Technology Clubs, R&D and Growth Patterns: Evidence from EU Manufacturing
Claire Economidou, J. W. B. Bos, Michael Koetter
European Economic Review,
No. 1,
2010
Abstract
This paper investigates the forces driving output change in a panel of EU manufacturing industries. A flexible modeling strategy is adopted that accounts for: (i) inefficient use of resources and (ii) differences in the production technology across industries. With our model we are able to identify technical, efficiency, and input growth for endogenously determined technology clubs. Technology club membership is modeled as a function of R&D intensity. This framework allows us to explore the components of output growth in each club, technology spillovers and catch-up issues across industries and countries.
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Do All Countries Grow Alike?
Claire Economidou, J. W. B. Bos, Michael Koetter, James W. Kolari
Journal of Development Economics,
No. 1,
2010
Abstract
This paper investigates the driving forces of output change in 77 countries during the period 1970–2000. A flexible modeling strategy is adopted that accounts for (i) the inefficient use of resources, and (ii) different production technologies across countries. The proposed model can identify technical, efficiency, and input change for each of three endogenously determined regimes. Membership in these regimes is estimated, rather than determined ex ante. This framework enables explorations into the determinants of output growth and convergence issues in each regime.
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Monopolistic Competition and Costs in the Health Care Sector
Ingmar Kumpmann
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 17,
2009
Abstract
Competition among health insurers is widely considered to be a means of enhancing efficiency and containing costs in the health care system. In this paper, it is argued that this could be unsuccessful since health care providers hold a strong position on the market for health care services. Physicians exert a type of monopolistic power which can be described by Chamberlin’s model of monopolistic competition. If many health insurers compete with one another, they cannot counterbalance the strong bargaining position of the physicians. Thus, health care expenditure is higher, financing either extra profits for physicians or a higher number of them. In addition, health insurers do not have an incentive to contract selectively with health care providers as long as there are no price differences between physicians. A monopolistic health insurer is able to counterbalance the strong position of physicians and to achieve lower costs.
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Energy Efficient Homes in Germany: Lower Energy Requirement in the East and the South – Results of the ista-IWH-Energy-Efficiency-Index 2007
Claus Michelsen
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 9,
2009
Abstract
Mit der Ölkrise in den 1970er Jahren rückten Wohnimmobilien erstmals in den Fokus einer Politik für mehr Energieeffizienz. Seinerzeit wurde die Diskussion in erster Linie vor dem Hintergrund der Ressourcenknappheit fossiler Brennstoffe geführt – aktuell sind es vor allem klimapolitische Überlegungen, die staatliche Anreize für mehr Energieeffizienz motivieren. Der zum Jahresbeginn 2009 verpflichtend eingeführte Energieausweis für Immobilien soll dabei einerseits mehr Markttransparenz herstellen und andererseits Energieeinsparpotenziale für Immobilieneigentümer aufzeigen. Ähnlich wie bei Energielabeln für Waschmaschinen oder Kühlschränke sollen Verbraucher ab sofort sowohl beim Kauf als auch bei der Anmietung von Wohnraum die energetischen Eigenschaften der betreffenden Objekte in ihren Entscheidungsprozess einbeziehen. Der erhoffte Nachfragedruck soll Investitionen stimulieren und insgesamt zu höherer Energieeffizienz führen.
Vernachlässigt wird bei diesen Ansätzen jedoch, dass Immobilien mit anderen Wirtschaftsgütern kaum verglichen werden können. So sind sie räumlich gebunden und in ihrer Struktur nur unter hohen Kosten veränderbar. Die Anreize, Immobilien energetisch aufzurüsten, sind demnach stark davon abhängig, wie sich dies für den Eigentümer, beispielsweise in einer höheren Kaltmiete, auszahlt. Die Möglichkeiten, eine höhere Miete tatsächlich durchzusetzen, sind dabei von den regionalen Marktstrukturen abhängig. Immobilieneigentümer optimieren daher ihre Investitionen entsprechend der regionalen Renditechancen. So ist zu vermuten, dass analog zu den verschiedenen Marktstrukturen auch die Energieeffizienz des Gebäudebestands eine große räumliche Heterogenität aufweist.
Unklarheit herrschte bisher darüber, welches Ausmaß die regionalen Unterschiede in der Energieeffizienz annehmen. Auf Grundlage von Verbrauchsdaten des Energiemessdienstleisters ista wird in diesem Artikel erstmalig der auf Raumordnungsregionen aggregierte ista-IWH-Energieeffizienzindex vorgestellt, der sowohl ein Ost-West- als auch ein Nord-Süd-Gefälle in der Energieeffizienz aufzeigt. Zugrunde liegen dafür Informationen zu rund 257 000 Mehrfamilienhäusern bzw. rund 2,6 Mio. Wohnungen. Dies stellt die für Deutschland bisher umfänglichste Untersuchung dar. Neben der Darstellung räumlicher Differenzen wird in diesem Artikel ebenfalls nach möglichen Gründen für die Unterschiede gesucht.
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The Economic Optimality of Sanction Mechanisms in Interorganizational Ego Networks – A Game Theoretical Analysis –
Muhamed Kudic, Marc Banaszak
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 15,
2009
Abstract
Even though small- and medium-sized firms (SMEs) were believed not to proceed beyond exporting in their internationalization routes, we can observe new types of co-operation intensive entrepreneurial firms – so-called “micromultinational enterprises” (mMNEs) – entering the global landscape. These firms face the challenge to manage and control a portfolio of national and international alliances simultaneously (ego network). The aim of this paper is to provide game theoretically consolidated conditions in order to analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of interorganizational sanction mechanisms in an alliance portfolio setting. A game theoretical framework is developed over three stages with increasing complexity. Results show that two out of six analyzed sanction mechanisms do not fulfill the game theoretical condition for effectiveness. The efficiency analysis sensibilizes for discretionary elements in governance structures and demonstrates that not one single sanction mechanism but rather the right choice and combination of different types of sanction mechanisms leads to efficient results. We contribute to the international business, alliance, and network literature in several ways by focusing on alliance portfolios held by mMNEs. In doing so, we move beyond the dyadic level and analyze sanction mechanisms from an ego network perspective, a still widely under-emphasized topic in the literature.
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The Identification of Technology Regimes in Banking: Implications for the Market Power-Fragility Nexus
Michael Koetter, Tigran Poghosyan
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 8,
2009
Abstract
Neglecting the existence of different technologies in banking can contaminate efficiency, market power, and other performance measures. By simultaneously estimating (i) technology regimes conditional on exogenous factors, (ii) efficiency conditional on risk management, and (iii) Lerner indices of German banks, we identify three distinct technology regimes: Public & Retail, Small & Specialized, and Universal & Relationship. System estimation at the regional level reveals that greater bank market power increases bank profitability but also fosters corporate defaults. Corporate defaults, in turn, lead to higher probabilities of bank distress, which supports the market power-fragility hypothesis.
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Regional Growth and Finance in Europe: Is there a Quality Effect of Bank Efficiency?
Iftekhar Hasan, Michael Koetter, Michael Wedow
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 8,
2009
Abstract
In this study, we test whether regional growth in 11 European countries depends on financial development and suggest the use of cost- and profit-efficiency estimates as quality measures of financial institutions. Contrary to the usual quantitative proxies of financial development, the quality of financial institutions is measured in this study as the relative ability of banks to intermediate funds. An improvement in bank efficiency spurs five times more regional growth then an identical increase in credit does. More credit provided by efficient banks exerts an independent growth effect in addition to direct quantity and quality channel effects.
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Lending Technology, Bank Organization and Competition
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena, Günseli Tümer-Alkan
Journal of Financial Transformation,
2009
Abstract
This paper reviews recent theoretical and empirical studies investigating how both bank technology and organization shape bank-borrower interactions. We refer to two related concepts for bank technology. First, the technologies banks employ in loan granting decisions and second, the advances in information technology linked to the bank's lending technology. We also summarize and interpret the theoretical and empirical work on bank organization and its influence on lending technologies. We show that the choice of lending technology and bank organization depend heavily on the availability of information, the technological progress in the collection of information, as well as the banking market structure and the legal environment. We draw important policy conclusions from the literature. Competition authorities and supervisors have to remain alert to the consequences of the introduction of any new technology because: (1) advances in technology do not necessarily lead to more intense banking competition, and (2) the impact of technological and financial innovation on financial efficiency and stability depends on the incentives of the entire „loan production chain.‟
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Effects of Heterogeneity on Bank Efficiency Scores
J. W. B. Bos, Michael Koetter, James W. Kolari, Clemens J. M. Kool
European Journal of Operational Research,
No. 1,
2009
Abstract
Bank efficiency estimates often serve as a proxy of managerial skill since they quantify sub-optimal production choices. But such deviations can also be due to omitted systematic differences among banks. In this study, we examine the effects of heterogeneity on bank efficiency scores. We compare different specifications of a stochastic cost and alternative profit frontier model with a baseline specification. After conducting a specification test, we discuss heterogeneity effects on efficiency levels, ranks and the tails of the efficiency distribution. We find that heterogeneity controls influence both banks’ optimal costs and profits and their ability to be efficient. Differences in efficiency scores are important for more than only methodological reasons. First, different ways of accounting for heterogeneity result in estimates of foregone profits and additional costs that are significantly different from what we infer from our general specification. Second, banks are significantly re-ranked when their efficiency is estimated with a specification other than the preferred, general specification. Third, the general specification gives the most reliable estimates of the probability of distress, although differences to the other specifications are low.
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Are European Equity Style Indices Efficient? – An Empirical Quest in Three Essays
Marian Berneburg
Schriften des IWH,
No. 28,
2008
Abstract
Many situations in the history of the stock markets indicate that assets are not always efficiently priced. But why does it matter whether the stock market is efficiently priced? Because “well-functioning financial markets are a key factor to high economic growth”. (Mishkin and Eakins, 2006, pp. 3-4) In three essays, it is the aim of the author to shed some more light on the topic of market efficiency, which is far from being resolved. Since European equity markets have increased in importance globally, the author, instead of focusing on US markets, looks at a unified European equity market. By testing for a random walk in equity prices, revisiting Shiller’s claim of excess volatility through the means of a vector error correction model, and modifying the Gordon-Growth-Model, the book concludes that a small degree of inefficiency cannot be ruled out. While usually European equity markets are pricing assets correctly, some periods (e.g. the late 1990s and early 2000s) show clear signs of mispricing; the hypothesis of a world with two states (regime one, a normal efficient state, and regime two, a state in which markets are more momentum driven) presents a possible explanation.
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