Russia: Importance of the Energy Sector for the Economic Growth Remains High
Martina Kämpfe
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 7,
2007
Abstract
Die russische Wirtschaft wuchs im vergangenen Jahr erneut dynamisch. Dafür ausschlaggebend waren vor allem die günstigen außenwirtschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen, wie die Entwicklung der Weltmarktpreise für Rohöl, die über die hohen Exporterlöse auch auf die Binnenwirtschaft Einfluß hatten. Dank der guten Ertragslage der Energieexportunternehmen, aber auch durch die Umverteilung der staatlichen Erlöse aus dem Öl- und Gasgeschäft wurden umfangreiche Investitionen in der Wirtschaft finanziert. Die Expansion der Inlandsnachfrage regte die inländische Produktion an. Der Energiesektor besitzt damit nach wie vor eine herausragende Rolle für die Gesamtwirtschaft. Dies birgt allerdings auch Risiken für eine stabile Wirtschaftsentwicklung. Zwar können Schwankungen auf den Weltmärkten in ihren Auswirkungen auf die Wirtschaft über den Stabilisierungsfonds kurzfristig abgefedert werden, längerfristig bleibt die Entwicklung allerdings ungewiß, denn die russische Politik hat nur begrenzten Einfluß auf die Weltmarktpreise für Energieträger. Um die Rohstoffabhängigkeit der Wirtschaft zu verringern, müßten die Investitionen stärker wachsen und die Umstrukturierung der Wirtschaft rascher vorangebracht werden. Dies ist von der russischen Regierung erkannt worden. In einem mittelfristigen Entwicklungsprogramm von Wirtschaftsminister Gref sollen durch Maßnahmen zur Umstrukturierung und Modernisierung der Wirtschaft ihre Wettbewerbsfähigkeit gefördert und gezielt neue Wachstumschancen jenseits der bisherigen Wege erschlossen werden. Dies wird sich aber nur schrittweise realisieren lassen.
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Editorial
Hubert Gabrisch
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 1,
2006
Abstract
Der Besuch von Frau Merkel in Moskau erfolgte im Lichte einer neuen Sachlichkeit, die auch auf die Beziehungen zu Rußland als Energielieferant ausstrahlen sollte. Dies ist nach den Turbulenzen, welche die russische Energiepolitik letztens ausgelöst hatte, notwendig. Denn wir sind in einem Zwiespalt: Einerseits ist Rußland ein attraktiver und wachsender Absatzmarkt für die deutsche Industrie. Diesem Interesse stehen jedoch andererseits zwei Barrieren gegenüber. Die eine ist die Nichtmitgliedschaft Rußlands in der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO). Dadurch werden deutsche Exporte und Direktinvestitionen behindert. Die zweite Barriere ist die Energiepolitik Rußlands, und zwar aus ökonomischen wie auch politischen Gründen. Zwar mag die russische Regierung die Versorgung der Haushalte und Industrie mit billiger Energie mit dem Argument sozialer Stabilität verteidigen.
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The Economics of Restructuring the German Electricity Sector
Christian Growitsch, Felix Müsgens
Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft,
No. 3,
2005
Abstract
The debate about the development of German electricity prices after the liberalization of energy markets in 1998 raises the question of failures in market restructuring. However, a general statement would be misleading for two main reasons. Firstly, the price development, analyzed for the exemplary case of household prices, shows significant differences among the stages of the value chain. Secondly, the underlying cost structure might have changed from 1998 to 2004. While such effects can be expected to level out over time, they can distort the comparison of a small period of observation. For these reasons, we analyzed the different price components at a detailed level, finding a considerable price reduction of about 32% in generation and a much lower reduction of 13% in transmission and distribution tariffs. These decreases have been mostly compensated by a significant increase in taxes and subsidies (+56%).
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Negotiated Third Party Access - an Industrial Organisation Perspective
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
European Journal of Law and Economics,
2005
Abstract
In the course of the liberalization of European energy markets, the German government opted – diverging from all other European countries – for Negotiated Third-Party Access. In this article we analyze if, theoretically, this institutional regime can be superior to regulation. We review empirically whether certain aspects of the actual implementation, in particular publication of the network access charges for each network supplier, facilitated or inhibited competition. In the first place we reconsider previous research, showing that NTPA can – under certain conditions – be economically effective. Our empirical analysis shows that the duty of publishing access charges supported market transparency and imposed a regulatory threat, particularly to suppliers with significantly above-average charges. On the other hand observable price adjustments over time serve as an indicator of tacit collusion. Although the expensive suppliers cut their prices, the cheaper ones raised theirs.
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An analysis of household electricity price developments in Germany since liberalization
Christian Growitsch, Felix Müsgens
Externe Publikationen,
2005
Abstract
Despite the liberalization of energy markets in 1998, household electricity prices in 2004 are nearly the same as 1998, indicating a failure of market restructuring. However, such a general consideration is misleading for two main reasons. Firstly, the price development shows significant differences among the stages of the value chain. Secondly, the underlying cost structure might have changed from 1998 to 2004. While such effects can be expected to level out over time, they can distort the comparison of a small period of observation. For these reasons, we analyzed the different price components at a detailed level, finding a considerable price reduction of about 32% in generation and a much lower reduction of 13% in transmission and distribution tariffs. These decreases have been mostly compensated by a significant increase in taxes and subsidies (+56%).
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Network Access Charges, Vertical Integration, and Property Rights Structure
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Energy Economics,
No. 2,
2005
Abstract
After the deregulation of the German electricity markets in 1998, the German government opted for a regulatory regime called negotiated third party access, which would be subject to ex post control by the federal cartel office. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers. As the electricity networks are incontestable natural monopolies, the local and regional network operators are able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, limited only by their concerns over possible interference by the federal cartel office (Bundeskartellamt). In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for varying charging behaviour depending on a supplier`s economic independence (structure of property rights) or its level of vertical integration. For this purpose we hypothesise that incorporated and vertically integrated suppliers set different charges than independent utility companies. Multivariate estimations show a relation between network access charges and the network operator’s economic independence as well as level of vertical integration. On the low voltage level, for an estimated annual consumption of 1700 kW/h, vertically integrated firms set – as predicted by our hypothesis - significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers. There is insufficient evidence available to confirm these results for other consumptions or voltage levels.
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Structural Change, Natural Resources Sector Expansion and Growth in Russia
Albrecht Kauffmann, P. J. J. Welfens
Internationalization and Economic Policy Reforms in Transition Countries,
2005
Abstract
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20.12.2004 • 43/2004
Konjunktur aktuell: Konjunkturausblick des IWH für 2005 - Deutsche Binnenkonjunktur zieht allmählich nach
Der kräftige Aufschwung in der Weltwirtschaft musste sich im Lauf des Jahres 2004 infolge der drastischen Verteuerung von Energie und Rohstoffen einem Belastungstest stellen. War die Verlangsamung des konjunkturellen Auftriebs ohnehin durch die nachlassende Dynamik der Produktion in den Wachstumszentren USA und China angelegt, so verstärkte sich dadurch die Abschwächung noch. Anfang 2005 werden jedoch die negativen Folgen des Ölpreisanstiegs abklingen.
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The Contestable Markets Theory - Efficient Advice for Economic Policy
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Externe Publikationen,
2004
Abstract
During the nineties of the last century several formerly monopolistic markets (telecommunication, electricity, gas, and railway) have been deregulated in Germany based on European directives and theoretically inspired by the theory of contestable markets. The original contestable market theory implied three assumptions necessary to be satisfied to establish potential competition: Free market entry, market exit possible without any costs, and the price adjustment lag exceeding the entry lag. Our analysis shows that if the incumbent reduces its prices slowly (high adjustment lag) and the market entry can be performed quickly (low entry lag), a new competitor will be able to earn back sunk costs. Therefore it is not necessary that all three conditions be complied with for potential competition to exist. Applying this „revised“ contestable market theory to the deregulated sectors in Germany, natural monopolies can be identified in telecommunication sections local loops and local/regional connection networks, in the national electricity grid and the regional/local electricity distribution networks, in the national and regional/local gas transmission/distribution sections, and in the railroad network. These sections are not contestable due to sunk costs, expected high entry lags and a probably short price adjustment lag. They are identified as bottlenecks, which should be regulated. The function of system operators in energy and railroad are closely related to the non-contestable monopolistic networks.
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The influence of Vertical Integration and Property Rights on Network Access Charges in the German Electricity Markets
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Externe Publikationen,
No. 6,
2004
Abstract
German Electricity markets were deregulated in the late nineties of the last century. In contrast to other European countries, the German government enacted negotiated third party access instead of installing a regulation authority. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers, which specify the calculation schemes for access charges. Local and regional suppliers are nevertheless able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, restricted only by the possibility of interference competition authorities. While some of those suppliers have been acquired by one of the four Transmission System Operators and become vertically integrated, the majority is still independent public utility companies. In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for different charging behaviour depending on the supplier’s economic independence or its level of vertical integration. Controlling for other coefficients as the so called structural features and related cost differences as well as the influence of competition law suits, multivariate estimations show significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers for at least one typical case.
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