Distance, Lending Relationships, and Competition
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena
Journal of Finance,
No. 1,
2005
Abstract
We study the effect on loan conditions of geographical distance between firms, the lending bank, and all other banks in the vicinity. For our study, we employ detailed contract information from more than 15,000 bank loans to small firms comprising the entire loan portfolio of a large Belgian bank. We report the first comprehensive evidence on the occurrence of spatial price discrimination in bank lending. Loan rates decrease with the distance between the firm and the lending bank and increase with the distance between the firm and competing banks. Transportation costs cause the spatial price discrimination we observe.
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The Impact of Technology and Regulation on the Geographical Scope of Banking
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena
Oxford Review of Economic Policy,
No. 4,
2004
Abstract
We review how technological advances and changes in regulation may shape the (future) geographical scope of banking. We first review how both physical distance and the presence of borders currently affect bank lending conditions (loan pricing and credit availability) and market presence (branching and servicing). Next we discuss how technology and regulation have altered this impact and analyse the current state of the European banking sector. We discuss both theoretical contributions and empirical work and highlight open questions along the way. We draw three main lessons from the current theoretical and empirical literature: (i) bank lending to small businesses in Europe may be characterized both by (local) spatial pricing and resilient (regional and/or national) market segmentation; (ii) because of informational asymmetries in the retail market, bank mergers and acquisitions seem the optimal route of entering another market, long before cross-border servicing or direct entry are economically feasible; and (iii) current technological and regulatory developments may, to a large extent, remain impotent in further dismantling the various residual but mutually reinforcing frictions in the retail banking markets in Europe. We conclude the paper by offering pertinent policy recommendations based on these three lessons.
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The Influence of a Heterogeneous Banking Sector on the Interbank Market Rate in the Euro Area
Ulrike Neyer, Jürgen Wiemers
Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics,
2004
Abstract
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Standortfaktoren im Existenzgründerrating
Ulrich Blum, Werner Gleißner, A. Schaller
Existenzgründerrating,
2004
Abstract
Die Qualität eines Standorts stellt einen wesentlichen Erfolgsfaktor für ein Unternehmen dar. Wenn sich Gründer für einen Standort entscheiden, dann sollten sie daher die Eigenschaften des Orts, an dem soie sich niederlassen, sorgsam abwägen. Das moderne Rating, das zunächst aus Sicht der Banken die Fähigkeit eines Unternehmens bewertet, seinen Kapitaldienst zu leisten, und das starken Bezug auf Markt- und Wettbewerbskräfte nimmt bzw. nehmen sollte, wird hier um standörtliche Aspekte erweitert. Ein sukzessiver Filteransatz wird entwickelt, mit Hilfe dessen in der ersten Stufe die globalen Erfolgsfaktoren von Branchen herausgearbeitet werden, dann gefragt wird, welche Eigenschaften einer Wirtschaftsregion aus Sicht des Unternehmens erfolgswirksam sind und schließlich geprüft wird, welche Unternehmen oder Branchen für eine Region interessant sind. Daraus ergibt sich ein Portfolio von Möglichkeiten, das sowohl die Sicht des Unternehmens auf alternative Standorte, als auch die Sicht der Bank oder des Wirtschaftsförderers auf interessante Unternehmen schärft.
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Why do we have an interbank money market?
Jürgen Wiemers, Ulrike Neyer
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 182,
2003
Abstract
The interbank money market plays a key role in the execution of monetary policy. Hence, it is important to know the functioning of this market and the determinants of the interbank money market rate. In this paper, we develop an interbank money market model with a heterogeneous banking sector. We show that besides for balancing daily liquidity fluctuations banks participate in the interbank market because they have different marginal costs of obtaining funds from the central bank. In the euro area, which we refer to, these cost differences occur because banks have different marginal cost of collateral which they need to hold to obtain funds from the central bank. Banks with relatively low marginal costs act as intermediaries between the central bank and banks with relatively high marginal costs. The necessary positive spread between the interbank market rate and the central bank rate is determined by transaction costs and credit risk in the interbank market, total liquidity needs of the banking sector, costs of obtaining funds from the central bank, and the distribution of the latter across banks.
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Does Transparency of Central Banks Produce Multiple Equilibria on Currency Markets?
Axel Lindner
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 178,
2003
Abstract
A recent strand of literature (see Morris and Shin 2001) shows that multiple equilibria in models of markets for pegged currencies vanish if there is slightly diverse information between traders. It is known that this approach works only if there is not too precise common knowledge in the market. This has led to the conclusion that central banks should try to avoid making their information common knowledge. We present a model in which more transparency of the central bank means better private information, because each trader utilizes public information according to her own private information. Thus, transparency makes multiple equilibria less likely.
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Hungarian Central Bank´s Exchange Rate Policy under Pressure - Current Trend
Thomas Linne, Johannes Stephan
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
2003
Abstract
Mitte Januar senkte die ungarische Nationalbank in zwei Schritten den Refinanzierungszinssatz um jeweils 100 Basispunkte auf nunmehr 6,5%. Gleichzeitig versuchte die Nationalbank durch Devisenmarktinterventionen, den Forint-Wechselkurs innerhalb der Schwankungsbandbreiten zu halten. Anlass für die Zinssenkungen und die Interventionen war die relativ starke Aufwertung des Forint. Seit Oktober 2001 verfolgt die Nationalbank einen fixen Wechselkurs gegenüber dem Euro mit einer zulässigen Schwankungsbandbreite von ±15% um eine zentrale Parität. Damit entspricht die Wechselkurspolitik weitgehend der institutionellen Ausgestaltung des WKM II.
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Bank Concentration and Retail Interest Rates
S. Corvoisier, Reint E. Gropp
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 11,
2002
Abstract
The recent wave of mergers in the euro area raises the question whether the increase in concentration has offset the increase in competition in European banking through deregulation. We test this question by estimating a simple Cournot model of bank pricing. We construct country and product specific measures of bank concentration and find that for loans and demand deposits increasing concentration may have resulted in less competitive pricing by banks, whereas for savings and time deposits, the model is rejected, suggesting increases in contestability and/or efficiency in these markets. Finally, the paper discusses some implications for tests of the effect of concentration on monetary policy transmission.
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Financial fragility and exchange rate arrangements of EU candidate countries
Hubert Gabrisch
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 156,
2002
Abstract
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Rating Agency Actions and the Pricing of Debt and Equity of European Banks: What Can we Infer About Private Sector Monitoring of Bank Soundness?
Reint E. Gropp, A. J. Richards
Economic Notes,
No. 3,
2001
Abstract
The recent consultative papers by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has raised the possibility of an explicit role for external rating agencies in the assessment of the credit risk of banks’ assets, including interbank claims. Any judgement on the merits of this proposal calls for an assessment of the information contained in credit ratings and its relationship to other publicly available information on the financial health of banks and borrowers. We assess this issue via an event study of rating change announcements by leading international rating agencies, focusing on rating changes for European banks for which data on bond and equity prices are available. We find little evidence of announcement effects on bond prices, which may reflect the lack of liquidity in bond markets in Europe during much of our sample period. For equity prices, we find strong effects of ratings changes, although some of our results may suffer from contamination by contemporaneous news events. We also test for pre-announcement and post-announcement effects, but find little evidence of either. Overall, our results suggest that ratings agencies may perform a useful role in summarizing and obtaining non-public information on banks and that monitoring of banks’ risk through bond holders appears to be relatively limited in Europe. The relatively weak monitoring by bondholders casts some doubt on the effectiveness of a subordinated debt requirement as a supervisory tool in the European context, at least until bond markets are more developed.
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