Bank Credit Standards, Demand, Pro-cyclicality and the Business Cycle: A Comment
Á. Maddaloni, J. L. Peydró Alcalde, J. Suárez, Reint E. Gropp
Moneda y crédito,
No. 230,
2010
Abstract
We analyze the determinants fo standards and demand for loans to firms and house-holds over the last business cycle using the comprehensive and confidential Bank Lending Survery from the Euro area. There is significant variation of standards and demand over the cycle. Standards for business loans vary more during the business cycle than the lending standards for households, whereas credit demand from households varies more than demand from firms. Lending standards vary mainly due to charges in perception of borrower risk, bank balance sheet positions and competitive pressures. In particular, we find that higher GDP growth softens lending standards for all loans, i. e. lending standards are pro-cyclical. However, we also find pro-cyclicality in credit demand.
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Margins of international banking: Is there a productivity pecking order in banking, too?
Claudia M. Buch
Bundesbank Discussion Paper 12/2009,
2009
Abstract
Modern trade theory emphasizes firm-level productivity differentials to explain
the cross-border activities of non-financial firms. This study tests whether a
productivity pecking order also determines international banking activities. Using
a novel dataset that contains all German banks’ international activities, we
estimate the ordered probability of a presence abroad (extensive margin) and the
volume of international assets (intensive margin). Methodologically, we enrich the
conventional Heckman selection model to account for the self-selection of banks
into different modes of foreign activities using an ordered probit. Four main
findings emerge. First, similar to results for non-financial firms, a productivity
pecking order drives bank internationalization. Second, only a few non-financial
firms engage in international trade, but many banks hold international assets, and
only a few large banks engage in foreign direct investment. Third, in addition to
productivity, risk factors matter for international banking. Fourth, gravity-type
variables have an important impact on international banking activities.
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Book Review on: Ahmed Bahagat, Fostering the use of Financial Risk Management Products in Developing Countries, 2002, Economic Research Papers No. 69, Abidjan: African Development Bank
Tobias Knedlik
African Development Perspectives Yearbook: Private and Public Sectors: Towards a Balance,
2004
Abstract
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The Identification of Technology Regimes in Banking: Implications for the Market Power-Fragility Nexus
Michael Koetter, Tigran Poghosyan
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 8,
2009
Abstract
Neglecting the existence of different technologies in banking can contaminate efficiency, market power, and other performance measures. By simultaneously estimating (i) technology regimes conditional on exogenous factors, (ii) efficiency conditional on risk management, and (iii) Lerner indices of German banks, we identify three distinct technology regimes: Public & Retail, Small & Specialized, and Universal & Relationship. System estimation at the regional level reveals that greater bank market power increases bank profitability but also fosters corporate defaults. Corporate defaults, in turn, lead to higher probabilities of bank distress, which supports the market power-fragility hypothesis.
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Stages of the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis: Is there a Wandering Asset Price Bubble?
Lucjan T. Orlowski
Economics E-Journal 43. Munich Personal RePEc Archive 2008,
2009
Abstract
This study identifies five distinctive stages of the current global financial crisis: the meltdown of the subprime mortgage market; spillovers into broader credit market; the liquidity crisis epitomized by the fallout of Northern Rock, Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers with counterparty risk effects on other financial institutions; the commodity price bubble, and the ultimate demise of investment banking in the U.S. The study argues that the severity of the crisis is influenced strongly by changeable allocations of global savings coupled with excessive credit creation, which lead to over-pricing of varied types of assets. The study calls such process a “wandering asset-price bubble“. Unstable allocations elevate market, credit, and liquidity risks. Monetary policy responses aimed at stabilizing financial markets are proposed.
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Parenting Benefit – A New Risk for Companies
Nicole Nulsch, Henry Dannenberg
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 7,
2008
Abstract
Mit dem zum 1. Januar 2007 neu eingeführten Elterngeld verfolgt der Gesetzgeber unter anderem das Ziel, mehr Väter für eine Elternzeit zu begeistern. Bislang wurden die Auswirkungen des Elterngelds insbesondere aus familienpolitischer Perspektive betrachtet. Ziel dieses Beitrags ist es jedoch, die unternehmenspolitischen Folgen des Elterngelds zu untersuchen.
Die Entwicklung der Elterngeldanträge im Jahr 2007 deutet darauf hin, dass zunehmend mehr Väter von der Elternzeit Gebrauch machen. Dabei handelt es sich in mehr als der Hälfte der Fälle um berufstätige Väter. Konnten Unternehmen in der Vergangenheit das Risiko, dass eine wichtige Position im Unternehmen für einen längeren Zeitraum aufgrund der Geburt eines Kindes unbesetzt ist, verhältnismäßig einfach dadurch senken, indem ein Mann beschäftigt wurde, wird diese Strategie in Zukunft an Bedeutung verlieren. Es ist zu erwarten, dass dieses veränderte Risikoumfeld einerseits die Karrierechancen der Frauen verbessern und zu einer Verringerung der Lohnlücke zwischen den Geschlechtern beitragen kann. Es ist jedoch auch zu erwarten, dass sich die Risikosituation der Unternehmen insgesamt verschlechtert und bei gegebener Risikotragfähigkeit bisher tragbare Risiken zukünftig nicht mehr eingegangen werden können, was sich negativ auf die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung auswirken könnte.
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Do Weak Supervisory Systems Encourage Bank Risk-taking?
Claudia M. Buch, G. DeLong
Journal of Financial Stability,
2008
Abstract
Weak bank supervision could give banks the ability to shift risk from themselves to supervisors. We use cross-border bank mergers as a natural experiment to test changes in risk and the impact of supervision. We examine cross-border bank mergers and find that the supervisory structures of the partners’ countries influence changes in post-merger total risk. An acquirer from a country with strong supervision lowers total risk after a cross-border merger. However, total risk increases when the target bank is located in a country with relatively strong supervision. This result is consistent with strong host regulators limiting the risky activities of their local banks. Foreign-owned competitors could then engage in the risky projects, especially if the foreign banks’ supervisors are not strong. An acquirer entering a country with strong supervision appears to shift risk back to its home country. The results suggest that bank supervisors can reduce total banking risk in their countries by being strong.
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The Stability of Bank Efficiency Rankings when Risk Preferences and Objectives are Different
Michael Koetter
European Journal of Finance,
No. 2,
2008
Abstract
We analyze the stability of efficiency rankings of German universal banks between 1993 and 2004. First, we estimate traditional efficiency scores with stochastic cost and alternative profit frontier analysis. Then, we explicitly allow for different risk preferences and measure efficiency with a structural model based on utility maximization. Using the almost ideal demand system, we estimate input- and profit-demand functions to obtain proxies for expected return and risk. Efficiency is then measured in this risk-return space. Mean risk-return efficiency is somewhat higher than cost and considerably higher than profit efficiency (PE). More importantly, rank–order correlation between these measures are low or even negative. This suggests that best-practice institutes should not be identified on the basis of traditional efficiency measures alone. Apparently, low cost and/or PE may merely result from alternative yet efficiently chosen risk-return trade-offs.
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International Banking and the Allocation of Risk
Claudia M. Buch
IAW Discussion Paper No. 32,
2007
Abstract
Macroeconomic risks could magnify individual bank risk. Mitigating the influence of economy-wide risks on banks could therefore be very important to maintain a smooth-running banking system. In this paper, we explore the extent to which macroeconomic risks affect banks. We use a bank-level dataset on over 2,000 banks worldwide for the years 1995-2002 to study the effect of macroeconomic volatility, the openness of the banking system, and banking regulations on bank risks. Our measure of bank risk is the volatility of banks' pre-tax profits. We find that macroeconomic volatility increases banks' profit volatility and that international openness of the banking system lowers bank risk. We find no impact of banking regulation on profit volatility. Our findings suggest that if policymakers want to lower bank risk, they should seek to lower macroeconomic volatility as well as increase openness in the banking system.
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The Role of Credit Ratings in Banking Regulations. Credit Ratings Are Insufficiently Anticipating the Risk for Currency Crises.
Tobias Knedlik, Johannes Ströbel
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 10,
2007
Abstract
Bonitätsbewertungen durch Rating-Agenturen gewinnen durch die unter dem Stichwort Basel II diskutierten Reformvorschläge zur Bankenregulierung an Bedeutung. Insbesondere hängt das durch die Regulierung geforderte Mindesteigenkapital unter dem standardisierten Ansatz von Basel II von der Bewertung der Kreditrisiken durch externe Rating-Agenturen ab. Bonitätsbewertungen, speziell von souveränen Schuldnern, bestimmen damit wesentlich die Höhe des Mindesteigenkapitals von Banken. In der Vergangenheit haben Rating-Agenturen Währungskrisenrisiken systematisch unterschätzt. Diese sind jedoch für die Bewertung des Kreditausfallrisikos souveräner Schuldner wichtig. Die prozyklischen Effekte von Basel II entstehen vor allem dadurch, daß im Fall von Währungskrisen aufgrund der zu positiven Bewertung im Vorfeld der Krise schlagartig massive Herabstufungen notwendig werden. Diese Effekte können nur minimiert werden, wenn die währungskriseninduzierten Kreditausfallrisiken angemessen berücksichtigt werden. Die Kritik an der Methode der Rating-Agenturen, insbesondere an mangelnder Berücksichtigung neuerer Währungskrisenmodelle infolge der Asienkrisen von 1997/98, führte zu Reaktionen der Agenturen. So sagte z. B. Standard and Poor’s die Berücksichtigung mikroökonomischer Indikatoren zu, die bei aktuellen Krisen als Krisenfaktoren erkannt wurden. In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird anhand eines Beispiels untersucht, inwiefern sich empirische Anzeichen dafür erkennen lassen, daß mikroökonomische Indikatoren in der Praxis der Bonitätsprüfung beachtet werden. Das Ergebnis der empirischen Untersuchungen zeigt, daß traditionelle makroökonomische Indikatoren die Rating-Ergebnisse dominieren. In aktuellen Ratings können keine Anzeichen für eine stärkere Berücksichtigung von Mikro-Indikatoren gefunden werden. Es muß daher geschlußfolgert werden, daß, wie in der Wirtschaft im Wandel 8/2007 ausgeführt, auch weiterhin prozyklische, krisenverstärkende Effekte von Basel II ausgehen. Die Rating-Agenturen erfüllen bislang die Rolle als frühzeitige Antizipatoren für Währungskrisenrisiken unzureichend.
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