Kommentar: Mit bester Absicht in die Krise
Reint E. Gropp
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 4,
2018
Abstract
Zehn Jahre nach der Lehman-Pleite werden die Finanzmärkte besser kontrolliert denn je. Das kann böse Folgen haben.
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Zum Risiko einer Staatsschuldenkrise in Italien
Oliver Holtemöller, Tobias Knedlik, Axel Lindner
Abstract
Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung Italiens war in den vergangenen Jahren durch eine ausgesprochen schwache Produktivitätsentwicklung gekennzeichnet. Das Bruttoinlandsprodukt je Einwohner beträgt nur 92% des Niveaus im Jahr 2007, während es im Euroraum insgesamt (inklusive Italien) bei 103% des Vorkrisenniveaus von 2007 liegt. Die Staatsschuldenquote ist im Zeitraum von 2007 bis 2017 von 100% in Relation zum Bruttoinlandsprodukt um 30 Prozentpunkte auf 130% gestiegen. Es bestehen daher Zweifel, ob die Wirtschaftskraft Italiens ausreichend ist, um die weiter steigenden Staatsschulden künftig bedienen zu können. Diese Zweifel kommen zum Beispiel in der gegenwärtig (August 2018) um gut 3 Prozentpunkte höheren Umlaufsrendite 10-jähriger italienischer Staatsanleihen im Vergleich zu deutschen Staatsanleihen zum Ausdruck.
Die Regierung Italiens will der Wirtschaft durch expansive Finanzpolitik wieder auf die Beine helfen. Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird die Tragfähigkeit der italienischen Staatsverschuldung für verschiedene Szenarien analysiert. Dabei gibt es je nach den getroffenen Annahmen zu wichtigen Wirkungszusammenhängen eine ganze Bandbreite von möglichen Entwicklungen, die aber allesamt eine deutlich expansive Finanzpolitik für Italien nicht ratsam erscheinen lassen, weil sie insgesamt nicht förderlich für die Stabilisierung der Staatsverschuldung wäre. Vielmehr sollten produktivitätssteigernde Strukturreformen umgesetzt werden, die dann auch moderat höhere Staatsausgaben erlauben würden.
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On DSGE Models
Lawrence J. Christiano, Martin S. Eichenbaum, Mathias Trabandt
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
No. 3,
2018
Abstract
The outcome of any important macroeconomic policy change is the net effect of forces operating on different parts of the economy. A central challenge facing policymakers is how to assess the relative strength of those forces. Economists have a range of tools that can be used to make such assessments. Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models are the leading tool for making such assessments in an open and transparent manner. We review the state of mainstream DSGE models before the financial crisis and the Great Recession. We then describe how DSGE models are estimated and evaluated. We address the question of why DSGE modelers—like most other economists and policymakers—failed to predict the financial crisis and the Great Recession, and how DSGE modelers responded to the financial crisis and its aftermath. We discuss how current DSGE models are actually used by policymakers. We then provide a brief response to some criticisms of DSGE models, with special emphasis on criticism by Joseph Stiglitz, and offer some concluding remarks.
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Market Power and Risk: Evidence from the U.S. Mortgage Market
Carola Müller, Felix Noth
Economics Letters,
2018
Abstract
We use mortgage loan application data of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) to shed light on the role of banks’ market power on their presumably insufficient risk screening activities in the U.S. mortgage market in the pre-crisis era. We find that banks with higher market power protect their charter value. The effect is stronger for banks that have more information about local markets.
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Banks Fearing the Drought? Liquidity Hoarding as a Response to Idiosyncratic Interbank Funding Dry-ups
Helge Littke, Matias Ossandon Busch
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 12,
2018
Abstract
Since the global financial crisis, economic literature has highlighted banks’ inclination to bolster up their liquid asset positions once the aggregate interbank funding market experiences a dry-up. To this regard, we show that liquidity hoarding and its detrimental effects on credit can also be triggered by idiosyncratic, i.e. bankspecific, interbank funding shocks with implications for monetary policy. Combining a unique data set of the Brazilian banking sector with a novel identification strategy enables us to overcome previous limitations for studying this phenomenon as a bankspecific event. This strategy further helps us to analyse how disruptions in the bank headquarters’ interbank market can lead to liquidity and lending adjustments at the regional bank branch level. From the perspective of the policy maker, understanding this market-to-market spillover effect is important as local bank branch markets are characterised by market concentration and relationship lending.
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On the Empirics of Reserve Requirements and Economic Growth
Jesús Crespo Cuaresma, Gregor von Schweinitz, Katharina Wendt
Abstract
Reserve requirements, as a tool of macroprudential policy, have been increasingly employed since the outbreak of the great financial crisis. We conduct an analysis of the effect of reserve requirements in tranquil and crisis times on credit and GDP growth making use of Bayesian model averaging methods. In terms of credit growth, we can show that initial negative effects of higher reserve requirements (which are often reported in the literature) tend to be short-lived and turn positive in the longer run. In terms of GDP per capita growth, we find on average a negative but not robust effect of regulation in tranquil times, which is only partly offset by a positive but also not robust effect in crisis times.
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Comments on “Consultation BCBS discussion paper on the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures”
Michael Koetter, Lena Tonzer
Einzelveröffentlichungen,
2018
Abstract
The BCBS discussion paper on the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures addresses a so far hardly touched topic as concerns capital regulation. While the regulatory framework has been changed substantially over recent years including the establishment of the European Banking Union, risk weights on sovereign exposures have remained mostly unchanged and sovereign exposures of banks benefit from a favourable capital treatment. This applies despite the fact that the recent European sovereign debt crisis has revealed the potential of a doom loop between bank and sovereign risk and demonstrated that sovereign exposures are by no means “risk-free”. The paper is thus an important proposal how to change the risk evaluation of banks’ sovereign exposures.
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Sovereign Stress, Banking Stress, and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism in the Euro Area
Oliver Holtemöller, Jan-Christopher Scherer
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 3,
2018
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate to what extent sovereign stress and banking stress have contributed to the increase in the level and in the heterogeneity of nonfinancial firms’ refinancing costs in the Euro area during the European debt crisis and how they did affect the monetary transmission mechanism. We identify the increasing effect of government bond yield spreads (sovereign stress) and the share of non-performing loans (banking stress) on firms’ financing costs using an instrumental-variable approach. Moreover, we estimate both sources of stress to have significantly impaired the monetary transmission mechanism during the European debt crisis.
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