The Determinants of Bank Capital Structure
Reint E. Gropp, Florian Heider
Review of Finance,
No. 4,
2010
Abstract
The paper shows that mispriced deposit insurance and capital regulation were of second-order importance in determining the capital structure of large U.S. and European banks during 1991 to 2004. Instead, standard cross-sectional determinants of non-financial firms’ leverage carry over to banks, except for banks whose capital ratio is close to the regulatory minimum. Consistent with a reduced role of deposit insurance, we document a shift in banks’ liability structure away from deposits towards non-deposit liabilities. We find that unobserved time-invariant bank fixed-effects are ultimately the most important determinant of banks’ capital structures and that banks’ leverage converges to bank specific, time-invariant targets.
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Cross-border Diversification in Bank Asset Portfolios
Claudia M. Buch, J.C. Driscoll, C. Ostergaard
International Finance,
forthcoming
Abstract
We compute optimally diversified international asset portfolios for banks located in France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States using the mean–variance portfolio model with currency hedging. We compare these benchmark portfolios with the actual cross-border asset positions of banks from 1995 to 2003 and ask whether the differences are best explained by regulations, institutions, cultural conditions or other financial frictions. Our results suggest that both culture and regulations affect the probability of a country's being overweighted in banks' portfolios: countries whose residents score higher on a survey measure of trust are more likely to be overweighted, while countries that have tighter capital controls are less likely to be overweighted. From a policy standpoint, the importance of culture suggests a limit to the degree of financial integration that may be achievable by the removal of formal economic barriers.
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Potential Effects of Basel II on the Transmission from Currency Crises to Banking Crises – The Case of South Korea
Tobias Knedlik, Johannes Ströbel
Journal of Money,
No. 13,
2010
Abstract
In this paper we evaluate potential effects of the Basel II accord on preventing the transmission from currency crises to banking crises by analyzing the South Korean crisis of 1997. We show that regulatory capital reserves under Basel II would have been lower than those under Basel I, and that therefore Basel II would have had adverse effects on the development of the crisis. Furthermore we investigate whether the behavior of rating agencies has changed since the East Asian crisis. We find no evidence that rating agencies have started to take micro-mismatches into account. Thus, we have reservations concerning the effectiveness of Basel II.
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Monetary Policy and Financial (In)stability: An Integrated Micro–Macro Approach
Ferre De Graeve, Thomas Kick, Michael Koetter
Journal of Financial Stability,
No. 3,
2008
Abstract
Evidence on central banks’ twin objective, monetary and financial stability, is scarce. We suggest an integrated micro–macro approach with two core virtues. First, we measure financial stability directly at the bank level as the probability of distress. Second, we integrate a microeconomic hazard model for bank distress and a standard macroeconomic model. The advantage of this approach is to incorporate micro information, to allow for non-linearities and to permit general feedback effects between financial distress and the real economy. We base the analysis on German bank and macro data between 1995 and 2004. Our results confirm the existence of a trade-off between monetary and financial stability. An unexpected tightening of monetary policy increases the probability of distress. This effect disappears when neglecting microeffects and non-linearities, underlining their importance. Distress responses are largest for small cooperative banks, weak distress events, and at times when capitalization is low. An important policy implication is that the separation of financial supervision and monetary policy requires close collaboration among members in the European System of Central Banks and national bank supervisors.
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Banking Regulation: Minimum Capital Requirements of Basel II Intensify Transmission from Currency Crises to Banking Crises
Tobias Knedlik, Johannes Ströbel
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 8,
2007
Abstract
Auf Währungskrisen in Schwellenländern folgen oft Bankenkrisen. Ein wesentlicher Grund sind die durch die Abwertung der Währung ansteigenden Bilanzwerte für Auslandsverbindlichkeiten der Unternehmen. Das vorgehaltene Eigenkapital reicht dann oft nicht aus, um die Zahlungsfähigkeit aufrechtzuerhalten. Hier setzt der unter dem Stichwort Basel II bekannte Vorschlag zur Bankenregulierung, insbesondere zu Mindesteigenkapitalanforderungen an Banken an. Im Unterschied zur bestehenden Regulierung (Basel I) wird eine differenzierte Risikogewichtung auf Basis von Kredit-Ratings für unterschiedliche Assets vorgeschlagen. In diesem Beitrag wird am Beispiel der Währungs- und Bankenkrise von Südkorea im Jahr 1997 hypothetisch berechnet, wie sich die neue Regulierung auf das Eigenkapital der Banken ausgewirkt hätte. Diese Ergebnisse werden mit den Anforderungen der aktuellen Regulierung verglichen. Es zeigt sich, daß die Eigenkapitalanforderungen im Vorfeld der Krise unter Basel II geringer gewesen wären als unter Basel I. Zudem wäre das geforderte Eigenkapital nach dem Eintreten der Krise aufgrund der verschlechterten Ratings stark angestiegen. Die Transmission der Währungs- zur Bankenkrise wäre im Fall Südkoreas nicht verhindert, sondern beschleunigt worden. Dabei waren im koreanischen Fall die Eigenkapitalanforderungen unter Basel I aufgrund der OECD-Mitgliedschaft noch relativ gering. Im Sinne einer Verallgemeinerung der Ergebnisse kann geschlußfolgert werden, daß in anderen Schwellenländern, die nicht OECD-Mitglied sind (beispielsweise Osteuropa und Lateinamerika), das Verhältnis der Eigenkapitalanforderungen von Basel I und Basel II noch höher wäre. Die Übertragung von Währungs- zu Bankenkrisen wird demzufolge mit dem vorgeschlagenen Instrument zur Bankenregulierung verstärkt.
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Bank Lending, Bank Capital Regulation and Efficiency of Corporate Foreign Investment
Diemo Dietrich, Achim Hauck
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 4,
2007
Abstract
In this paper we study interdependencies between corporate foreign investment and the capital structure of banks. By committing to invest predominantly at home, firms can reduce the credit default risk of their lending banks. Therefore, banks can refinance loans to a larger extent through deposits thereby reducing firms’ effective financing costs. Firms thus have an incentive to allocate resources inefficiently as they then save on financing costs. We argue that imposing minimum capital adequacy for banks can eliminate this incentive by putting a lower bound on financing costs. However, the Basel II framework is shown to miss this potential.
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Why do banks hold capital in excess of regulatory requirements? A functional approach
Diemo Dietrich, Uwe Vollmer
DBW-Die Betriebswirtschaft,
No. 2,
2007
Abstract
Dieser Beitrag erklärt, warum Banken Eigenkapitalvorschriften übererfüllen. Es wird gezeigt, dass Banken ihre Eigenkapitalquote strategisch bei Nachverhandlungen mit Kreditnehmern nutzen können, da sie ihre Selbstbindungsfähigkeit beeinflusst, ausstehende Kredite einzufordern. Weil dieser Zusammenhang nicht-monoton ist, kann eine Bank gezwungen sein, mehr Eigenkapital als vorgeschrieben zu halten.
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Banks’ Internationalization Strategies: The Role of Bank Capital Regulation
Diemo Dietrich, Uwe Vollmer
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 18,
2006
Abstract
This paper studies how capital requirements influence a bank’s mode of entry into foreign financial markets. We develop a model of an internationally operating bank that creates and allocates liquidity across countries and argue that the advantage of multinational banking over offering cross-border financial services depends on the benefit and the cost of intimacy with local markets. The benefit is that it allows to create more liquidity. The cost is that it causes inefficiencies in internal capital markets, on which a multinational bank relies to allocate liquidity across countries. Capital requirements affect this trade-off by influencing the degree of inefficiency in internal capital markets.
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Bank Market Discipline
Reint E. Gropp, M. Schleicher
ECB Monthly Bulletin,
2005
Abstract
This article reviews the conceptual issues surrounding market discipline for banks and describes to what extent market discipline could complement supervisory activities. The potential of market discipline has been explicitly recognised in the New Basel Accord. In addition to capital requirements (Pillar I) and supervisory review (Pillar II), the Accord provides for a greater role of financial markets in complementing traditional supervisory activities by asking banks for increased transparency with regard to their operations (Pillar III). This article puts Pillar III in the broader context of direct and indirect market discipline. It is argued that both direct and indirect market discipline should be enhanced by the transparency requirements of the New Capital Accord, but that other conditions may also need to be met in order for market discipline to become more effective. Nevertheless, the article also shows that aggregated market prices can play a useful role in monitoring banking sector stability.
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Why do banks hold capital in excess of regulatory requirements? A functional approach
Diemo Dietrich, Uwe Vollmer
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 192,
2004
Abstract
This paper provides an explanation for the observation that banks hold on average a capital ratio in excess of regulatory requirements. We use a functional approach to banking based on Diamond and Rajan (2001) to demonstrate that banks can use capital ratios as a strategic tool for renegotiating loans with borrowers. As capital ratios affect the ability of banks to collect loans in a nonmonotonic way, a bank may be forced to exceed capital requirements. Moreover, high capital ratios may also constrain the amount a banker can borrow from investors. Consequently, the size of the banking sector may shrink.
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