Progressivity and flexibility in developing an effective competition regime: using experiences of Poland, Ukraine and South Africa for developing countries. Forschungsbericht innerhalb des EU-Projektes: Competition Policy Foundations for Trade Reform, Regulatory Reform, and Sustainable Development, 2005
Franz Kronthaler, Johannes Stephan
Einzelveröffentlichungen,
No. 5,
2005
Abstract
The paper discusses the role of the concept of special and differential treatment in the framework of regional trade agreements for the development of a competition regime. After a discussion of the main characteristics and possible shortfalls of those concepts, three case countries are assessed in terms of their experience with progressivity, flexibility, and technical and financial assistance: Poland was led to align its competition laws to match the model of the EU. The Ukraine opted voluntarily for the European model, this despite its intense integration mainly with Russia. South Africa, a developing country that emerged from a highly segregated social fabric and an economy dominated by large conglomerates with concentrated ownership. All three countries enacted (or comprehensively reformed) their competition laws in an attempt to face the challenges of economic integration and catch up development on the one hand and particular social problems on the other. Hence, their experience may be pivotal for a variety of different developing countries who are in negotiations to include competition issues in regional trade agreements. The results suggest that the design of such competition issues have to reflect country-particularities to achieve an efficient competition regime.
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Developments in efficiency and productivity research – a report about the first Halle Efficiency and Productivity Analysis Workshop
Christian Growitsch
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 7,
2006
Abstract
Produktivitäts- und Effizienzanalysen gewinnen – vor allem unter dem Stichwort benchmarking – in akademischer Forschung, unternehmerischer Praxis und nicht zuletzt aktueller Wirtschaftspolitik zunehmend an Einfluß. So bildet beispielsweise der Effizienzvergleich deutscher Energieversorgungsunternehmen im jüngst vorgestellten Entwurf zur Anreizregulierung der Bundesnetzagentur ein zentrales Element der nationalen Energieregulierung. Aber auch in anderen Disziplinen der Wirtschaftswissenschaften haben diese Analysen Einzug gehalten. Das IWH hat daher gemeinsam mit dem Institut für Agrarentwicklung in Mittel- und Osteuropa (IAMO) einen Workshop zu den Themen Effizienz- und Produktivitätsanalysen, den “1st Halle Efficiency and Productivity Analysis Workshop – HEPAW” veranstaltet. Ziel des Workshops war die Diskussion aktueller theoretischer und empirischer Forschungsergebnisse der Produktivitäts- und Effizienzmessung aus den Disziplinen Volkswirtschaftslehre, Agrarökonomik, Betriebswirtschaftslehre, Operations Research und verwandten Gebiete.
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Quality of Service, Efficiency, and Scale in Network Industries: An Analysis of European Electricity Distribution. EPRG Working Paper 05/04
Christian Growitsch, Tooraj Jamasb, Michael Pollitt
Externe Publikationen,
2005
Abstract
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‘Ich-AG’, bridge money and foundation allowance – more efficient promotion or simply budget recapitalization
Herbert S. Buscher
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 6,
2006
Abstract
Die bislang bestehenden Förderkonzepte zur Gründung einer selbständigen Existenz aus der Arbeitslosigkeit – das Überbrückungsgeld und der Existenzgründungszuschuß – sollen zum 1. August 2006 zu einem einheitlichen Förderkonzept „Gründungszuschuß“ zusammengefaßt werden. Neben einer verbesserten Transparenz in den Förderinstrumenten erwartet die Regierung hiervon eine zielgerichtetere Förderung mit einer höheren Erfolgswahrscheinlichkeit und nicht unerhebliche Einsparungen bei den Fördermitteln. Der Beitrag überprüft auf der Grundlage der bisher veröffentlichten Informationen über das neue Förderkonzept, ob mit den erwarteten Einsparungen zu rechnen ist und welche beschäftigungspolitischen Signale hiervon ausgehen können. Die Ergebnisse einer Überschlagsrechnung zeigen, daß es voraussichtlich nicht zu den erhofften Einsparungen kommen wird, wenn nicht die Zahl der geförderten Personen deutlich abgesenkt wird. Als eindeutige „Gewinner“ der Neuregelung gelten die Empfänger von Überbrückungsgeld; für die vorherigen Ich-AGs ergeben sich keine nennenswerten Einspareffekte pro geförderte Person. Somit stellt sich die Frage, ob dieser Effekt aus arbeitsmarktpolitischen Überlegungen heraus gewünscht ist.
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Progressivity and Flexibility in Developing an Effective Competition Regime: Using Experiences of Poland, Ukraine, and South Africa for developing countries
Franz Kronthaler, Johannes Stephan
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 6,
2006
Abstract
The paper discusses the role of the concept of special and differential treatment in the framework of regional trade agreements for the development of a competition regime. After a discussion of the main characteristics and possible shortfalls of those concepts, three case countries are assessed in terms of their experience with progressivity, flexibility, and technical and financial assistance: Poland was led to align its competition laws to match the model of the EU. The Ukraine opted voluntarily for the European model, this despite its intense integration mainly with Russia. South Africa, a developing country that emerged from a highly segregated social fabric and an economy dominated by large conglomerates with concentrated ownership. All three countries enacted (or comprehensively reformed) their competition laws in an attempt to face the challenges of economic integration and catch up development on the one hand and particular social problems on the other. Hence, their experience may be pivotal for a variety of different developing countries who are in negotiations to include competition issues in regional trade agreements. The results suggest that the design of such competition issues have to reflect country-particularities to achieve an efficient competition regime.
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Economies of Scope in European Railways: An Efficiency Analysis
Christian Growitsch, Heike Wetzel
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 5,
2006
Abstract
In the course of railway reforms in the end of the last century, national European governments, as well the EU Commission, decided to open markets and to separate railway networks from train operations. Vertically integrated railway companies – companies owning a network and providing transport services – argue that such a separation of infrastructure and operations would diminish the advantages of vertical integration and would therefore not be suitable to raise economic welfare. In this paper, we conduct a pan-European analysis to investigate the performance of European railways with a particular focus on economies of vertical integration. We test the hypothesis that integrated railways realise economies of joint production and, thus, produce railway services on a higher level of efficiency. To determine whether joint or separate production is more efficient we apply a Data Envelopment Analysis super-efficiency bootstrapping model which relates the efficiency for integrated production to a virtual reference set consisting of the separated production technology. Our findings are that in a majority of European Railway companies exist economies of scope.
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The Magnitude of Distortions when Measuring Bank Efficiency with Misspecified Input Prices
Michael Koetter
Competition and Profitability in European Financial Services: Strategic, Systemic and Policy Issues,
2006
Abstract
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A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Conditions of Knowledge Transfer by New Employees in Companies
Sidonia vonLedebur
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 3,
2006
Abstract
The availability of knowledge is an essential factor for an economy in global competition. Companies realise innovations by creating and implementing new knowledge. Sources of innovative ideas are partners in the production network but also new employees coming from another company or academia. Based on a model by HECKATHORN (1996) the conditions of efficient knowledge transfer in a team are analysed. Offering knowledge to a colleague can not be controlled directly by the company due to information asymmetries. Thus the management has to provide incentives which motivate the employees to act in favour of the company by providing their knowledge to the rest of the team and likewise to learn from colleagues. The game theoretic analysis aims at investigating how to arrange these incentives efficiently. Several factors are relevant, especially the individual costs of participating in the transfer. These consist mainly of the existing absorptive capacity and the working atmosphere. The model is a 2x2 game but is at least partly generalised on more players. The relevance of the adequate team size is shown: more developers may increase the total profit of an innovation
(before paying the involved people) but when additional wages are paid to each person a greater team decreases the remaining company profit. A further result is
that depending on the cost structure perfect knowledge transfer is not always best for the profit of the company. These formal results are consistent with empirical studies to the absorptive capacity and the working atmosphere.
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Measuring the Efficiency of Regional Innovation Systems – An Empirical Assessment
Michael Fritsch, Viktor Slavtchev
Freiberg Working Papers, Nr. 08-2006,
No. 8,
2006
Abstract
Wir messen die Effizienz der regionalen Innovationssysteme (RIS) in Deutschland anhand einer Wissensproduktionsfunktion. Diese Funktion stellt einen Zusammenhang zwischen der Anzahl der von den Einwohnern einer Region angemeldeten Patente und der Anzahl der FuE-Beschäftigten im Privatsektor in der Region. Zwei alternative Methoden zur empirischen Berechnung der Wissensproduktionsfunktion werden vorgestellt. In einem ersten Ansatz nehmen wir an, dass sich Unterschiede der Produktivität der FuE-Beschäftigten in der Steigung der Wissensproduktionsfunktion und somit in der Grenzproduktivität der FuE-Aktivitäten niederschlagen. Ein zweiter Ansatz bestimmte die Durchschnittsproduktivität der FuE-Beschäftigten mittels einer stochastischen Frontier-Wissensproduktionsfunktion. Wir vergleichen die Resultate beider Ansätze und diskutieren kritische Fragen hinsichtlich der Verteilungscharakteristika der technischen Effizienz von Regionen, der adäquaten Größe regionaler Innovationssysteme sowie der Präsenz und der Effekte räumlicher Interdependenzen zwischen den Regionen (räumlicher Autokorrelation).
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Non-market Allocation in Transport: A Reassessment of its Justification and the Challenge of Institutional Transition
Ulrich Blum
50 Years of Transport Research: Experiences Gained and Major Challenges Ahead,
2005
Abstract
Economic theory knows two systems of coordination: through public choice or through the market principle. If the market is chosen, then it may either be regulated, or it may be fully competitive (or be in between these two extremes). This paper first inquires into the reasons for regulation, it analyses the reasons for the important role of government in the transportation sector, especially in the procurement of infrastructure. Historical reasons are seen as important reasons for bureaucratic objections to deregulation. Fundamental economic concepts are forwarded that suggest market failure and justify a regulatory environment. The reasons for regulation cited above, however, may be challenged; we forward theoretical concepts from industrial organization theory and from institutional economics which suggest that competition is even possible on the level of infrastructure. The transition from a strongly regulated to a competitive environment poses problems that have given lieu to numerous failures in privatization and deregulation. Structural inertia plays an important role, and the incentive-compatible management of infrastructure is seen as the key element of any liberal transportation policy. It requires that the setting of rules on the meta level satisfies both local and global efficiency ends. We conclude that, in market economies, competition and regulation should not be substitutes but complements. General rules, an "ethic of competition" have to be set that guarantee a level playing field to agents; it is complimented by institutions that provide arbitration in case of misconduct.
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