Does too much Transparency of Central Banks Prevent Agents from Using their Private Information Efficiently?
Axel Lindner
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 16,
2007
Abstract
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects of different communication strategies of a central bank: it can either publish no more than its overall assessment of the economy or be more transparent, giving detailed reasons for this assessment. The latter strategy is shown to be superior because it enables agents to use private information and to be less dependent on common knowledge. This result holds true even if the strategies of agents are strategic complements, for which case it has been argued that too much transparency might induce agents to neglect their private knowledge.
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Accounting for Distress in Bank Mergers
Michael Koetter, J. W. B. Bos, Frank Heid, James W. Kolari, Clemens J. M. Kool, Daniel Porath
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 10,
2007
Abstract
Most bank merger studies do not control for hidden bailouts, which may lead to biased results. In this study we employ a unique data set of approximately 1000 mergers to analyze the determinants of bank mergers. We use undisclosed information on banks’ regulatory intervention history to distinguish between distressed and non-distressed mergers. Among merging banks, we find that improving financial profiles lower the likelihood of distressed mergers more than the likelihood of non-distressed mergers. The likelihood to acquire a bank is also reduced but less than the probability to be acquired. Both distressed and non-distressed mergers have worse CAMEL profiles than non-merging banks. Hence, non-distressed mergers may be motivated by the desire to forestall serious future financial distress and prevent regulatory intervention.
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The East German Cement Cartel: Cartel Efficiency and Policy after Economic Transformation
Ulrich Blum
Eastern Economic Review,
2007
Abstract
Im Jahr 2003 wurde von der deutschen Kartellbehörde ein Zementkartell aufgedeckt. Eines der Hauptzentren des Kartells war Ostdeutschland, wo das ostdeutsche Zementkombinat Anfang der 1990er Jahre von der Treuhand im Rahmen der Privatisierung der ehemals volkseigenen Betriebe an vier große Zementproduzenten verkauft wurden.
In diesem Aufsatz stellen wir die Behauptung der Kartellbehörde in Frage, dass durch das Kartell Überschussgewinne auf dem ostdeutschen Markt erziehlt wurden. Wir behaupten, dass die juristischen Anzeichen eines Kartells nicht zwangsläufig den wirtschaftlichen Hinweisen entsprechen. Zu diesem Zweck versuchen wir nachzuweisen, dass die Zementnachfrage regional begrenzt ist und nur in einem sehr kleinen Umfang von der Produktpalette abhängt. Wenn das Zementkartell einen Einfluss auf die Wirtschaft hatte, dann müsste sich seine Zerschlagung in der Veränderung der individuellen Nachfragefunktion der Unternehmen widerspiegeln. Allerdings konnten mit dem verwendeten ökonometrischen Modell keine strukturellen Nachfrageänderungen beobachtet werden. Dies kann unter anderem damit begründet werden, dass Billigimporte aus Polen und der Tschechei sowie mittelständische Unternehmen dafür gesorgt haben, dass das Zementkartell seine Wirkung nie voll entfalten konnte.
Der Aufsatz zeigt, dass selbst in etablierten Marktwirtschaften wie Westdeutschland die Schwierigkeit besteht, Wettbewerb in bestimmten Industriebereichen zu generieren und dass hierfür die Offenheit der Wirtschaft entscheidend ist.
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Requirements on Regulation Frameworks: What is the Best Way of Securing Efficiency in the Water Sector?
Peter Haug
Competition Policy in Network Industries, INFER Research Perspectives, Vol. 3,
2007
Abstract
Der Beitrag untersucht die Auswirkungen unterschiedlich gestalteter Regulierungssysteme auf die Effizienz der Wasserversorgung. Dazu werden zum einen diverse Anforderungen an effiziente Regulierungssysteme in modifizierter Form aus Studien zu anderen Netzwerkindustrien herangezogen. Zum anderen werden ergänzend weitere Bedingungen aus verschiedenen ökonomischen Theorien der Regulierung abgeleitet. Die Erfüllung der resultierenden Kriterien wird am Beispiel der Regulierungssysteme für die Wasserwirtschaft in den Niederlanden, Deutschland und den USA überprüft. Ein Vergleich unterschiedlicher Leistungskennzahlen für die drei Länder legt die Vermutung nahe, daß möglicherweise ein Zusammenhang zwischen der Gestaltung des Ordnungsrahmens der Regulierung und dem Preis-Qualitäts-Verhältnis im Trinkwasserbereich besteht.
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Slippery Slopes of Stress: Ordered Failure Events in German Banking
Thomas Kick, Michael Koetter
Journal of Financial Stability,
No. 2,
2007
Abstract
Outright bank failures without prior indication of financial instability are very rare. In fact, banks can be regarded as troubled to varying degrees before outright closure. But failure studies usually neglect the ordinal nature of bank distress. We distinguish four different kinds of increasingly severe events on the basis of the distress database of the Deutsche Bundesbank. Only the worst distress event entails a bank to exit the market. Since the four categories of hazard functions are not proportional, we specify a generalized ordered logit model to estimate respective probabilities of distress simultaneously. We find that the likelihood of ordered distress events changes differently in response to given changes in the financial profiles of banks. Consequently, bank failure studies should account more explicitly for the different shades of distress. This allows an assessment of the relative importance of financial profile components for different degrees of bank distress.
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Systematic Mispricing in European Equity Prices?
Marian Berneburg
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 6,
2007
Abstract
One empirical argument that has been around for some time and that clearly contra- dicts equity market efficiency is that market prices seem too volatile to be optimal estimates of the present value of future discounted cash flows. Based on this, it is deduced that systematic pricing errors occur in equity markets which hence can not be efficient in the Effcient Market Hypothesis sense. The paper tries to show that this so-called excess volatility is to a large extend the result of the underlying assumptions, which are being employed to estimate the present value of cash flows. Using monthly data for three investment style indices from an integrated European Equity market, all usual assumptions are dropped. This is achieved by employing the Gordon Growth Model and using an estimation process for the dividend growth rate that was suggested by Barsky and De Long. In extension to Barsky and De Long, the discount rate is not assumed at some arbitrary level, but it is estimated from the data. In this manner, the empirical results do not rely on the prerequisites of sta- tionary dividends, constant dividend growth rates as well as non-variable discount rates. It is shown that indeed volatility declines considerably, but is not eliminated. Furthermore, it can be seen that the resulting discount factors for the three in- vestment style indices can not be considered equal, which, on a risk-adjusted basis, indicates performance differences in the investment strategies and hence stands in contradiction to an efficient market. Finally, the estimated discount rates under- went a plausibility check, by comparing their general movement to a market based interest rate. Besides the most recent data, the estimated discount rates match the movements of market interest rates fairly well.
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Industry Specialization, Diversity and the Efficiency of Regional Innovation Systems
Michael Fritsch, Viktor Slavtchev
Jena Economic Research Papers, Nr. 2007-018,
No. 18,
2007
Abstract
Innovation processes are characterized by a pronounced division of labor between actors. Two types of externality may arise from such interactions. On the one hand, a close location of actors affiliated to the same industry may stimulate innovation (MAR externalities). On the other hand, new ideas may be born by the exchange of heterogeneous and complementary knowledge between actors, which belong to different industries (Jacobs’ externalities). We test the impact of both MAR as well as Jacobs’ externalities on innovative performance at the regional level. The results suggest an inverted u-shaped relationship between regional specialization in certain industries and innovative performance. Further key determinants of the regional innovative performance are private sector R&D and university-industry collaboration.
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What Determines the Efficiency of Regional Innovation Systems?
Michael Fritsch, Viktor Slavtchev
Jena Economic Research Papers, Nr. 2007-006,
No. 6,
2007
Abstract
We assess the efficiency of regional innovation systems (RIS) in Germany by means of a knowledge production function. This function relates private sector research and development (R&D) activity in a region to the number of inventions that have been registered by residents of that region. Different measures and estimation approaches lead to rather similar assessments. We find that both spillovers within the private sector as well as from universities and other public research institutions have a positive effect on the efficiency of private sector R&D in the respective region. It is not the mere presence and size of public research institutions, but rather the intensity of interactions between private and public sector R&D that leads to high RIS efficiency. We find that relationship between the diversity of a regions’ industry structure and the efficiency of its innovation system is inversely u-shaped. Regions dominated by large establishments tend to be less efficient than regions with a lower average establishment size.
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Bank Lending, Bank Capital Regulation and Efficiency of Corporate Foreign Investment
Diemo Dietrich, Achim Hauck
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 4,
2007
Abstract
In this paper we study interdependencies between corporate foreign investment and the capital structure of banks. By committing to invest predominantly at home, firms can reduce the credit default risk of their lending banks. Therefore, banks can refinance loans to a larger extent through deposits thereby reducing firms’ effective financing costs. Firms thus have an incentive to allocate resources inefficiently as they then save on financing costs. We argue that imposing minimum capital adequacy for banks can eliminate this incentive by putting a lower bound on financing costs. However, the Basel II framework is shown to miss this potential.
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Local Government Control and Efficiency of the Water Industry: An Empirical Analysis of Water Suppliers in East Germany
Peter Haug
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 3,
2007
Abstract
The paper deals with the effects of local governments’ interference with business affairs of publicly owned utilities. A partial model is presented to illustrate the consequences of “democratic control” for the public managers’ effort and the efficiency of local public production. To check the theoretical results empirically, a two-stage data envelopment analysis (DEA) is carried out for a sample of East German water suppliers. The organisational form is used as a measure for the degree of municipal control. The results of the OLS- and Tobit regression indicate an efficiency-enhancing effect of organisational forms with less distinctive control options for local politicians.
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