain aspects of the actual implementation, in particular publication of the network access charges for each network supplier, facilitated or inhibited competition. In the first place we reconsider previous research, showing that NTPA can – under certain conditions – be economically effective. Our empirical analysis shows that the duty of publishing access charges supported market transparency and imposed a regulatory threat, particularly to suppliers with significantly above-average charges. On the other hand observable price adjustments over time serve as an indicator of tacit collusion. Although the expensive suppliers cut their prices, the cheaper ones raised theirs.
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Employment restraints in public service - considering scientific assistants in research establishments
Herbert Buscher
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 6,
2005
Abstract
Spätestens mit den so genannten Hartz-Reformen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt verstärkt sich das Interesse der Öffentlichkeit an der Arbeitsvermittlung und ihrer Wirksamkeit. Eine effiziente Arbeitsvermittlung ist nicht nur wünschenswert, sondern auch notwendige Voraussetzung für einen spürbaren Abbau von Arbeitslosigkeit. Aber die Vermittlung allein ist nur eine notwendige, keine hinreichende Bedingung dafür, dass die Arbeitsuchenden auch entsprechende Beschäftigungsverhältnisse abschließen können. Gesetzliche und tarifvertragliche Regelungen können trotz aller Vermittlungsbemühungen dazu führen, dass potenzielle Arbeitsplätze nicht besetzt werden.
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The influence of Vertical Integration and Property Rights on Network Access Charges in the German Electricity Markets
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Externe Publikationen,
No. 6,
2004
Abstract
German Electricity markets were deregulated in the late nineties of the last century. In contrast to other European countries, the German government enacted negotiated third party access instead of installing a regulation authority. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers, which specify the calculation schemes for access charges. Local and regional suppliers are nevertheless able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, restricted only by the possibility of interference competition authorities. While some of those suppliers have been acquired by one of the four Transmission System Operators and become vertically integrated, the majority is still independent public utility companies. In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for different charging behaviour depending on the supplier’s economic independence or its level of vertical integration. Controlling for other coefficients as the so called structural features and related cost differences as well as the influence of competition law suits, multivariate estimations show significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers for at least one typical case.
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