Testing for Structural Breaks at Unknown Time: A Steeplechase
Makram El-Shagi, Sebastian Giesen
Abstract
This paper analyzes the role of common data problems when identifying structural breaks in small samples. Most notably, we survey small sample properties of the most commonly applied endogenous break tests developed by Brown, Durbin, and Evans (1975) and Zeileis (2004), Nyblom (1989) and Hansen (1992), and Andrews, Lee, and Ploberger (1996). Power and size properties are derived using Monte Carlo simulations. Results emphasize that mostly the CUSUM type tests are affected by the presence of heteroscedasticity, whereas the individual parameter Nyblom test and AvgLM test are proved to be highly robust. However, each test is significantly affected by leptokurtosis. Contrarily to other tests, where skewness is far more problematic than kurtosis, it has no additional effect for any of the endogenous break tests we analyze. Concerning overall robustness the Nyblom test performs best, while being almost on par to more recently developed tests in terms of power.
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International Bank Portfolios: Short- and Long-Run Responses to Macroeconomic Conditions
S. Blank, Claudia M. Buch
Review of International Economics,
No. 2,
2010
Abstract
International bank portfolios constitute a large component of international country portfolios. Yet, banks’ response to international macroeconomic conditions remains largely unexplored.We use a novel dataset on banks’ international portfolios to answer three questions. First, what are the long-run determinants of banks’ international portfolios? Second, how do banks’ international portfolios adjust to short-run macroeconomic developments? Third, does the speed of adjustment change with the degree of financial integration?We find that, in the long-run, market size has a positive impact on foreign assets and liabilities. An increase in the interest differential between the home and the foreign economy lowers foreign assets and increases foreign liabilities. Foreign trade has a positive impact on international bank portfolios, which is independent from the effect of other macroeconomic variables. Short-run dynamics show heterogeneity across countries, but these dynamics can partly be explained with gravity-type variables.
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Specialization, Diversity, Competition and their Impact on Local Economic Growth in Germany
Martin T. W. Rosenfeld, Annette Illy, Michael Schwartz, Christoph Hornych
Abstract
This study systematically examines the impact of fundamental elements of urban economic structure on urban growth in Germany from 2003 to 2007. We test four elements simultaneously, that is sectoral specialization, diversification of economic activities, urban size as well as the impact of local competition. To account for the effect of varying spatial delimitations in the analysis of urban growth, we further differentiate between cities and planning regions as geographical units. The analysis covers manufacturing industries as well as service sectors. Most previous work produces inconsistent results and concentrates on localization economies and/or diversification, while urban size and the effect of local competition are widely ignored. Our regression results show a U-shaped relationship between localization economies and urban growth and positive effects of local competition on urban growth. With respect to diversification, we find positive effects on urban growth on the city-level, but insignificant results on the level of the planning regions. The impact of urban size also differs between free cities and planning regions; in the former a U-shaped relationship is found whereas the effect is inversely U-shaped for the latter.
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Shocks at Large Banks and Banking Sector Distress: The Banking Granular Residual
S. Blank, Claudia M. Buch, Katja Neugebauer
Journal of Financial Stability,
No. 4,
2009
Abstract
Size matters in banking. In this paper, we explore whether shocks originating at large banks affect the probability of distress of smaller banks and thus the stability of the banking system. Our analysis proceeds in two steps. In a first step, we follow Gabaix and construct a measure of idiosyncratic shocks at large banks, the so-called Banking Granular Residual. This measure documents the importance of size effects for the German banking system. In a second step, we incorporate this measure of idiosyncratic shocks at large banks into an integrated stress-testing model for the German banking system following De Graeve et al. (2008). We find that positive shocks at large banks reduce the probability of distress of small banks.
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Urban Growth in Germany – The Impact of Localization and Urbanization Economies
Christoph Hornych, Michael Schwartz, Annette Illy, Martin T. W. Rosenfeld
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 19,
2009
Abstract
This study examines the impact of localization and urbanization economies as well as the impact of city size on urban growth in German cities from 2003 to 2007. Although, from a theoretical perspective, agglomeration economies are supposed to have positive impacts on regional growth, prior empirical studies do not show consistent results. Especially little is known about agglomeration economies in Germany, where interregional support policy and the characteristics of the federal system are further determinants of urban growth. The results of the econometric analysis show a U-shaped relationship between specialization and urban growth, which particularly holds for manufacturing industries. We do not find evidence for the impact of Jacobs-externalities; however, city size shows a positive (but decreasing) effect on urban growth.
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Size and Focus of a Venture Capitalist's Portfolio
Paolo Fulghieri, Merih Sevilir
Review of Financial Studies,
No. 11,
2009
Abstract
We take a portfolio approach to analyze the investment strategy of a venture capitalist (VC) and show that portfolio size and scope affect both the entrepreneurs' and the VC's incentives to exert effort. A small portfolio improves entrepreneurial incentives because it allows the VC to concentrate the limited human capital on a smaller number of startups, adding more value. A large and focused portfolio is beneficial because it allows the VC to reallocate the limited resources and human capital in the case of startup failure and allows the VC to extract greater rents from the entrepreneurs. We show that the VC finds it optimal to limit portfolio size when startups have higher payoff potential - that is, when providing strong entrepreneurial incentives is most valuable. The VC expands portfolio size only when startup fundamentals are more moderate and when he can form a sufficiently focused portfolio. Finally, we show that the VC may find it optimal to engage in portfolio management by divesting some of the startups early since this strategy allows him to extract a greater surplus.
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The Economic Optimality of Sanction Mechanisms in Interorganizational Ego Networks – A Game Theoretical Analysis –
Muhamed Kudic, Marc Banaszak
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 15,
2009
Abstract
Even though small- and medium-sized firms (SMEs) were believed not to proceed beyond exporting in their internationalization routes, we can observe new types of co-operation intensive entrepreneurial firms – so-called “micromultinational enterprises” (mMNEs) – entering the global landscape. These firms face the challenge to manage and control a portfolio of national and international alliances simultaneously (ego network). The aim of this paper is to provide game theoretically consolidated conditions in order to analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of interorganizational sanction mechanisms in an alliance portfolio setting. A game theoretical framework is developed over three stages with increasing complexity. Results show that two out of six analyzed sanction mechanisms do not fulfill the game theoretical condition for effectiveness. The efficiency analysis sensibilizes for discretionary elements in governance structures and demonstrates that not one single sanction mechanism but rather the right choice and combination of different types of sanction mechanisms leads to efficient results. We contribute to the international business, alliance, and network literature in several ways by focusing on alliance portfolios held by mMNEs. In doing so, we move beyond the dyadic level and analyze sanction mechanisms from an ego network perspective, a still widely under-emphasized topic in the literature.
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Barriers to Internationalization: Firm-Level Evidence from Germany
Claudia M. Buch
IAW Discussion Paper No. 52,
2009
Abstract
Exporters and multinationals are larger and more productive than their domestic
counterparts. In addition to productivity, financial constraints and labor market
constraints might constitute barriers to entry into foreign markets. We present new
empirical evidence on the extensive and intensive margin of exports and FDI based on detailed micro-level data of German firms. Our paper has three main findings. First, in line with earlier literature, we find a positive impact of firm size and productivity on firms’ international activities. Second, small firms suffer more frequently from financial constraints than bigger firms, but financial conditions have no strong effect on internationalization. Third, labor market constraints constitute a more severe barrier to foreign activities than financial constraints. Being covered by collective bargaining particularly impedes international activities.
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The Impact of Organizational Structure and Lending Technology on Banking Competition
Hans Degryse, Luc Laeven, Steven Ongena
Review of Finance,
No. 2,
2009
Abstract
We investigate how bank organization shapes banking competition. We show that a bank's geographical lending reach and loan pricing strategy is determined by its own and its rivals’ organizational structure. We estimate the impact of organization on the geographical reach and loan pricing of a large bank. We find that the reach of the bank is smaller when rival banks are large and hierarchically organized, have superior communication technology, have a narrower span of organization, and are closer to a decision unit with lending authority. Rival banks’ size and the number of layers to a decision unit soften spatial pricing.
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