Network Access Charges, Vertical Integration, and Property Rights Structure
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Energy Economics,
No. 2,
2005
Abstract
After the deregulation of the German electricity markets in 1998, the German government opted for a regulatory regime called negotiated third party access, which would be subject to ex post control by the federal cartel office. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers. As the electricity networks are incontestable natural monopolies, the local and regional network operators are able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, limited only by their concerns over possible interference by the federal cartel office (Bundeskartellamt). In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for varying charging behaviour depending on a supplier`s economic independence (structure of property rights) or its level of vertical integration. For this purpose we hypothesise that incorporated and vertically integrated suppliers set different charges than independent utility companies. Multivariate estimations show a relation between network access charges and the network operator’s economic independence as well as level of vertical integration. On the low voltage level, for an estimated annual consumption of 1700 kW/h, vertically integrated firms set – as predicted by our hypothesis - significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers. There is insufficient evidence available to confirm these results for other consumptions or voltage levels.
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Technology spillovers from foreign investors in transition economies - are the effects still expected?
Jutta Günther
Economic and business review,
No. 1,
2005
Abstract
While it is widely acknowledged that there is a technology transfer from parent companies to foreign subsidiaries in central East European countries, there is no clear cut evidence for technology spillovers in favour of domestic companies so far. The paper presents a theoretical framework for how spillover mechanisms are turned into a reality and outlines empirical findings on technology spillovers for transition economies based on a comprehensive literature review. Against the background of an empirical qualitative study, the paper provides firm level explanations for the obvious lack of technology spillovers. Policy oriented issues will be discussed in the conclusions.
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The Impact of Technology and Regulation on the Geographical Scope of Banking
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena
Oxford Review of Economic Policy,
No. 4,
2004
Abstract
We review how technological advances and changes in regulation may shape the (future) geographical scope of banking. We first review how both physical distance and the presence of borders currently affect bank lending conditions (loan pricing and credit availability) and market presence (branching and servicing). Next we discuss how technology and regulation have altered this impact and analyse the current state of the European banking sector. We discuss both theoretical contributions and empirical work and highlight open questions along the way. We draw three main lessons from the current theoretical and empirical literature: (i) bank lending to small businesses in Europe may be characterized both by (local) spatial pricing and resilient (regional and/or national) market segmentation; (ii) because of informational asymmetries in the retail market, bank mergers and acquisitions seem the optimal route of entering another market, long before cross-border servicing or direct entry are economically feasible; and (iii) current technological and regulatory developments may, to a large extent, remain impotent in further dismantling the various residual but mutually reinforcing frictions in the retail banking markets in Europe. We conclude the paper by offering pertinent policy recommendations based on these three lessons.
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The Contestable Markets Theory - Efficient Advice for Economic Policy
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Externe Publikationen,
2004
Abstract
During the nineties of the last century several formerly monopolistic markets (telecommunication, electricity, gas, and railway) have been deregulated in Germany based on European directives and theoretically inspired by the theory of contestable markets. The original contestable market theory implied three assumptions necessary to be satisfied to establish potential competition: Free market entry, market exit possible without any costs, and the price adjustment lag exceeding the entry lag. Our analysis shows that if the incumbent reduces its prices slowly (high adjustment lag) and the market entry can be performed quickly (low entry lag), a new competitor will be able to earn back sunk costs. Therefore it is not necessary that all three conditions be complied with for potential competition to exist. Applying this „revised“ contestable market theory to the deregulated sectors in Germany, natural monopolies can be identified in telecommunication sections local loops and local/regional connection networks, in the national electricity grid and the regional/local electricity distribution networks, in the national and regional/local gas transmission/distribution sections, and in the railroad network. These sections are not contestable due to sunk costs, expected high entry lags and a probably short price adjustment lag. They are identified as bottlenecks, which should be regulated. The function of system operators in energy and railroad are closely related to the non-contestable monopolistic networks.
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The influence of Vertical Integration and Property Rights on Network Access Charges in the German Electricity Markets
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Externe Publikationen,
No. 6,
2004
Abstract
German Electricity markets were deregulated in the late nineties of the last century. In contrast to other European countries, the German government enacted negotiated third party access instead of installing a regulation authority. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers, which specify the calculation schemes for access charges. Local and regional suppliers are nevertheless able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, restricted only by the possibility of interference competition authorities. While some of those suppliers have been acquired by one of the four Transmission System Operators and become vertically integrated, the majority is still independent public utility companies. In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for different charging behaviour depending on the supplier’s economic independence or its level of vertical integration. Controlling for other coefficients as the so called structural features and related cost differences as well as the influence of competition law suits, multivariate estimations show significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers for at least one typical case.
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The Reform of Local Public Services of General Interest in Europe
Peter Haug, Martin T. W. Rosenfeld
Applied Economics Quarterly (Supplement),
2004
Abstract
The benefits of a reduced supply of local public services may more than outweigh the supposed welfare losses. This was suggested by various theoretical and empirical investigations in many fields of economics during the last decades. Nevertheless, local and national politicians, trade unionists, charities, and other lobbyists have succeeded in preventing further liberalisation of “services of general interest” in Europe. This article examines why these preserve agents have been and are still successful. The analysis is based on an institutional economic approach. Several policy measures and institutional changes are suggested to either reduce influence of preserve agents or to compensate them for their losses.
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Standortbedingungen der Biotechnologiebranche - Eine Analyse zur Identifikation von Erfolgsfaktoren für Biotechnologiefirmen und Bioregionen
Walter Komar
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 176,
2003
Abstract
Im Artikel werden die Faktoren ermittelt, die für den Erfolg von Biotechnologiefirmen und Bioregionen wichtig sind. Dazu werden die Standortbedingungen einer fortgeschrittenen Bioregion mit denen einer nicht so fortgeschrittenen Bioregion in Deutschland in einem Benchmark-Ansatz verglichen. Die signifikanten Erfolgsfaktoren werden mittels logistischer Regression identifiziert. Das Ergebnis ist, dass ein Bündel von Faktoren für den Erfolg von Biotechnologiefirmen und Bioregionen bedeutsam ist. Darin spielen das Humankapitalangebot, Netzwerke und die öffentliche Forschung in der Region eine herausragende Rolle.
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Local conditions for the New Economy in structurally weak areas: The Example of Saxony-Anhalt
Walter Komar
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 9,
2003
Abstract
Der Artikel präsentiert Befunde einer Analyse der Standortbedingungen für die New Economy in Sachsen-Anhalt, d. h. für die Sektoren der modernen Biotechnologie und der modernen Informationstechnologie. Hierfür wurden die Standortbedingungen zwischen Sachsen-Anhalt und der Raumordungsregion (ROR) München verglichen, die zu den fortgeschrittenen Regionen in diesen Branchen in Deutschland zählt. Erwartungsgemäß schneidet die ROR München bei den meisten Feldern besser ab. Die Analyse zeigt aber auch, dass noch nicht so fortgeschrittene Regionen auch Entwicklungschancen in neuen Branchen haben. Dazu müssen diese Regionen ihre Potentiale und Standortvorteile noch besser nutzen sowie noch vorhandene Standortdefizite abbauen.
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Does East Germany need a new technology policy? – Implications from the functioning of the R&D market after the transformation
Ralf Müller
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 145,
2001
Abstract
Einen wesentlichen Teil der Wirtschaftsförderung in Ostdeutschland bildet die Förde-rung unternehmerischer Forschung und Entwicklung (FuE). Trotzdem bestehen noch zehn Jahre nach der Vereinigung erhebliche Defizite Ostdeutschlands für die Herstellung von Technologiegütern. Dies wirft die Frage auf, ob überhaupt eine spezielle För-derung von FuE-Aktivitäten sinnvoll ist oder aber, soweit dies der Fall ist, die derzeit ergriffenen Maßnahmen nicht wirksam und daher durch andere zu ersetzen sind. Hierzu zeigt sich, dass generell eine Technologiepolitik für Ostdeutschland durch das dortige Fehlen von Netzwerken begründbar ist; ohne eine dies kompensierende Förderung droht ein Fortbestand der schwachen Aktivität Ostdeutschlands in der Erstellung von Technologiegütern und damit entsprechende Einkommensnachteile. Ein Gutteil der für Ost-deutschland angewandten technologiepolitischen Instrumente ist jedoch nicht problemadäquat, da keine Beiträge zur Netzwerkbildung entstehen. Eine künftige ostdeutsche Technologiepolitik sollte dem Rechenschaft tragen, so insbesondere durch eine ver-stärkte Förderung von FuE-Infrastruktur, die die Bildung solcher Netzwerke erleichtert.
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East German technology policies - Situation and prospects
Klaus Holst
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 3,
1996
Abstract
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